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ABSTRACT 
 Between 350 and 330 BCE, Athenians, facing growing anxieties about attacks on the 
citizen body, passed a series of laws that penalized foreigners who usurped the rights of 
citizenship. Furthermore, Athenian citizens were required to reaffirm their identities before their 
communities and the court system. This legislation sparked numerous lawsuits which have 
survived in the speeches of the Attic orators. These orations give modern scholars critical 
insights into the complicated process through which Athenian citizens proved their identities in 
court.  
 In Classical Athens, citizens did not rely on public records to confirm their status. 
Instead, they were required to complete specific performances as members of key identifying 
groups. These groups included Athenians’ families and their deme and phratry, the two 
institutions that controlled Athenian citizenship. If citizens’ identities were ever questioned in 
court, they could call on the members of these organizations as witnesses to the performative acts 
that defined their civic identity. These performances could be political in nature; for example, 
citizens could point to the fact that they had held political office as evidence of their status. 
Athenians could also complete religious performances to establish themselves within their 
communities; litigants in court often called on their relatives as witnesses to testify that they had 
completed sacrifices together as a family.  
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 Furthermore, Athenians considered mundane activities, or the performances of everyday 
life, as equally important proofs of identity. These quotidian actions also ranged in nature. 
Athenians could point to minute daily actions, like socializing with friends or attending school, 
as evidence of their citizenship. They could also carry out performances within formal 
institutions that fell outside of typical political activities. For example, Athenians often presented 
their participation in lawsuits or in arbitrations as proofs of status. This dissertation offers 
detailed analyses of legal decisions that highlight these everyday performative acts and make 
clear that mundane activities were as crucial to the establishment of civic identity as the 
participation within political and religious institutions on which modern scholars have most often 
concentrated. In examining Athenian forensic speeches in this way, this dissertation redefines 
Athenian citizenship as a complex identification process in which all Athenians—men, women, 
slaves, foreigners, citizens, and non-citizens—could take part, either as actors or as audience. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
Thesis statement  
(77) Γεγόνασι διαψηφίσεις ἐν τοῖς δήµοις, καὶ ἕκαστος ὑµῶν ψῆφον δέδωκε περὶ  
τοῦ σώµατος, ὅστις Ἀθηναῖος ὄντως ἐστὶ καὶ ὅστις µή. Καὶ ἔγωγε, ἐπειδὰν προσστῶ  
πρὸς τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἀκροάσωµαι τῶν ἀγωνιζοµένων, ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ παρ’ ὑµῖν 
 ἰσχύει. (78) Ἐπειδὰν γὰρ εἴπῃ ὁ κατήγορος· ἄνδρες δικασταί, τουτουὶ κατεψηφίσαντο  
οἱ δηµόται ὀµόσαντες, οὐδενὸς  ἀνθρώπων οὔτε κατηγορήσαντος οὔτε  
καταµαρτυρήσαντος, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ  συνειδότες,  εὐθὺς οἶµαι θορυβεῖτε ὑµεῖς ὡς 
οὐ µετὸν τῷ κρινοµένῳ τῆς πόλεως· 
(77) There have been scrutinies among the demes, and each of you has submitted to a vote 
concerning himself, [to determine] who is really an Athenian and who is not. And I, 
whenever I’m in the law court and I hear those contending, I see that the same argument 
always holds strength among you. (78) For whenever the prosecutor says: “Gentlemen of 
the jury, the demesmen having sworn an oath have voted against this man, although no one 
accused him or gave testimony against him, but because they themselves knew [him]!” 
Straightaway, I think, you all shout on the grounds that the man who is being judged has 
no claim to citizenship. 
 In his speech Against Timarchus, Aeschines detailed the legal proceedings that sprang 
from the decree of Demophilus passed in 346 BCE that ordered all demes to conduct a general 
scrutiny of their members.  The Athenian demes were one of the key identifying groups that 1
controlled citizenship. When their sons reached the age of eighteen, Athenian citizens introduced 
them to their demesmen at a special deme assembly during which each father swore that his son 
was his legitimate offspring by his lawfully wedded citizen-wife. The demesmen voted on 
whether to admit each new member. If the candidate were admitted into the deme, his name was 
 For an interesting discussion of this decree and deme scrutinies in Athens, see Diller 1932 and Diller 1
1935; see also Gomme 1937; Cooper 2003, 66; Whitehead 1986, 104-109. 
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written in the deme rolls kept by the demarch. If he were denied admission, the candidate could 
appeal the vote to the Athenian courts. If he failed in his appeal, he could then be sold into 
slavery, his property confiscated, and the civic statuses of all his family members called into 
doubt.  A general scrutiny of the demes, such as the one called by Demophilus, thus represented 2
a huge and stressful undertaking for all Athenian citizens. As Aeschines, and other Attic orators 
like Isaeus and Demosthenes, attested in their court speeches, the decree of Demophilus required 
every deme to hold a special assembly, where the demesmen voted to reaffirm the civic identities 
of all their members. As a result of these scrutinies, thousands of Athenians were disenfranchised 
and appealed their demesmen’s decisions in court.    3
 Aeschines’ description offers critical insights into the Athenians’ response to the deme 
scrutinies. First, Aeschines appealed to his audience of jurors by characterizing the deme 
scrutinies and the court appeals that arose from them as shared experiences for all Athenian 
citizens. His language suggests that many disenfranchised Athenians appealed the decisions of 
their demes. Aeschines stressed that while he sat in court, he repeatedly heard the same 
arguments from prosecutors, and he expected his audience to be familiar with these proceedings. 
Second, Aeschines described the kind of arguments that moved Athenian jurors. Aeschines 
asserted that prosecutors relied more on the personal knowledge of demesmen than on witness 
testimony to discredit their opponents and call their civic status into question. In Aeschines’ 
 For an informative discussion of deme assemblies and expulsions from the deme, see Whitehead 1986, 2
86-109. 
 For a full consideration of the passages from the Attic orators which describe the scope of the scrutinies, 3
see Gomme 1932, 194-196. 
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speech, we can begin to understand that the Athenians valued interpersonal relationships, 
especially among their demesmen, as critical proofs of civic identity. 
 Of the numerous appeals to the law courts described by Aeschines, only two have 
survived: Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides and Isaeus’ On behalf of Euphiletus.  In both 4
speeches, the litigants touched on the same key tropes that explain for modern readers the 
Athenians’ motives in passing the decree of Demophilus and the methods they used to establish 
their identities in court. First, both speakers alluded to Athenian anxieties that foreigners might 
infiltrate into the ranks of citizens through the demes. In Against Eubulides, the speaker 
Euxitheus suggested that metics (or resident aliens) regularly bribed deme officials to register 
them illegally into the deme rolls (Dem. 57.49; Dem. 57.59). In Isaeus’ appeal, the speaker, the 
half-brother of Euphiletus who acted as his advocate, suggested that childless Athenians were 
sometimes driven to claim foreigners as their own children to ensure that they would be cared for 
in their old age (Isaeus. 12.2). Both speakers clearly displayed the prejudice against foreigners 
particularly prominent between 350 and 330 BCE when the Athenians passed legislation to 
punish any pretender to citizenship.  This legislation included the decree of Demophilus and the 5
rearticulation of the laws governing foreigners which prompted the famous lawsuit against 
Neaira.  6
 The dates of both these speeches have come under question, but the general consensus among scholars 4
dates them both close to 346 BCE. For a discussion of the dating of Against Eubulides, see Diller 1935, 
303-304. For a discussion of the dating of On behalf of Euphiletus, see Wyse 1904, 715-716.  
 For further discussion of the widespread xenophobia in Athens during this period, see Cooper 2003 and 5
Lape 2010. Cooper in particular gives a good account of the scholarship on this topic. 
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 More critical to the arguments presented in this study are the insights that both these 
speeches offer about the methods by which Athenians established their civic identities in court. 
Both Euxitheus and Euphiletus’ half-brother relied on their interpersonal relationships with their 
relatives, their demesmen, and the members of other key identifying groups to confirm their 
citizenship status and that of their family members. In his defense, Euxitheus stressed that 
numerous relatives and the members of his genos, phratry, and deme were all well-acquainted 
with him and his parents and were all willing to testify on his behalf. These people then acted as 
witnesses in court to attest to a wide range of performances that citizens needed to carry out on 
several different “stages”—both in the political and religious realms but also in their daily 
activities that fell outside of public institutions. To Euxitheus, his introduction into his deme 
represented the culmination of a series of performative acts he had carried out in all these 
identifying groups. Futhermore, in his own speech, Euphiletus’ brother stressed that the formal 
performances that his father and mother carried out on their sons’ behalf—for example, 
introducing them to their phratrymen—represented a larger set of performances that the family 
completed in their daily lives, caring for one another and managing their household. 
 Although modern scholars have often focused on the deme as the central institution that 
controlled citizenship, I argue that the speeches of Demosthenes and Isaeus demonstrate that 
Athenians had to establish their civic identities in a series of key identifying groups, most 
critically their relatives and the members of their genos and orgeones, phratry, and deme. 
Athenians’ relationships within this network of people determined their status. All of these 
groups were equally important in confirming citizenship, and if even one group were to question 
a member, this would constitute a serious attack on that citizen. Furthermore, Athenian citizens 
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needed to carry out specific sets of performances within these key identifying groups to 
safeguard their status. Although modern scholars have focused specifically on political and 
religious performances, such as the holding of political office and membership in local cults, I 
argue that everyday activities, like the management of property and the household and the care 
for elderly parents, also constituted powerful performative acts. I would further assert that 
scholars have overlooked the fact that formal performances of identity carried out in public 
institutions meant nothing if not backed up by the reality of everyday life and daily activities. 
 In this introductory chapter, I describe the key identifying groups in Athenian society and 
discuss the work of modern scholars who have studied them. In my view, modern scholars have 
created artificial divides between these groups largely because they carry out narrow studies that 
focus on one group only and do not consider the many connections between them. Then I 
examine the performances that Athenians completed as citizens within these organizations and in 
the context of their larger communities. Again, scholars of Classical Studies have limited their 
analysis of these performances to those actions carried out within political and religious 
institutions. Furthermore, by concentrating too much on the legal requirements of citizenship 
within the context of formal political and religious institutions, scholars have overlooked the 
informal performances that were also critical in establishing Athenian civic identity. I argue that 
Athenian legal speeches give us a richer understanding of the informal performative acts that 
Athenians completed in everyday situations if we analyze them through the lens of performance 
studies. Finally, I give a summary of the dissertation’s chapters, all of which are linked by my 
focus on the quotidian performances repeatedly described and emphasized in a variety of legal 
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cases that provide tremendous insight into how Athenians defined citizenship and into their 
persistent anxieties about identity.  
Identifying groups 
 Although the demes formed important population centers in Attica in the seventh and 
sixth centuries BCE, they did not acquire their political and administrative importance until the 
reforms of the Cleisthenes in 508 BCE. At this time, Cleisthenes reorganized the democracy, 
splitting Attica into three sectors—urban, inland, and coastal—and dividing the 139 demes into 
thirty trittyes (“thirds”), ten urban trittyes, ten inland trittyes, and ten coastal trittyes. Each of the 
ten tribes created by Cleisthenes were made up of three trittyes, one from each zone.  7
Furthermore, Cleisthenes shaped the demes into smaller poleis so to speak, administrative units 
that held their own assemblies and that were controlled by a demarch who acted as intermediary 
between the deme and the polis. Membership in the deme became the key legal requirement for 
Athenian citizenship, and so Athenians became known not by their patronymics but by their 
demotics.  
 Pseudo-Aristotle’s precise description of the criteria for citizenship and his focus on the 
deme as its sole controlling institution in the Constitution of the Athenians has had a profound 
effect on modern works on citizenship in Classical Studies:  8
µετέχουσιν µὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀµφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν, ἐγγράφονται δ’ εἰς τοὺς  
 For a good introduction to the demes, see Whitehead 1986, 3-16. 7
 See in particular Finley 1981, Manville 1990; Todd 1993; Hansen 1991; Hansen 1998; Hansen 2000; 8
Hansen 2006; Rhodes 2009. Although the French school of scholarship on Athenian citizenship follows a 
different theoretical framework, these scholars too focus on the performances of male citizens within po-
litical institutions like the deme. See Loraux 1981; Vernant 1985; Vidal-Naquet 1986; Detienne 1989; 
Goldhill 1994; Zeitlin 1996; Graeber 2001; Vernant 2006. 
 '6
δηµότας ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες. ὅταν δ’ ἐγγράφωνται, διαψηφίζονται περὶ αὐτῶν  
ὀµόσαντες οἱ δηµόται, πρῶτον µὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι γεγονέναι τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόµου,  
κἂν µὴ  δόξωσι, ἀπέρχονται  πάλιν εἰς παῖδας, δεύτερον δ’ εἰ ἐλεύθερός ἐστι καὶ γέγονε 
κατὰ τοὺς νόµους.  
They have a right to citizenship who have been born from citizens on both sides, and when 
they turn eighteen years of age they are registered among their demesmen. And when they 
are registered, the demesmen having sworn an oath vote concerning them, first if they are 
seem to have received the lawful age, and if they do not seem [to have reached the lawful 
age], they return them to [the status of] boys, and second whether [the boy] is free and is 
of legitimate birth ([Arist]. Ath.Pol.42.1). 
Technically, the author has said nothing incorrect in this passage. Citizens were required to 
introduce their children to their demesmen, and their demesmen were responsible for sorting 
lawful citizens from those seeking to usurp the rights of citizens. If an Athenian were expelled 
from his deme, it could prove catastrophic to both him and his entire family. In the conclusion of 
Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides, the speaker Euxitheus threatened to kill himself if he were to 
lose the case, so that both he and his aged mother could be buried together in their family 
cemetery (Dem. 57.70). The focus on demes by modern scholars then is completely 
understandable.   
 The works of the Attic orators, however, especially those of Demosthenes and Isaeus 
where speakers were forced to prove their identities in cases centered on both civic status and 
adoption, paint a far more complicated picture. In no surviving forensic speech does any 
Athenian litigant rely solely on his membership within the deme to establish citizenship.  9
Athenians operated within a network of key identifying groups, and they were compelled to 
prove their identities to each of these groups in turn to safeguard their civic status and that of 
their families. 
 In fact, in the fragmentary speech On behalf of Euphiletus, in which the conclusion is recorded, the 9
speaker emphasized his brother’s membership in the phratry, not the deme (Isaeus. 12.3). 
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 More important than the testimony of demesmen in confirming civic identity was the 
evidence given by relatives.  In both their speeches, Euxitheus and Euphiletus’ brother 10
emphasized that, far more than their demesmen, their relatives respected their rights as citizens 
and were willing to testify on their behalf in court. In fact, Euxitheus spent the largest portion of 
his speech painstakingly introducing the relatives both from his father’s and his mother’s sides of 
the family, explaining their connections to him, and offering their testimony. Furthermore, 
speakers in court did not call their relatives to bear witness to their political or religious 
performances as citizens. More frequently, they emphasized their shared management of family 
property and their involvement in lawsuits together as proofs of identity, proofs that fell outside 
of the spectrum of performative acts on which modern scholars generally focus. Accordingly, I 
consider relatives as one of the key identifying groups on which Athenians relied if their 
identities were called into question, and their witness statements served a special purpose in 
court to establish the daily activities of litigants.  
 Just as important to Athenian identification were the phratries. Phratries were groups with 
hereditary membership that were active in numerous city-states, including Sparta and Argos.  11
Ionian Greeks, including Athenians, considered phratries an important Ionian institution, and all  
Ionians celebrated the Apatouria, the annual phratry festival at which new members were 
introduced. In Athens, before the Cleisthenic reforms, the phratries were the central group that 
controlled descent and citizenship. They were also a critical social institution; under the statutes 
 In her influential article, Scafuro discussed the role of relatives as witnesses in lawsuits. See Scafuro 10
1994, 166-168. See also Osborne 1985, 138-151. 
 See Lambert 1993, 245-279. See also Guarducci 1937; Roussel 1976; Jones 1987, 195-214; Hedrick 11
1990; Parker 1996, 104ff; Rhodes and Osborne 2007. 
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of Draco’s homicide law (originally dated to ca. 620 BCE and later revised in the late fifth 
century BCE), phratry members were required to support the family of the victim. If the victim 
had no family, the phratrymen were then obliged to pursue prosecution.  After the Cleisthenic 12
reforms, the phratries were still critical in establishing descent, and they had similar 
administrative structures as the demes. The phratries were overseen by a phratrarch, and like the 
demes, they collected revenue and managed property.  
 In support of the theory that phratries mainly controlled descent, phratry members served 
as witnesses in inheritance cases, in which litigants often had to establish their ties to the estate 
owner, and in cases brought on the charge of ξενία (being a foreigner pretending to be a 
citizen).  Phratry membership was not a legal requirement of citizenship, but we have no 13
evidence either from epigraphic sources or from the speeches of the Attic orators that any 
Athenian citizen ever lived who was not a member of a phratry.  Along similar lines, no 14
American is obligated to have a birth certificate issued, but that citizen would have a particularly 
difficult time obtaining a passport or even enrolling in school.  It would be impossible to be a 15
functional member of society. 
 For an interesting discussion of Draco’s homicide law as evidence for relationships within the phratry, 12
see Lambert 1993, 248-249. 
 See Lambert 1993, 35-36.13
 At the risk of undermining my own argument, there was one exception to the rule that all citizens were 14
members of phratries. Foreigners who had been granted citizenship as a group by special decree, like 
Plataeans in 427 BCE and the Samians in 405/4 and 403/2 BCE, were not members of phratries. See 
Lambert 1993, 49-57. See also Lysias’ speech Against Pancleon, where the defendant Pancleon is a 
Plataean. 
 See the case of Alecia Pennington, a woman from Texas, who was born at home, homeschooled, and 15
never taken to the dentist or doctor. Her many attempts to acquire a birth certificate failed, and eventually 
her state senator was forced to intercede on her behalf. There is an excellent RadioLab on her story: 
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/invisible-girl. 
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 More complicated are the roles of the genos (plural gene; the members are known as 
gennetai) and the orgeones in Athenian identification. The gene were groups of citizen families 
or even of individual citizens who most likely considered themselves related through a common 
male ancestor and who shared a collective patronymic. Although not every Athenian was a part 
of a genos, membership in one still served as important evidence of citizenship in court.  At 16
least some gene were subgroups of phratries, and in Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides, Euxitheus 
implied that the new members were admitted into the genos in the same ceremony as the phratry 
(Dem. 57.23). The nature of the gene and the performances that the gennetai carried out together 
have been contested in modern scholarship. Epigraphic evidence suggests that membership in a 
genos guaranteed its members certain priesthoods. Passages from the Attic orators, particularly 
from Apollodorus’ description of Phrastor’s genos in Against Neaira, suggest that certain gene 
were more concerned with the management of shared assets, for example (Dem. 59.59-60). We 
can clearly link the gene with other identifying groups, however, in its administrative 
organization. Like the phratry and the deme, the members of the genos held an annual meeting at 
which members introduced their sons to the group and swore that they were their offspring by a 
lawful citizen-wife. Moreover, if the genos refused any member, that man had the right to appeal 
their decision to the law courts, which suggests that rejection by the gennetai constituted a major 
threat to civic identity. Indeed, in Demosthenes’ Against Neaira, Apollodorus treated the 
rejection of Phrastor’s son by the members of his genos as proof positive that the child was 
illegitimate (Dem. 59.59). 
 See Roussel 1976, 17-88. The seminal work on the gene still remains Bourriot 1976. See also Ferguson 16
1944; Meritt 1940; Andrewes 1961a; MacKendrick 1969; Davies 1981; Rhodes 1993; Parker 1996, 
284-327. 
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 Membership in the orgeones was not a requirement of Athenian citizenship, but litigants 
could call on the members of their orgeones to testify to their citizenship in court. In Attica,  
orgeones fell into two distinct categories: the first type of orgeones were groups composed of 
citizens devoted to the worship of a single hero or even a heroine, and their administration was 
overseen by a single officer, the “host” (ὁ ἑστιάτωρ). The second type seems to have been made 
up entirely of non-citizens with the organization overseen by a company of officers.  In this 17
study, we are concerned with the first type. In the works of the Attic orators, speakers treated 
their membership in the orgeones along similar lines as membership in the genos. Like the 
genos, the orgeones held an annual meeting at which they admitted new members, often at the 
same time as the phratry. If the new member were rejected, this would constitute a serious attack 
on his identity as a citizen.  
 In this study of these key identifying groups, I disagree with the majority of modern 
scholars who in my view have created artificial divides between these organizations by 
conducting studies that narrowly focus on one group to the exclusion of the others, such as 
Whitehead’s work on the Attic demes, Lambert’s on the phratry, Bourriot’s on the genos, and 
Ferguson’s on the orgeones.  This tendency is understandable given that these organizations 18
operated separately from one another. Each of these subgroups had their own administration, 
managed their own shared property, and often celebrated different cults. The works of the Attic 
 Ferguson is responsible for the breakdown of the orgeones into types; see Ferguson 1944, 73-121. See 17
also Ferguson 1949; Andrewes 1961a; Kearns 1989; Jones 1999, 249-267; Arnaoutoglou 2003. 
 See Whitehead 1986; Lambert 1993; Bourriot 1976; Ferguson 1944 and Ferguson 1949. There have 18
been works which have discussed these key identifying groups all together, but these authors, especially  
Ismard, tend to discuss the groups separately and neglect the connections between them and the ways in 
which Athenians would operate within these groups; see Jones 1999 and Ismard 2010.  
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orators also make clear that demesmen were not all members of the same phratry, and sometimes 
in court the testimony of phratrymen and gennetai could differ from that of demesmen. What is 
compelling, however, is the fact that in no surviving speech did any Athenian litigant ever 
discuss these organizations singularly. Even if that speaker were not a member of a genos or 
orgeones, he would need to be part of a phratry and deme to be a citizen. Arguments in the legal 
cases I examine in this study strongly indicate that these groups were all part of an intricate 
network of organizations in which citizens had to operate and that they should not be considered 
in isolation.  
 My second focus in this study centers on the crucial interpersonal relationships that 
Athenians maintained within these associations. In recent studies, scholars have reacted against 
the hypothesis that Athens constituted the quintessential “face-to-face” society. Edward Cohen, 
the most prominent example, skewers the idea that “the entire population knew one another 
intimately and interacted closely on a societywide basis.”  I do not entirely disagree with Cohen 19
and the scholars who follow him; indeed, the Athenians controlled one of the largest territories 
among the Greek city-states, and thousands of people were spread across Attica.  It would be 20
impossible for a single citizen to know all of his neighbors. Citizens who were members of the 
larger demes, like the deme of Acharnae, would also have a difficult time acquainting themselves 
with all of their demesmen.  Scholars who pursue this track, however, overlook the numerous 21
passages in Attic oratory in which litigants stressed the intimate relationships they cultivated 
 Cohen 2002, 104. 19
 See especially Vlassopoulos 2007; Vlassopoulos 2009; Osborne 2011. 20
 On the deme at Acharnae, see Kellogg 2013. 21
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with their key identifying groups. It was not necessary that a citizen know every single member 
of his phratry or deme to ensure his civic identity, but he did need to cultivate a circle of people 
who would support him. As I will contend in my next section, I also argue that these 
interpersonal relationships and friendships themselves constituted performances of identity that 
fell outside political and religious institutions.  
Performances of civic identity 
 Athenians had to complete a range of performances both within their families and as 
members of these identifying groups to affirm their identities. Citizens did not necessarily have 
to complete every single performance possible, just as they did not need to be members of a 
genos or orgeones. If a man’s identity were called into question in court, however, it would 
benefit him to produce as many witnesses as possible to as many of those performative acts as 
possible to clear his name. Modern scholars have often focused on Athenians’ political 
performances, taking their cue from authors like Aristotle and the author of the Constitution of 
the Athenians who depicted citizenship as a wholly political institution.  More recently, 22
researchers like Josine Blok have considered the religious performances that also defined civic 
identity, particularly that of Athenian women.  In my analyses of key speeches of the Attic 23
orators through the prism of performance studies, I argue that Athenians also considered daily 
activities that fell beyond the political and religious as equally critical proofs of civic status. 
Viewed in this way, the arguments in cases involving challenges to adoptions, inheritances, or 
 Again, see Finley 1981, Manville 1990; Todd 1993; Hansen 1991; Hansen 1998; Hansen 2000; Hansen 22
2006; Rhodes 2009.
 See Blok 2017. See also Patterson 1986; Sourvinou-Inwood 1990; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995.  23
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citizenship reflect the kinds of everyday performances that litigants described in detail, knowing 
that they would resonate with Athenian juries.  
 My approach carries with it some key advantages. First, although we can gain a much 
better understanding of Athenian identification through speeches like Demosthenes’ Against 
Eubulides, the litigants were not representative of the Athenian citizen population. Euxitheus, 
despite his claims that he and his family lived in poverty (Dem. 57.36), would need substantial 
resources to be elected to prestigious offices like the phratarchy and the demarchy and to support 
priesthoods (not to mention his ability to pay the speechwriter Demosthenes to write his 
defense). Only the richest Athenian citizens could complete these kind of performative acts. If 
we consider, however, everyday activities—the nurturing of children and the caring for the 
elderly, the management of property, relationships with family, and friendships with phratrymen 
and demesmen—as powerful performances of identity, we can begin to discern how Athenian 
citizens could establish themselves within their communities, regardless of their income.  
 Furthermore, in my focus on the mundane, I can also consider female citizens and the 
performances by which they affirmed their own identities. It is clear from the speeches of the  
Attic orators and other historical texts like the Constitution of the Athenians that the Athenians 
considered women citizens. Yet scholars, by focusing on the political aspects of civic identity, 
leave the precise nature of women’s citizenship unexplored because women could not participate 
in key institutions like the assembly and the law courts.  In recent years, researchers have begun 24
to explore the important roles that women played in the religious institutions of the city.  In this 25
 See especially Hansen 1991; Rhodes 2009. 24
 For a good summary of this scholarship, see Blok 2017, 35-36. 25
 '14
study, I suggest that women’s everyday behaviors in large part defined their identities as citizens. 
The works of the Attic orators further suggest that women faced greater legal dangers if they 
engaged in aberrant behaviors. By considering the quotidian performances of identity, I can thus 
include citizens in my study that many researchers have overlooked.   
 While modern scholars have overstated their arguments that political performances alone 
defined citizenship, Athenian litigants clearly considered their roles in political institutions as 
important proofs of identity. Take, for example, Euxitheus’ defense in Demosthenes’ Against 
Eubulides.  Euxitheus referred to the political offices which he had held repeatedly throughout 26
his speech. He called on his phratrymen to attest that he had been elected to the office of 
phratrarch (Dem. 57.23). Euxitheus also criticized his opponent Eubulides for plotting to 
disenfranchise him when he and his father Thucritus had passed multiple scrutinies by the deme: 
first when Thucritus had passed his deme scrutiny at the age of eighteen; second when he himself 
passed the scrutiny; third when he passed a scrutiny when the deme rolls were lost on a previous 
occasion; and fourth when his demesmen nominated him to draw lots for a priesthood of 
Heracles (Dem. 57.62). Furthermore, Euxitheus asserted that when he had acted as demarch, he 
had earned the hatred of his enemies within his deme by demanding that they pay the rents they 
owed on sacred land (Dem. 57.63). Euxitheus even claimed that conspirators within the deme 
had stolen shields he had dedicated to the temple of Athena and that they had destroyed a decree 
his demesmen had passed in his honor and which he might have used as evidence of his 
citizenship in court (Dem. 57.64). While I do not focus on these political performances in my 
 Interestingly, Blok dismisses the importance of political performances almost entirely. See Blok 2017, 26
11. 
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chapter on the performative acts which defined civic identity, other scholars having already 
covered them extensively, I do not deny their importance in Euxitheus’ defense.  
 Likewise, Athenians seeking to prove their identities in court also emphasized their duties 
when they were elected to priesthoods or simply as members of local cults. To return once again 
to Euxitheus’ defense: throughout his speech, Euxitheus stressed his participation in the cults of 
his genos, phratry, and deme (see especially Dem. 57.67). Furthermore, in one of his most 
powerful rhetorical points, Euxitheus argued that he had been chosen by lot to become a priest of 
Heracles by his demesmen and carried out sacrifices on their behalf. His accuser Eubulides also 
joined in these sacrifices with him and raised no objections at the time (Dem. 57.47-48). 
Likewise, in adoption cases where litigants often needed to establish ties between themselves and 
their adoptive fathers, they often emphasized that they accompanied their adopted fathers to 
public sacrifices as proofs of their identities (Isaeus. 1.31; Isaeus. 8.15; Isaeus. 9.21). Again, I do 
not disagree with scholars like Josine Blok that religious performances were crucial in 
establishing Athenian civic identity, but we need to consider them as part of a range of 
performative acts that Athenians completed.  27
 We come then to those everyday performances that are the focus of this study. The first 
category of these performances involves the truly mundane activities of daily life. In court, 
Athenians often held up their interpersonal relationships with their family and within their key 
identifying groups as proofs of citizenship. Often, litigants stressed that they cared for their aging 
parents and helped them in the management of family property, and they could call on their 
demesmen as witnesses to this kind of behavior. Athenians in court also could point to the 
 For Blok’s discussion of Against Eubulides, see Blok 2017, 6-11. 27
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completion of burial rites for their loved ones as evidence of family relationships.  Friendships 28
within the phratry and deme could also serve as crucial evidence of identity. In Lysias’ Against 
Pancleon, the speaker called Pancleon’s civic identity into doubt because he had failed to form 
close bonds within his deme (Lys. 23.3). Furthermore, Athenians considered even the minutest 
actions as crucial to identity. In Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides, Euxitheus claimed that his 
opponents were able to disenfranchise him in part because his father spoke with a foreign accent 
(Dem. 57.18). Here, too, is another crucial point in my argument: Athenians’ failure to carry out 
normative performances, such as an Athenian woman leaving the family home to take up outside 
employment, could also spell disaster for them in court.  
 In the speeches of Demosthenes and Isaeus, Athenians defined women’s civic identities 
by their quotidian activities.  Litigants who were attempting to call a woman’s identity into 29
question often would accuse her or her children of aberrant behaviors. These deviant activities 
provide modern scholars with negative examples of the positive performances that Athenian 
women needed to complete to affirm their identities. For example, in Demosthenes’ Against 
Eubulides, Euxitheus devoted a major portion of his speech to the defense of his mother, whom 
his opponents had accused of being a foreigner on the grounds that she worked as wet-nurse and 
sold ribbons in the central agora, behaviors associated with slaves and metics (Dem. 57.35). In 
 Blok considers the completion of burial rites as a religious performance of identity, but I believe that 28
the Athenians’ view of funeral rites was a bit more complex, especially if we consider them in the context 
of adoption cases. Athenians considered it key proof of their family identities that they completed the  
burial rites of their adopted fathers; see particularly Isaeus’ On the Estate of Ciron, where the defendant 
made a special point to pay for his portion of his grandfather Ciron’s burial to ensure his inheritance rights 
(Isaeus. 8.21-23). His attitude toward burial was quite mercenary and removed from religious  
considerations. 
 Scafuro gives an excellent explanation of women’s citizenship in Athens and the methods by which 29
they established their identities. See Scafuro 1994, 162-163. 
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the pseudo-Demosthenic Against Neaira, the speaker Apollodorus repeatedly stressed that Neaira 
had been seen publicly dining and drinking with men, behavior which he took as proof that she 
was a prostitute and not a citizen (e.g. Dem. 59.24).  In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Pyrrhus, the 30
speaker accused his opponents of claiming that Pyrrhus’s mistress was actually his citizen-wife. 
To prove that this woman was no citizen, the speaker asserted that whenever she was present at 
Pyrrhus’ house, there were scenes of disorder, revelry, and serenading (Isaeus. 3.13). Again, these 
examples demonstrate the complexity of the performances associated with Athenian civic 
identity. As we have established, Athenians, both men and women, had to carry out certain 
actions to ensure their status. Likewise, if they failed to carry out these duties or deviated from 
normal behavior, they could also endanger themselves and their families.  
 I further argue that Athenians defined their identities by a second category of 
performances that constitute a middle ground between the everyday and the directly political. In 
this range of performative acts, Athenians engaged with formal institutions, such as the law-
courts or publicly appointed arbitrators, outside of typical political performances. Perhaps most 
critically, litigants pointed to lawsuits and arbitrations in which they had taken part to establish 
their own or the civic identities of others in court. For example, in Lysias’ Against Pancleon, the 
speaker originally believed that Pancleon was a non-citizen, because Pancleon had taken part in 
several lawsuits held before the polemarch, the official who had charge over metic affairs (Lys. 
23.3). Likewise, in the speech Against Neaira, the speaker Apollodorus recounted an arbitration 
between Phrynion, Neaira’s former lover from whom she had fled, and Stephanus, her partner in 
Athens. Phrynion entered into arbitration with Stephanus on the grounds that he still owned 
 On this particular passage in Against Neaira, see Kapparis 1999, 216-221.30
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Neaira. The arbitrators decided that Neaira would split her time between the two men, a decision 
to which they could not have come had Neaira been a lawful citizen of Athens (Dem. 59.46). 
Litigants in adoption cases also pointed to arbitration as proof of their identity. In Isaeus’ On the 
Estate of Menecles, the speaker, attempting to prove that his adoption by Menecles was lawful, 
argued that his opponents had acknowledged him as Menecles’ rightful heir when they willingly 
entered into arbitration with him at an earlier date (Isaeus. 2.38). Although we cannot categorize 
involvement in these kind of legal proceedings as daily activities, the Athenians clearly 
considered such participation as an important proof of identity, proof which had nothing to do 
with holding political office or joining in the city cults.  
 The Athenians offered other civic performances as important evidence of citizenship in 
court. For example, to return to Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides once again, Euxitheus argued 
that if Eubulides wanted to prove that his mother was a metic, he should have offered proof that 
she had paid the metic tax. If she were a slave, Euxitheus claimed that Eubulides ought to have 
brought forward her owner as a witness (Dem. 59.34). Likewise, in Against Pancleon, the 
speaker offered testimony that several people had come forward to claim Pancleon as a slave as 
proof of his non-citizen status (Lys. 23.10). Furthermore, inheritance of property also served as 
proof of citizenship in court. In both the speeches Against Eubulides and On behalf of 
Euphiletus, the speakers considered that their relatives had acknowledged Euxitheus and 
Euphiletus’ right to inherit their family property as their confirmation that the two men were 
citizens (Dem. 57.19; Isaeus. 12.4). Again, the payment of the metic tax and the division of 
property do not easily fall into the category of everyday activities, but we certainly need to 
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consider them separately from the political and religious performances by which the Athenians 
also established their civic status. 
 As I have outlined above, the Athenian legal speeches I will examine make clear that 
Athenians engaged in a complex set of performances carried out with their relatives, their 
phratrymen, and their demesmen as key witnesses to affirm their civic identities. I call this range 
of performative acts completed in every realm of life the Athenian identification process. 
Furthermore, I have chosen the term “process” to reflect that citizens constantly engaged in these 
behaviors and needed to repeat them multiple times over the course of their lives. They not only 
participated in these performances to affirm their own status but that of their children and other 
relatives. We can further understand the multiple and repeated nature of these performative acts 
that are referred to again and again by the Attic orators by considering them in the theoretical 
framework developed in performance studies.  
Performance studies  
 We can gain better insight into the performances of identity in Classical Athens as 
reflected in surviving legal speeches by examining them in light of performance studies. The 
vein of scholarship within performance studies most pertinent to my own research was 
developed by Erving Goffman and scholars like Victor Turner and Richard Schechner who 
followed and expanded on his methodology. Goffman’s discussion of the performance of 
everyday life most informs my examination of identity.  Goffman moved performance theory 31
away from ritual spaces and civic institutions by considering performance more broadly in a 
 Goffman 1959; Goffman 1974. 31
 '20
variety of social settings. Essentially, Goffman developed an anthropological approach that 
established the daily routines of everyday life and even minute actions like speech, dress, and 
facial expressions as central to larger cultural processes. Goffman also constructed a spectrum 
ranging from the routines and habits (the “performances”) of everyday life to what Simon 
Goldhill referred to as “institutional events,” such as the public funeral orations and citizen 
assemblies of ancient Athens.  Goffman concluded that people played “social roles” in their 32
everyday life in accordance with a cultural script. 
 Goffman worked closely with the anthropologist Victor Turner, who began his work in 
performance studies with fieldwork on the Ndembu tribe in western Africa. Turner viewed ritual 
as a performance through which community members could negotiate cultural values and viewed 
participation in these symbolic performances as key to the formation of individual and collective 
identity.  Turner also collaborated with Richard Schechner, a prominent scholar in performance 33
studies who ushered the field into the twenty-first century. Most notably, Schechner   developed 
the concept of restored behavior.  Schechner defined restored behavior as “living behavior 34
treated as a film director treats a strip of film. These strips of behavior can be rearranged or 
reconstructed.”   35
 Restored behaviors, repeated and rearranged again and again by all members of a 
community, help shape the culture of a society and establish the specific social roles played by 
 See Goldhill 1999. 32
 See Turner 1967; Turner 1969; Turner 1974. 33
 Schechner, describes restored behaviors as “actions reified into the ‘rules of the game, ‘etiquette, or diplomatic 34
‘protocol’—or any other of the myriad, known-beforehand actions of life.” See Schechner 2002, 28. 
 See Schechner and Turner 1985, 35. 35
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particular members of that community. When an individual carries out these behaviors, he also 
reenacts the behaviors exhibited by his fellow community members, placing himself within the 
larger culture and forming his own unique identity. Schechner gave the examples of a boy from 
the Gahuku tribe from Papa New Guinea betraying no pain as his nostrils were slit during an 
initiation ceremony and of a bride blushing as she walked down the aisle, although she had lived 
with her fiancé for years. As Schechner elaborated, “the self can act in/as another; the social or 
transindividual self is a role or a set of roles.”  Taking an example from ancient Athens, consider 36
an Athenian citizen from the deme of Decelea. He had a range of everyday performances open to 
him by which he could establish his identity. He might meet with his demesmen at the 
barbershop by the street of the Herms in Athens, where they regularly gathered to socialize (Lys. 
23.3). He might walk his young children to school and speak with their teachers (Isaeus. 9.28; 
Isaeus. 12.3). He might care for his aged father and make preparations for his funeral (Isaeus. 
4.19-20; Isaeus. 8.38; Isaeus. 9.4). That citizen could not complete all of the performances 
available to him—he chose among them and rearranged those behaviors at will (as Schechner 
suggested, behavior treated as a director treats film strips) to establish himself within his 
community. Moreover, these performances of identity both defined this individual citizen and 
every citizen; they were at once individual and universal. Any Athenian juror who listened to a 
litigant in court recount these everyday activities would recognize them and realize that he too 
had completed them as a member of the larger Athenian community. 
 I also employ another approach developed by Schechner in my consideration of Athenian 
identity, elaborating on his concepts of the “is” performance and “as” performance. In 
 Schechner and Turner 1985, 36. 36
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Schechner’s theoretical framework, “is” performances are those ritualistic or institutional events 
consisting of actual performances delivered by actors to an audience.  In my own consideration 37
of the quotidian performances of identity in Classical Athens, I consider citizens (and non-
citizens, like metics) taking part in lawsuits or in arbitrations as the strongest examples of “is” 
performances. Essentially, they were actors delivering scripted speeches to a group of co-
participants at public events that formed critical Athenian institutions. Also pertinent to this study 
is the fact that the litigants who delivered the speeches that make up the main body of evidence 
in this study were also delivering what Schechner would term “is” performances. Accordingly, 
the speeches of the Attic orators are not simply texts from which to draw information about 
public institutions. Rather, these speeches constituted performances in their own right by 
speakers fulfilling specific social roles. What makes these performances even more extraordinary 
is their depiction of other critical performative acts through multiple spheres of Athenian society. 
 Schechner defined “as” performances more broadly: “Any behavior, event, action, or 
thing can be studied ‘as’ performance, can be analyzed in terms of doing, behaving, and 
showing.”  Into this category, Schechner placed the restored behaviors of everyday life—the 38
acts we perform every day, rearranging and repeating them at will. The concepts of “as” 
performances and restored behaviors allow us to expand performative identity beyond religious 
rituals and civic institutions. I consider those truly mundane performances of daily life, such as a 
woman caring for her elderly father every day with the help of her family or even a man 
speaking with a particular accent, as potent “as” performances. Most crucially, I will argue that 
 Schechner 2002, 30. 37
 Schechner 2002, 32. 38
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in Athenian culture these everyday actions proved and established identity just as much as 
enrollment in groups like the phratries and demes and participation in political and religious 
institutions.  
Summary of chapters 
 In the following chapters, I examine different types of legal cases involving the 
establishment of or challenges to civic identity. The common link between these speeches is the 
litigants’ reliance on the quotidian performances that citizens engaged in repeatedly and by 
necessity to establish their civic status and protect themselves against any attacks on their rights 
or social status. In my second chapter, through a case study of Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides, 
I consider Athenian civic identity as a broad range of performances which encapsulated the 
political, religious, and the mundane. I also question modern scholars who have argued that these 
kind of performances would have little impact on the civic identities of everyday Athenians 
because they lived in relative anonymity.  I argue rather that Athenians purposefully cultivated 39
relationships within their communities, particularly their phratries and demes, to ensure that their 
performances of identity would be witnessed by the proper people. Moreover, these interpersonal 
relationships constituted powerful performative acts in and of themselves.  
 My third chapter, in which I reconsider the Athenian institution of adoption and link it 
closely with the Athenian identification process, builds from my chapter on civic identity. In this 
chapter, I perform case studies on two speeches of Isaeus: On the Estate of Menecles and On the 
Estate of Apollodorus. In both, citizens sought to affirm their adoptions called into question by 
 See in particular Cohen 2002; Vlassopoulos 2007; Osborne 2011. 39
 '24
relatives. Although scholars have often considered adoption as a private transaction undertaken 
between two Athenian families, these cases indicate that adoption was a public institution 
controlled by the same identifying groups which governed citizenship.  Furthermore, Athenians 40
affirmed their adoptive identities through the same set of performances, including everyday 
activities, by which they established their citizenship. Accordingly, I argue that legal cases 
centering on adoption can give modern scholars critical insights into the Athenian identification 
process. 
 In my fourth chapter, in a case study of the pseudo-Demosthenic Against Neiara, I 
consider the methods by which Athenians confirmed women’s civic identities. The speeches of 
the Attic orators clearly demonstrate that Athenians considered women citizens despite the fact 
that they could not participate in the political institutions by which scholars typically define 
citizenship. Moreover, I argue that Athenians defined women’s identities through their quotidian 
activities. In the case against Neaira in particular, the speaker Apollodorus attacked the identities 
of both Neaira and her (alleged) daughter Phano by pointing to their aberrant behavior. Through 
an examination of the characters of both women, I further assert that Athenian families, both men 
and women, shared one civic identity, and litigants often attacked their opponents in court 
through their female relatives.  
 In my final body chapter, I focus on Athenian anxieties surrounding citizenship in a case 
study of Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon. Researchers have focused on Athenian anxieties 
in studies of different pieces of legislation. For example, in scholarship on Pericles’ Citizenship 
 For another refutation of adoption as private transaction, see Rubinstein 1993, 33-36. Scholars who 40
have argued for adoption as a private legal agreement include Beauchet 1969, 10-18; Bruck 1909, 54; 
Becker 1930, 301-306; Brindesi 1961, 45; Polacek 1967, 162; Todd 1993, 89.
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Law (451/0 BCE), scholars often have considered the cultural anxieties that drove Athenians to 
pass such a law.  In another vein of scholarship, writers have concentrated on Athenians’ 41
anxieties about foreigners and metics pretending to be citizens, concerns that became particularly 
prevalent between 350 and 330 BCE.  In this chapter, however, I take an altogether different 42
approach and focus on the major and minor catastrophes that could disrupt the Athenian 
identification process. I argue that Athenians felt acute anxieties about large-scale disasters, like 
the Peloponnesian War, and smaller events, like conniving women and deaths in the family, 
because they had the power to disturb the everyday activities by which they defined their civic 
identities.  
 In all these chapters, I reject the limiting nature of traditional studies of Athenian 
citizenship that have focused solely on groups of men sitting isolated in the assembly and law-
courts, with the majority of the population trapped outside of the proverbial gates. If we continue 
to consider citizenship as a strictly political institution, we discount the most colorful and 
informative stories from Athenian litigants who sought to prove their identities in court, stories in 
which women, metics, and slaves often played key roles. Accordingly, my goal in this study is to 
redefine Athenian citizenship as a dynamic set of performances that all Athenians—men and 
women, citizens and non-citizens— participated in, as actors or as audience members. 
 For a good overview of this scholarship, see Boegehold 1994, 57-59.  41
 See Cooper 2003; Lape 2010. 42
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CHAPTER II  
Citizen Status in Classical Athens 
Introduction 
 In Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides, one of two surviving speeches in which an 
Athenian citizen defended himself on a charge of ξενία, the speaker Euxitheus recounted 
his bitter feud with his fellow demesman Eubulides.  Eubulides, infuriated that 43
Euxitheus had testified against him in an earlier trial, orchestrated Euxitheus’ expulsion 
from their deme and so disenfranchised him. In his appeal to the Athenian courts, 
Euxitheus declared if the jury upheld his demesmen’s decision, he would be utterly 
destroyed— he could be sold into slavery, his lands confiscated, and his elderly mother 
left destitute.  
 Scholars have often focused on Euxitheus’ defense because of the insights it offers 
into the proofs of civic identity which the Athenians considered most critical in court.  44
For modern writers, the speech is especially valuable because the speaker provides so 
many details about the elaborate rites of passage which Euxitheus, and all Athenian 
citizens, underwent within particular political and religious institutions: most critically, 
his admission into his father’s genos, his phratry, and his deme; his election to political 
 The English translation of ξενία is a bit ungainly—put simply, it is the charge of a foreigner pretending 43
to be a citizen.  
 See especially Whitehead 1986, 88-104; Osborne 1985, 147-151; Vlassopoulos 2009, 347-363; Blok 44
2017, 5-13. 
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and religious offices; and his participation in local and city cults. In this chapter, whereas 
others have focused on civic participation as proofs of citizenship, my focus will be on 
the proofs of identity offered by both Eubulides in his prosecution and Euxitheus in his 
defense that centered on personal relationships and the daily activities of Euxitheus’ 
family.  
 With their focus on political institutions, modern scholars often gloss over 
Eubulides’ case.  Although Eubulides’ speech has not survived, Euxitheus painstakingly 45
surveyed his accusations in his own defense. For my purposes, his arguments against 
Euxitheus are extremely interesting, because they demonstrate that Athenian litigants 
considered everyday performances critical proofs of civic status. Notably, Eubulides did 
not call Euxitheus’ participation in his phratry or deme, the two central groups that 
controlled citizenship, into question. Instead, he presented two accusations against 
Euxitheus’ parents: that his father spoke with a foreign accent (Dem. 57.18) and his 
mother sold ribbons in the agora and worked as a wet-nurse (Dem. 57.31; 57.42). It was 
these everyday activities that Eubulides offered as evidence that both Euxitheus and his 
parents illegally lived as citizens.  
 Notably, Euxitheus did not dismiss Eubulides’ arguments as frivolous; in fact, he  
devoted a large portion of his defense (Dem. 57.18-46) to countering them. To prove his 
parents’ civic identities, Euxitheus not only established his involvement in key Athenian 
 See particularly Blok 2017, 8-9, where she overlooked the accusations which Eubulides brought 45
against Euxitheus’ parents. If modern scholars do consider Eubulides’ accusation, it is usually within a 
larger discussion—See especially Lape’s discussion of the case in the context of racism in Classical 
Athens: Lape 2010, 43-44. See also Osborne’s discussion of Eubulides’ accusations in a larger discussion 
of slavery in Classical Athens: Osborne 2010, 99-103. 
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political and religious institutions, but also called numerous relatives and the members of 
his genos, phratry, and deme to bear witness to the interpersonal relationships with his 
family and their daily activities. Athenian litigants thus considered participation in 
particular identifying groups and their quotidian performances as equally important 
proofs of identity.  
 In this argument, I depart from other scholars who have studied Athenian civic 
identity by focusing on the proofs of identity that fell outside political and religious 
institutions.  My goal is to adopt a holistic approach to the study of Athenian 46
identification. Whereas previous scholars have focused on adult male citizens and the 
formal institutions through which they affirmed their citizen status, I concentrate on the 
informal performances that determined identity, so that I can include those actors—
particularly women, metics, and slaves—-in my study who are generally overlooked in 
modern studies. By adopting this framework, I redefine citizenship as an institution that 
penetrated every realm of Athenian life and that impacted the lives of every Athenian, 
both citizen and non-citizen. In sum, citizens needed to complete a range of performances 
before targeted audiences, most crucially before their relatives, phratrymen, and 
demesmen. They could then call upon these close associates as witnesses to these actions 
if their statuses as citizens were ever questioned in court. I call this series of witnessed 
performative acts the Athenian identification process.  
 In this chapter, I survey first the modern scholarship that has focused almost 
exclusively on the political and religious in the study of Athenian identification. Then, I 
 For scholars whose definitions of citizenship focus particularly on political institutions, see especially 46
Manville 1990, 3-34; Hansen 1991; Rhodes 2009, 57-69. 
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give a brief definition of the complicated identification process and the methods by which 
Athenian citizens safeguarded their identities. Most crucially, I then use my study of  
Demosthenes’Against Eubulides and related cases to go beyond theory and analyze the 
actual devices and evidence that speakers employed to establish and defend citizen 
identity. I examine the key identifying groups from which speakers such as Euxitheus 
drew witnesses to testify to civic identity, and I consider the emphasis which Euxitheus 
placed on the testimony of his family members in his counter-arguments against 
Eubulides, testimony that focused almost exclusively on interpersonal relationships and 
the daily activities of Euxitheus’ parents. I then analyze the witness statements of 
Euxitheus’ phratrymen, his demesmen, and the members of his genos. Again, I consider 
the importance of Euxitheus’ personal connections within these identifying groups as 
proofs of his civic identity.  
Modern scholarship  
 Scholarship on Athenian civic identity and status verification can be divided into 
three veins. In the first, scholars have focused on the identifying groups that controlled 
access to citizenship, especially the deme and the phratry. In his seminal work on the 
Attic deme, Whitehead undertook a comprehensive analysis of the political and religious 
functions of the demes and the various offices to which Athenian citizens could be 
elected as members. For example, Whitehead painstakingly described the proceedings of 
the deme assembly and the position of demarch.  Furthermore, he recognized (albeit 47
 Whitehead 1986, 67-114. 47
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briefly) that demesmen actively socialized with one another outside of formal functions 
of the deme and could attest to one another’s identities in court based on these personal 
relationships, an observation in line with my own arguments.   48
 In his work on the phratries of Attica, Lambert adopted a similar approach in 
examining the political and religious functions which the phratry performed in Athenian 
society. Most important for this study, he convincingly argued that Athenians considered 
recognition by, and enrollment within, the phratry as a crucial step in establishing civic 
identity equal in importance to deme membership.  While both Whitehead and Lambert 49
cursorily considered the personal relationships between demesmen and phratrymen, both 
scholars concentrated mainly on formal institutions and the formal performances citizens 
carried out within them. 
 In his broader consideration of “associations” in Classical Athens, Jones moved away 
from an emphasis on the operations and functions of institutions in the political realm.  Jones’ 50
work included not only studies of the Attic phylai (tribes), demes, and phratries, but also of 
smaller social institutions whose purposes have remained murky or unknown, such as the 
gennetai and the orgeones, and of associations like clubs and philosophical schools. His work 
represented a shift in focus from Athenian institutions with a distinct political function to those 
that apparently served a purely social or even educational function.  
 Whitehead 1986, 68-69. 48
 . Lambert 1993, 14. 49
 Jones declared: “No assumptions about the presence or identity of any function of our classical Athen50 -
ian associations (whatever they turn out to be) can be built into the definition of the subject matter to be 
studied.” See Jones 1999, 25-26. 
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 In a second vein of scholarship, scholars have focused on the methods Athenians adopted 
to verify their citizenship status. In her seminal article, Scafuro contended that in the absence of 
birth and death records, citizens carried out specific acts within Athenian political and religious 
institutions before family members, demesmen, and phratrymen.  In fact, Scafuro made clear 51
that Athenians considered demesmen, phratrymen, and close relatives to be the witnesses who 
could best testify to an Athenian’s status if he were brought to court because his citizenship was 
questioned. She further argued that suits of false witnessing were “used as a remedy for the 
deficiencies and abuses of the system of status identification in fourth-century Athens.”  Like 52
Jones, Scafuro took a more holistic approach to the study of Athenian citizenship by considering 
the complicated network of identifying groups in which Athenian citizens moved and the wide 
range of performances they needed to undertake to establish themselves in their communities. 
Yet she also had the same narrow focus as Whitehead and Lambert, in that she concentrated only 
on formal institutions and performances. 
 More recently, Blok has built on Scafuro’s arguments and argued that the Athenians 
considered the religious performances they carried out as members of city and private cults the 
most important proofs of civic identity. Blok argued that modern scholars need to shift away 
from their focus on the simplified guidelines for citizenship set down by Aristotle in the Politics 
and pseudo-Aristotle in the Constitution of the Athenians, where the author claimed that 
enrollment in the deme was the essential requirement to become an Athenian citizen.  In line 53
 Scafuro 1994, 156-198. 51
 Scafuro 1994, 158. 52
 [Arist]. Ath.Pol.42.1. See Blok 2017, 13-21. 53
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with my own work, Blok contended that the proofs of identity laid down by Euxitheus in Against 
Eubulides provided the best evidence for modern academics studying status verification in 
Classical Athens.  I do not disagree with Blok that Euxitheus emphasized his enrollment in local 54
cults and his election as a priest of Heracles as key proofs of his civic identity, but they are 
hardly the only evidence of his identity that he offered in the speech. Furthermore, it seems odd 
that Blok would completely overlook the grounds on which Eubulides challenged Euxitheus’ 
citizenship—that his father spoke with a foreign accent and his mother sold ribbons in the agora, 
activities that were in no way religious.  
In a third vein of scholarship, Cohen and Vlassopoulos have painted a far different 
picture of the Athenians’ methods for status verification. Rather than envision Classical 
Athens as a community marked by strict distinctions between citizen, metic, and slave, 
these scholars instead have argued for Athens as a community whose members did not 
define themselves solely through their personal relationships within identifying groups. 
Cohen in particular has argued against the claims presented by some scholars both in and 
outside of Classical Studies that Athens constituted a “face-to-face society” in which 
social categories were strictly enforced; rather, he has suggested that Athenians lived in 
relative anonymity, even within their own demes, and that their statuses were often 
difficult to determine.  Vlassopoulos further argued that the Athenians did not strictly 55
enforce social distinctions in daily life and so every Athenian, whether a male citizen, a 
 Blok 2017, 5-13. 54
 Cohen is reacting in particular to scholars who held Athens up as a prime example of the premodern 55
face-to-face society: See Laslett 1956; Laslett 2009; Finley 1973; Finley 1983; Himmelfarb 1996; MacIn-
tyre 2014. For critiques of this kind of scholarship, see Cohen 2002, Chapters 2 and 4; Vlassopoulos 
2007, 33-52.
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female ribbon-seller, or a slave, could potentially participate in the democracy in “free 
spaces” like the Athenian agora.   56
 While these scholars have done much to open the scope of Athenian identity studies 
to include marginalized groups like women, metics, and slaves, they leave critical aspects 
of Athenian identity and the Athenian’ methods for verifying status unexplored. Cohen 
and Vlassopoulos have gone too far in their conception of Athens as a community in 
which people’s identities became “blurred” in daily life, apparently without consequences 
for ordinary Athenians like Euxitheus. While both scholars have observed the difficulties 
Athenians faced in identifying people in the absence of official records, neither has 
acknowledged that the Athenians had means by which they established their positions in 
their communities.  In particular, Cohen and Vlassopoulos have passed over Adele 57
Scafuro’s article clearly outlining the methods Athenian citizens adopted to prove their 
civic identities in legal speeches. 
 In sum, modern scholars have done much to illuminate how central Athenian 
institutions like the phratry and deme operated and what were the duties of the citizen 
members of these groups. Yet in all three veins of scholarship I have discussed, the 
writers adopt too narrow a focus to consider fully the complex nature of the Athenian 
identification process. It is clear from Athenian legal speeches like Against Eubulides that 
no single group, not even the phratry or the deme, controlled citizenship. Furthermore, 
Athenian citizens clearly needed to carry out performances that fell outside the political 
 See Vlassopoulos 2007, 39-51.56
 See Cohen 2002, 128-129; Vlassopoulos 2007, 34-35; Vlassopoulos 2009, 358-360. 57
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and religious spectrum to establish their civic status. Conversely, they could also have 
their identities questioned if they failed to adhere to certain standards of behavior. 
The Athenian identification process: a brief definition   
 As I discussed in my introduction, in the Constitution of the Athenians, pseudo-Aristotle 
laid out the key requirements of Athenian citizenship. A citizen was born from the lawful 
marriage between a male citizen and a citizen wife. When he reached the age of eighteen, his 
father would introduce him to his demesmen at a special deme assembly where the demesmen 
would vote him a member once his father had sworn that he was his legitimate freeborn son. If 
the deme rejected him, the citizen had a right to appeal to the law courts. If the jury found against 
the son, he would be sold into slavery. If he prevailed in court, the deme was obligated to admit 
him ([Arist]. Ath.Pol.42.1).  This account of the identification process for citizens is quite tidy, 58
but the reality presented in Athenian legal speeches seems to have been a bit more complicated.   
 Take, for example, Euxitheus’ review of the witnesses after they testified to his 
parents’ civic identities: 
Τὰ µὲν τοίνυν ὑπὸ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ φρατέρων καὶ δηµοτῶν καὶ γεννητῶν, ὧν  
προσήκει, µαρτυρούµεν’ ἀκηκόατε. ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ὑµῖν εἰδέναι, πότερόν ποτ’ ἀστὸς  
ἢ ξένος ἦν ᾧ ταῦθ’ ὑπῆρχεν.  
You have heard testimony from my relatives and phratrymen and demesmen and 
the members of my genos, from whom it is fitting [to hear], [and] from whom you 
 The full Greek text reads: 58
Ἔχει δ’ ἡ νῦν κατάστασις τῆς πολιτείας τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. µετέχουσιν µὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ  
ἀµφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν, ἐγγράφονται δ’ εἰς τοὺς δηµότας ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες. ὅταν δ’  
ἐγγράφωνται, διαψηφίζονται περὶ αὐτῶν ὀµόσαντες οἱ δηµόται, πρῶτον µὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι γεγονέναι τὴν  
ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόµου, κἂν µὴ δόξωσι, ἀπέρχονται πάλιν εἰς παῖδας, δεύτερον δ’ εἰ ἐλεύθερός ἐστι  
καὶ γέγονε κατὰ τοὺς νόµους. ἔπειτ’ ἂν µὲν ἀποψηφίσωνται µὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον, ὁ µὲν ἐφίησιν εἰς τὸ  
δικαστήριον, οἱ δὲ δηµόται κατηγόρους αἱροῦνται πέντε [ἄν]δρας ἐξ αὑτῶν, κἂν µὲν µὴ δόξῃ δικαίως  
ἐγγράφεσθαι, [ἄν]δρας ἐξ αὑτῶν, κἂν µὲν µὴ δόξῃ δικαίως ἐγγράφεσθαι, πωλεῖ τοῦτον ἡ πόλις· ἐὰν δὲ  
νικήσῃ, τοῖς [δ]ηµόταις ἐπάναγκες ἐγγράφειν. (Arist. Ath.pol. 42.1).
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can know whether a man is a citizen or an alien who has this support [lit. for whom 
these things stand] (Dem. 57.24).  
Here Euxitheus made clear that the testimony of the members of these central identifying 
groups taken together proved his civic status. To establish himself in his community, 
Euxitheus needed to carry out his political, religious, and everyday duties within each 
group—not simply within his deme—, and he needed to cultivate personal relationships 
with his relatives, demesmen, phratrymen, and any other association to which he 
belonged in case his identity were ever questioned in court. While I will consider each of 
these identifying groups and the performances that Euxitheus completed within them 
separately, the divides between these groups are artificial.  59
  Put simply, the Athenian identification process can be described as follows. 
Citizens needed to engage in many identifying groups over the course of their lives to 
safeguard their citizenship. They could be part of smaller organizations like the genos and 
orgeones, religious groups with hereditary membership. Citizens absolutely had to be 
enrolled in the phratry and the deme.  Furthermore, Athenians did not participate in 60
these institutions in isolation: membership in the genos guaranteed membership in the 
phratry, and phratry membership was a prerequisite of deme membership.  These key 61
 To acknowledge the artificial divide between these key identifying groups is made more difficult by the 59
fact that modern scholars tend to make one institution the focus of their studies, ie. Whitehead’s work on 
demes, Lambert’s on phratries, and Bourriot’s on the genos. More astounding is the tendency of modern 
scholars to completely overlook some of these groups in their studies; for example, Cohen mentioned 
phratries twice in the main body of The Athenian Nation (69, 110), when it is quite clear that phratry 
membership was a requirement for citizenship. 
 S.D. Lambert has previously concluded that “in practice, the phratry played the major role in control60 -
ling the major qualification for citizenship, Athenian descent.” See Lambert 1993, 49. See also Adele Sca-
furo on the subject, Scafuro 1994, 158-159. See also Nicholas Jones: Jones 1999, 195-200.
 See Osborne 1985, 72-74.61
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identifying groups were interconnected, and Athenians needed to carry out crucial 
performative acts before all of them. First, in the political sphere, citizens needed to be 
admitted to a phratry and deme and complete military service; if they met certain 
property requirements, they might also hold political offices and complete liturgies. 
Second, citizens also needed to participate in Athenian religious institutions, celebrating 
private cults and participating in the great Athenian religious festivals like the 
Panatheneia. Again, if they were wealthy, they might also hold religious office. Lastly, in 
their personal lives, citizens managed their households and estates, married wives, reared 
and educated children, arranged marriages for those children, cared for the sick, buried 
the dead, and completed their funeral rites.   Failure to form close bonds within their 62
communities or to carry out these specific behaviors could jeopardize citizens’ statuses 
before the court.  
 As I discussed in my introduction, in my consideration of the Athenian 
identification process, I have drawn particularly on the performance theory developed by 
Erving Goffman, Victor Turner, and Richard Schechner.  Goffman and his supporters 63
have developed an approach that establishes everyday activities, and even minute actions 
like speech and facial expressions, as vital to larger cultural processes. In this theoretical 
framework, I argue that even minute actions were critical to the identification process, 
 I should note that Blok considered the burial of the dead and the completion of funeral rites as a strictly 62
religious activity and linked them with adoption and inheritance rights; see Blok 2017, 127-129. In my 
own view, in cases of adoption and inheritance Athenian litigants were quite mercenary about the comple-
tion of burial rites—They completed them in part to stake their claim on an estate, and that motivation 
seems to fall outside of the religious to me. See especially Isaeus. 4.19-20; Isaeus. 8.38; Isaeus. 9.4. 
 See Goffman, 1959; Turner 1967; Turner 1974; Schechner and Turner 1985; Schechner 2002. 63
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and Athenians regularly invoked daily routines as proof of identity in court. In particular, 
I draw on Schechner’s theoretical framework to differentiate between two categories of 
performance that were crucial to establishing civic identity.  In the first category, what 64
Schechner names “as” performances, I examine the truly mundane activities by which 
Athenians affirmed their citizen status. These kind of actions range from speaking with a 
certain accent to engaging in a particular profession. This first category could also 
include the relationships that Athenians nurtured with their families, friends, and the 
members of key identifying groups. In the second category, what Schechner terms “is” 
performances, I consider actions carried out in formal cultural institutions where citizens 
performed for an actual audience. For example, litigants often pointed to their 
participation in arbitrations and lawsuits as important proofs of identity. I further argue 
that even overtly political or religious performances, such as the koureion at which a 
father introduced his son to his phratrymen, served as the Athenians’ acknowledgement of 
everyday performances, such as the birth, rearing, and education of a child, which were 
critical to civic identity. To borrow a trope from The Bard, for Athenians, all the world 
was a stage, and all the men and women were players.  
Relatives  
 In the two surviving court cases in which speakers presented defenses on a charge 
of ξενία—Euxitheus in Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides and the unnamed speaker who 
defended his brother in Isaeus’ fragmentary On Behalf of Euphiletus—both men stressed 
 See Schechner 2002, 30-32. 64
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their families’ everyday activities and their intimate relationships with one another.  As 65
the author of the Constitution of the Athenians laid out ([Arist]. Ath.Pol.42.1), descent 
from two Athenian citizens was the key requirement for citizenship, and accordingly both 
speakers needed to establish their parentage. Euxitheus was at a particular disadvantage: 
his father was dead and could not testify on his son’s behalf, and although she was alive, 
Euxitheus’ mother was also not permitted to appear in court. To compensate for their 
absence, Euxitheus explained in detail his parents’ aberrant behaviors on which Eubulides 
had focused his legal attacks, actions which were neither political nor religious in nature.  
For example, he produced witnesses to testify as to how his father Thucritus had acquired 
a foreign accent after he was taken as a prisoner of war. Euxitheus even called upon 
Cleinias, the man whom Euxitheus’ mother had nursed as an infant, to establish that she 
was an Athenian citizen despite her dubious work history. Furthermore, Euxitheus called 
on his relatives to testify to his parents’ everyday activities and to their intimate 
relationships with them. Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletus provides a useful comparison for 
Euxitheus’ defense, since Euphiletus’ parents were alive at the time of speech and took 
active part in his defense. The speaker, Euphiletus’ brother, repeatedly stressed that both 
he and his parents were willing to swear oaths to their personal connection with 
Euphiletus. Most critical to my own argument, like Euxitheus, Euphiletus’ brother also 
considered the testimony of his relatives as the best proof of his brother’s civic status. 
 As I discussed in my introduction, in 346 BCE, a decree proposed by an otherwise unknown De65 -
mophilus called for a review of all deme registers and for the expulsion of non-citizens who had been il-
legally enrolled into the demes. This set off a number of lawsuits, including those documented in Demos-
thenes 57 and Isaeus 12. See Diller 1935, 302-311. Blok also has an interesting discussion of the decree; 
see Blok 2017, 244-245. 
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 Euxitheus began the main body of his speech by addressing Eubulides’ first 
accusation against his family: that his father Thucritus spoke with a foreign accent (Dem. 
57.18). Critically, Euxitheus neither dismissed Eubulides’ accusations as insignificant, 
nor did he deny his father’s aberrant behavior. His eagerness to counter this allegation 
suggests that his Athenian audience considered even minute everyday performances like 
speech key indicators of identity.  In his defense, he detailed Thucritus’ history as a 66
soldier during the Peloponnesian War and later as a prisoner of war: 
Διαβεβλήκασι γάρ µου τὸν πατέρα, ὡς ἐξένιζεν· καὶ ὅτι µὲν ἁλοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν  
πολεµίων ὑπὸ τὸν Δεκελεικὸν πόλεµον καὶ πραθεὶς εἰς Λευκάδα, Κλεάνδρῳ  
περιτυχὼν τῷ ὑποκριτῇ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἐσώθη δεῦρο πολλοστῷ χρόνῳ,  
παραλελοίπασιν, ὥσπερ δὲ δέον ἡµᾶς δι’ ἐκείνας τὰς ἀτυχίας ἀπολέσθαι, τὸ  
ξενίζειν αὐτοῦ κατηγορήκασιν. 
For they have stated slanderously that my father spoke with a foreign accent. And 
that he was captured by the enemy during the Decelean War and taken to Leucas, 
that he fell in with Cleander the actor and was returned safely here to his kinsmen 
after a very long time, they have passed over! But as if it is right that we come to 
ruin on account of those misfortunes, they have brought his speaking with a foreign 
accent as an accusation [against me] (Dem. 57.18).  
Both prosecutor and defendant relied on Thucritus’ performances outside of the political 
and religious realms to determine his status as a citizen. While Eubulides considered the 
simple fact that he spoke with a foreign accent proof that he was a metic, Euxitheus made 
clear the importance of Thucritus’ personal history in establishing his civic identity. 
Furthermore, the first depositions which Euxitheus presented in his defense were to 
validate this account of his father’s imprisonment (Dem. 57.19). To Euxitheus, his 
father’s actions during the Peloponnesian War determined his identity as much as his 
enrollment in his phratry and deme.  
 See Vlassopoulos 2009, 358. Vlassopoulos took almost the polar opposite view to my own in his con66 -
sideration of this passage; he argued that Eubulides’ accusations against Thucritus and his wife indicated 
how difficult it was for Athenians to differentiate citizens, slaves, and metics. 
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 As the second argument in his father’s defense, Euxitheus further stressed the 
division of property and management of his family estate as proof of Thucritus’ citizen 
identity. He called the children of his uncles Charisius and Lysanias as witnesses before 
the court, since they had inherited his father Thucritus’s estate when he had disappeared 
during the Decelean War and subsequently returned it to him when he miraculously 
returned. Perhaps Euxitheus needed to address previous arguments made by Eubulides, 
since he particularly stressed that his father could not possibly have bribed all these men 
to pretend to be his relatives: 
εἰ µὲν τοίνυν εὔπορος ὢν ὁ πατὴρ χρήµατα δοὺς τούτοις ἐφαίνετο πείσας συγγενεῖς  
αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῦ φάσκειν εἶναι, λόγον εἶχεν ἂν ὑποψίαν τιν’ ἔχειν ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἀστός· 
εἰ δὲ πένης ὢν ἅµα συγγενεῖς τε παρέσχετο τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ µεταδιδόντας τῶν  
ὄντων ἐπεδείκνυε, πῶς οὐκ εὔδηλον ὅτι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ προσῆκε τούτοις; οὐ γὰρ ἂν  
δήπου, εἴ γε µηδενὶ ἦν οἰκεῖος, χρήµατ’ αὐτῷ προστιθέντες οὗτοι τοῦ γένους  
µετεδίδοσαν; 
For if my father, being a wealthy man, appeared to have given money to these men 
to persuade them to claim they were his relatives, [Eubulides] would have some 
reason to suspect that he was not a citizen; but if, being a poor man, he produced 
these men as his relatives and proved that they shared their property with him, how 
is it not clear that he was fact related to them? For surely, if he had been a relative to 
none of them, they would not have given him money and given him a share in the 
genos? (Dem. 57.25). 
Euxitheus’ argument rested on the performative acts of property distribution that 
Thucritus’ uncles Charisius and Lysanias completed to confirm he was was a legitimate 
member of their family. They gave him his fair portion of his father’s (Euxitheus’ 
grandfather’s) estate and admitted him into their genos, two powerful confirmations both 
of his identity as their nephew and as an Athenian citizen. Inheritance in Athens was often 
closely linked to citizenship; only other citizens could inherit citizens’ property, and 
speakers in Isaeus’ speeches on inheritance disputes sometimes accused their opponents 
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of impersonating citizens to gain portions of the estate. Notably, Euxitheus’ argument 
also slyly referred to Athenian greed. By admitting that Thucritus was their nephew after 
his emancipation from slavery, his uncles Charisius and Lysanias devalued their own 
shares in Thucritus’ father’s estate. Euxitheus thus argued that no Athenian would claim a 
man as his relative and thus lose money, unless that man really were his relative. The 
speaker in Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletus employed the same tactic, claiming that no 
could think him so insane as to falsely claim Euphiletus as his brother and so cut his 
inheritance in half (Isaeus. 12.4).  
 Also important to note is the structure that Euxitheus gave to his father’s defense. 
As he explained the order of the depositions to the jurors: 
καὶ πρῶτον µὲν ὡς ἑάλω καὶ ἐσώθη, µάρτυρας ὑµῖν παρέξοµαι, ἔπειθ᾽ ὅτι ἀφικόµε
νος τῆς οὐσίαςπαρὰ τῶν θείων τὸ µέρος µετέλαβεν, εἶθ᾽ ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἐν τοῖςδηµόταις  
οὔτ᾽ ἐν τοῖς φράτερσιν οὔτ᾽ ἄλλοθι οὐδαµοῦ τὸνξενίζοντ᾽ οὐδεὶς πώποτ᾽ ᾐτιάσαθ᾽
 ὡς εἴη ξένος. καί µοι λαβὲτὰς µαρτυρίας. 
And first that [Thucritus] was captured and redeemed [from slavery], I shall 
present witnesses to you, then that after he returned he received his portion of the 
estate from his uncles, then that neither among his demesmen nor among his 
phratrymen nor anywhere else did anyone ever accuse him, although he spoke 
with a foreign accent, of being a foreigner. Take the depositions for me (Dem.  
57.19).  
When he defended his father, Euxitheus placed the greatest emphasis on Thucritus’ 
personal history, on his intimate relationship with his uncles, and on his inheritance of his 
portion of the family estate. Only after he established these facts did he move on to 
discuss Thucritus’ position within the phratry and deme. In establishing his father’s 
identity, Euxitheus’ organization of his arguments suggests that he considered Thucritus’ 
activities outside of key Athenian institutions equally if not more important than his 
involvement in those identifying groups.  
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 In his defense of his mother, Euxitheus began by concentrating on the central 
accusation brought by Eubulides: that his mother worked as a ribbon-seller in the 
Athenian agora (Dem. 57.30). Euxitheus first countered this allegation by arguing that his 
mother’s work in the agora in fact proved that she was a citizen. He explained: 
καὶ εἴ σοί ἐστιν τοῦτο σηµεῖον, ὦ Εὐβουλίδη, τοῦ µὴ Ἀθηναίους εἶναι [ἡµᾶς], ἐγώ
σοι τούτου ὅλως τοὐναντίον ἐπιδείξω, ὅτι οὐκ ἔξεστιν ξένῳ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ  
ἐργάζεσθαι. καί µοι λαβὼν ἀνάγνωθι πρῶτον τὸν Σόλωνος νόµον. 
And if this seems to you to be proof, Eubulides, that we are not Athenians, I shall 
prove to you altogether the opposite of this, since it is not possible for a foreigner 
to work in the agora. Take up for me the law of Solon first and read it (Dem. 
57.31).  
By turning Eubulides’ argument on its head, Euxitheus also acknowledged that his 
mother’s work as a ribbon-seller was a powerful performance of identity, an action that 
could be manipulated to condemn or acquit her son. Apparently, in his accusations 
Eubulides had relied on Athenian prejudices against people in certain slavish occupations. 
Euxitheus cleverly countered his opponent by invoking the laws of Solon, a common 
tactic of Athenian litigants.  He tied his mother’s work history in with the history of 67
Athens and so legitimized her to the jurors. To further discredit Eubulides’ accusations 
that his mother worked as a ribbon-seller, Euxitheus contended that Eubulides had failed 
to produce witnesses who had observed her working in the agora, although he declared 
that she had been visible to everyone (Dem. 57.33-34).  With this argument, Euxitheus 68
again acknowledged that his mother’s work in the marketplace was evidence of her civic 
status, evidence which Eubulides needed to corroborate through witness testimony. 
 See Harris 2006, 290-318. Harris gives an informative overview of scholarship on the transmission of 67
Solonian laws. 
 The Greek text reads: (33) ἣν γάρ φησιν ταινιόπωλιν εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν πᾶσιν, (34) προσῆκεν δήπουθεν 68
εἰδότας αὐτὴν πολλοὺς ἥτις ἐστὶ µαρτυρεῖν, καὶ µὴ µόνον ἀκοήν…
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Euxitheus thus treated his mother’s work history as a root cause of the lawsuit against 
him and as a major component of his defense. 
 Finally, Euxitheus also addressed Eubulides’ secondary accusation against his 
mother: that she had worked as wet-nurse (Dem. 57.35). As in his father’s defense, 
Euxitheus provided a detailed personal history for his mother. During the Peloponnesian 
War when his father was away performing military service, his mother was forced to 
work as a wet-nurse to Cleinias the son of Cleidicus (Dem. 57.42). To verify his account, 
Euxitheus called Cleinias and his relatives as witnesses: 
λαβὲ δή µοι καὶ τὴν τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ τὴν τῶν συγγενῶν αὐτοῦ µαρτυρίαν·  
οἳ ἴσασιν δήπου τίς οὖσά ποθ’ ἡ ἐµὴ µήτηρ ἐτίτθευσεν αὐτόν. οὐ γὰρ 
ἃ τήµερον ἡµεῖς φαµέν, εὔορκον αὐτοῖς µαρτυρεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἃ πάντα τὸν χρόνον  
ᾔδεσαν τὴν ἡµετέραν µὲν µητέρα, τιτθὴν δὲ τούτου νοµιζοµένην. 
Take also for me the deposition of Cleinias and of his relatives: they know, I 
suppose, who my mother was who once nursed him [Cleinias]. For it is in 
accordance with their oath to bear witness not to those things which we say today, 
but to those things which they have always known about her who is generally 
believed to be my mother and the nurse of [Cleinias] (Dem. 57.44).  
 Euxitheus made clear in his introduction of Cleinias that he called the man not to witness 
any formal performances of identity which his mother had carried out. Indeed, Cleinias 
and his family were not equipped to testify to any such institutional events in which his 
mother took part. Euxitheus called them precisely because of the intimate nature of their 
relationship with his mother. Cleinias and his relatives could bear witness that his mother 
worked as a wet-nurse not because she was a non-citizen but because she was poor and 
forced by her terrible circumstances during a tumultuous period of Athenian history.  
 Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletus, despite its fragmentary nature, provides an 
interesting parallel to Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides. The defendant Euphiletus was 
expelled from the deme Erchia, although on what grounds remains unclear. The 
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commentator Wyse suggested that the prosecutors claimed Euphiletus was his mother’s 
son from a first marriage to a foreigner and that his father had falsely claimed Euphiletus 
as his child.  Whatever the circumstances of the case may have been, the speaker, 69
Euphiletus’ brother, stressed his brother’s intimate relationships with his parents and with 
a network of relatives. Since both Euphiletus’ parents were alive at the time of the speech, 
they too could take an active part in his defense. Of particular interest is the emphasis 
which the speaker placed on oaths taken by his mother concerning her son’s civic 
identity.  
 In the conclusion to his speech, the speaker claimed that Euphiletus’ mother, whom 
his opponents admitted was of citizen descent, was willing to swear an oath on the altar 
of Delphinian Apollo that Euphiletus was her legitimate son before arbitrators who had 
previously given a decision in the case (Isaeus. 12.9). Women’s oaths could provide 
strong confirmation of a citizen’s birth and identity; in Demosthenes’ Against Boeotus I, 
the speaker claimed that his father Mantias was actually forced to introduce the defendant 
Boeotus and his brother when their mother Plangon swore that she had borne Mantias 
legitimate children.  The oaths sworn by Euphiletus’ mother and Plangon were 70
themselves powerful performances to identify their children as Athenian citizens.  71
 See Wyse 1904, 714-715. 69
 See Dem. 39.4. Note the force of the phrase ὡς δὲ τοῦτ᾽ἐποίησεν, εἰσάγειν εἰς τοὺς φράτερας ἦν 70
ἀνάγκη τούτους: ἡ δὲ δεξαµένη, οὐ µόνον τοῦτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν ἕτερον πρὸς τούτῳ  
κατωµόσατ’ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι τοῦ ἐµοῦ. ὡς δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐποίησεν, εἰσάγειν εἰς τοὺς φράτερας ἦν ἀνάγκη  
τούτους καὶ λόγος οὐδεὶς ὑπελείπετο. εἰσήγαγεν, ἐποιήσατο, ἵνα τἀν µέσῳ συντέµω, ἐγγράφει τοῖς  
Ἀπατουρίοις τουτονὶ µὲν Βοιωτὸν εἰς τοὺς φράτερας, τὸν δ’ ἕτερον Πάµφιλον· Μαντίθεος δ’ 
ἐνεγεγράµµην ἐγώ. 
 See Blok 2017, 62 for a full summary of references to women’s oaths in the ancient sources and mod71 -
ern scholarship on the subject. 
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Furthermore, these women swore these oaths to confirm their sexual relationships with 
their husbands, the ultimate acts which determined their children’s identities. As 
Euphiletus’ brother exclaimed, 
ὅρκον ὀµόσαι ἐπὶ τοῦ διαιτητοῦ ἐβούλετο ἐπὶ Δελφινίῳ ἦ µὴν τουτονὶ Εὐφίλητον 
εἶναι ἐξ αὑτῆς καὶ τοῦ ἡµετέρου πατρός. Καίτοι τίνα προσῆκε µᾶλλον αὐτῆς  
ἐκείνης τοῦτ’ εἰδέναι;  
Before the arbitrator [Euphiletus’ mother] wished to swear an oath in the sanctuary 
of Delphinian Apollo that indeed this man Euphiletus was the issue of her and our 
father; and who is more suitable to know this than she herself? (Isaeus. 12.9). 
The speaker’s joke highlighted that Euphiletus’ mother had carried out the proper 
performances as a wife and mother to ensure her son’s citizen status; she had remained 
faithful to her husband, become pregnant by him, and given birth to a legitimate son. As a 
woman, she could not swear to Euphiletus’ political activities, for example, but she could 
attest to the realities of her daily life and relationships with her husband and children.  
 Furthermore, the speaker also declared that both he and his father were prepared to 
swear an oath that Euphiletus was their relative and an Athenian citizen (Isaeus. 12.9-10). 
The father and son swore that they witnessed Euphiletus’ birth as a legitimate son, and 
the speaker proclaimed that his father “could best recognize his own son after his mother” 
(Isaeus. 12.9). The speaker also stressed that he had been thirteen years old when 
Euphiletus was born (Isaeus. 12.10) and thus would have been old enough to remember 
the event clearly. Most crucially to my own argument, they were swearing to the reality 
of their relationship with Euphiletus and the performative acts, like the marriage between 
his father and mother and his birth to a lawfully married couple, which established his 
identity. 
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 Euphiletus’ brother also placed heavy emphasis on his brother’s upbringing and 
education to establish his identity before the Athenian courts. Although only the final 
sections of Isaeus’ speech have survived, the speaker seems to have employed arguments 
similar to those offered by Euxitheus, explaining that he had already offered depositions 
that his father “reared [Euphiletus] from childhood, educated him, and introduced him to 
his phratrymen” (Isaeus. 12.3). Litigants often referred to the rearing and education of a 
child as proofs of identity with the implication that an Athenian citizen would not bear 
the costs of educating an illegitimate son. Accordingly, the speaker took pains to point out 
the great expenses his father had incurred for Euphiletus’ upbringing and education 
(Isaeus. 12.3). In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Astyphilus, the speaker also established his 
intimate relationship with his half-brother Astyphilus by describing their childhood 
together, declaring that his father had reared his stepson Astyphilus in the family home, 
educated the boys together, and managed Astyphilus’ property until he came of age 
(Isaeus. 9.27-28). The speaker even provided their school teachers as witnesses that they 
had attended the same lessons (Isaeus. 9.28). The Athenians considered even the most 
mundane realities of childhood—living at home and going to school—as strong 
confirmations of family and citizen identity. 
  Although modern scholars have often focused on participation in institutions like 
the phratry and deme as the best proof of identity, the arguments put forward by Athenian 
litigants suggest otherwise. In numerous cases, Athenians stressed their relationships with 
their relatives, both their immediate families and their more distant kin, as crucial 
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markers of their status as citizens. Perhaps the speaker in On the Behalf of Euphiletus put 
it best when he demanded this of his opponents in the case: 
Ὥστε ἡδέως κἂν τῶν ἀντιδικούντων ἡµῖν τοῦ σεµνοτάτου πυθοίµην εἰ ἄλλοθέν 
ποθεν ἔχοι ἂν ἐπιδεῖξαι αὑτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἢ ἐκ τούτων ὧν καὶ ἡµεῖς Εὐφίλητον  
ἐπιδείκνυµεν. Ἐγὼ µὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶµαι ἄλλο τι ἂν αὐτὸν <εἰπεῖν> ἢ ὅτι ἡ µήτηρ  
ἀστή τέ ἐστι καὶ <γαµετὴ καὶ ἀστὸς> ὁ πατήρ, καὶ ὡς ταῦτ’ ἀληθῆ λέγει,  
παρέχοιτ’ ἂν αὑτῷ τοὺς συγγενεῖς µάρτυρας. 
Gladly I’d learn from the most respectable of our opponents, whether he could 
show that he himself was an Athenian by any other methods than the ones by which 
we’ve shown Euphiletus [to be an Athenian]. For I don’t think that he could say 
anything else but that his mother is a lawfully-wedded citizen-wife and his father is 
a citizen, and that he speaks the truth, he could offer as witnesses on his behalf his 
relatives (Isaeus. 12.7).  
To Euphiletus’ brother, the most important witnesses he could present at trial were his kin 
who could attest to the lawfulness of his parents’ marriage and the reality of the family’s 
life together. Litigants presented their relatives as witnesses before Athenian jurors so that 
they could give evidence of interpersonal relationships and daily routines, those 
seemingly innocuous performances which could prove so crucial to establishing civic 
identity. The importance of both these kind of performative identity acts and the role of 
relatives as witnesses to these kinds of actions cannot be overstated. 
Phratries   
 While Athenian litigants like Euxitheus considered relatives to be crucial witnesses 
when they defended their civic status, they also needed to establish connections within 
key identifying groups, most particularly the phratry and deme. Numerous passages from 
Athenian legal speeches indicate that Athenians were admitted first into the phratry and 
then into the deme, probably because the phratry was the older institution that had 
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controlled access to citizenship before the Cleisthenic reforms.  As Lambert suggested in 72
his work on the Attic phratries, the Athenians followed this sequence because the 
phratries carried out a particular function within their identification process. The 
activities of the phratry, particularly the ceremonies phratrymen carried out during the 
special phratry festival, the Apatouria, verified members’ parentage and controlled 
kinship networks. Citizens introduced their legitimate sons to their phratrymen in two 
ceremonies at the Apatouria, as infants or young children in the meion (τὸ µεῖον) and then 
again as adolescents during the koureion (τὸ κούρειον).  Also important to note is that 73
the phratry played a crucial role in inheritance cases which often centered on 
questionable adoptions. When childless Athenians adopted an heir, they introduced him 
to the phratry because this group allowed for “the artificial creation of a legitimate 
relationship of descent.”  Finally, citizens also introduced their wives to their 74
phratrymen in a special ceremony called the gamelia (ἡ γαµηλία), another ritual by which 
Athenians could control family connections and to which litigants could point in 
establishing their citizen identities. 
 See Isaeus. 2.1414-15; Isaeus. 7.15-17 and 7.27-28; Dem. 43.11-15; Dem. 44.41.72
 See particularly Lambert 1993, 161-178; see also Scafuro 1994, 158-159. 73
 Lambert 1993, 38. Jones argues against Lambert’s assertion that the phratry served to confirm parent74 -
age, while the deme was mainly a political organization. Jones argues that in the political structure of the 
deme/trittys/phylai, which Lambert himself acknowledges, the phylai actually had the most control and 
the deme the least control. Jones also argues that demes, too, could confirm parentage, and demesmen 
often do so in cases revolving around status and inheritance. See Jones 1999, 196-198. I take the middle 
ground between Lambert and Jones. I agree with Lambert that the phratries did serve a special role in es-
tablishing parentage, a role which becomes quite clear if we examine legal cases revolving around adop-
tion. On the other hand, I agree with Jones that Lambert overstated the role of the deme as a political in-
stitution. Numerous passages from Attic oratory make clear that Athenians had personal relationships 
with their fellow demesmen on which they relied to establish their status.
 '
 Through the institutional events of the phratry, which were themselves powerful 
performances of civic identity, Athenians acknowledged the everyday performative acts 
they carried out with their phratrymen as witnesses and the interpersonal relationships 
they developed with them. When Athenian citizens introduced their offspring to their 
phratry, they swore that their sons were borne from their lawfully wedded wives, an oath 
to which their phratrymen bore witness. By acknowledging these oaths and admitting 
these children as members of the phratry, the phratrymen gave a formal 
acknowledgement of their upbringing as Athenian citizens. Although scholars like 
Lambert argue that the phratrymen did not necessarily bear witness to these everyday 
activities, the speeches of the Attic orators demonstrate that these formal performances of 
civic identity meant very little if they were not supported by the reality of daily life.   75
  Concerns with enrollment in the phratry naturally are reflected in Athenian legal 
speeches dealing with civic identity, but consistent and open participation in the rituals 
and performances of the phratry and everyday interactions with its members were much 
more important than mere membership. Euxitheus repeatedly stressed the crucial role of 
his phratrymen as witnesses to both his father’s and his own birth and parentage. First, he 
called both his relatives and his phratrymen in quick succession to testify to his father’s 
descent from Athenian citizens in both the paternal and maternal lines (Dem. 57.22-23). 
He explained,  
Οἱ µὲν τοίνυν ζῶντες οὗτοι τῶν συγγενῶν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν καὶ πρὸς  
γυναικῶν µεµαρτυρήκασιν, ὡς ἦν ἀµφοτέρωθεν Ἀθηναῖος καὶ µετῆν τῆς 
πόλεως αὐτῷ δικαίως. κάλει δή µοι καὶ τοὺς φράτερας, ἔπειτα τοὺς γεννήτας. 
 See Lambert 1993, 202-203.75
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Those who are still living from my father’s relatives on both the paternal and 
maternal side have borne witness that he was an Athenian on both sides and justly 
held citizenship rights. And indeed call for me also my phratrymen, then the 
members of the genos (Dem. 57.23). 
Euxitheus closely tied the testimony of his relatives, the people who could best attest to 
his father’s parentage and upbringing, with the testimony of his phratrymen and the 
members of his genos. He also set his demesmen apart from these two other groups, 
calling upon them, along with his kinsmen, to testify to his election as phratrarch (Dem. 
57.23). Euxitheus’ selection of witnesses suggests that his relatives, his phratrymen, and 
the members of his genos were best equipped to testify to his kinship relationships and 
his father’s parentage. 
 Euxitheus further emphasized the role of his phratrymen in establishing his own 
descent from two Athenian citizens. Apparently, in his prosecution, Eubulides had 
accused Euxitheus of bribing men to come forward as his relatives during the trial, an 
allegation which Euxitheus vehemently denied: 
(53) ἀλλ’ οἶµαι συγγενεῖς ὄντες τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦσι, (54) βοηθοῦντες αὑτῶν ἑνί.  
καὶ ταῦτ’ οὐχὶ νῦν πεπεισµένοι ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ παιδίον ὄντα µ’ εὐθέως ἦγον εἰς  
τοὺς φράτερας, εἰς Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῴου [ἦγον], εἰς τἄλλ’ ἱερά. καίτοι οὐ δήπου  
παῖς ὢν ἐγὼ ταῦτ’ ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἀργύριον διδούς.  
(53) But I think that, because they are my relatives, they act justly by helping one 
of their own. (54) And they were not “persuaded” to do these things at this time 
[only], but when I was a child straightaway they introduced me to my 
phratrymen, they led me to [the temple] of our ancestral Apollo, and to other 
sacred places. And yet I suppose being a child I could not persuade these men to 
do these things by giving them money! (Dem. 57.53-54).   
In his defense of his relationship with his relatives, Euxitheus made clear what purpose 
enrollment into the phratry served for Athenian citizens. Not only did the phratry 
members accept Euxitheus into their ranks as a child and acknowledge him as a member 
of his family, but his relatives also recognized their personal relationship with him 
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through a series of performative acts, and they did so over the course of his entire life. 
They did this not only by introducing him into the phratry but by taking him to important 
religious sites. Enrollment into the phratry was one performance meant to acknowledge 
the intimate everyday connections between Euxitheus, his relatives, and his phratrymen, 
connections which Euxitheus argued he could not easily fabricate through bribery.  
 Finally, Euxitheus recounted how his father Thucritus acknowledged their 
relationship to one another in the oath he swore when he introduced his son to his 
phratrymen:  
ἀλλὰ µὴν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ζῶν ὀµόσας τὸν νόµιµον τοῖς φράτερσιν ὅρκον εἰσήγαγέν
 µε, ἀστὸν ἐξ ἀστῆς ἐγγυητῆς αὑτῷ γεγενηµένον εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα µεµαρτύρηται. 
But truly my father himself while he was alive having sworn the customary oath 
introduced me to his phratrymen, because he knew that I had been born to him a 
citizen from his lawfully wedded citizen-wife, and these things have been 
witnessed (Dem. 57.54).    
Again, Euxitheus stressed that when Thucritus swore the oath to his phratrymen, he  
acknowledged the reality of his daily life with his family. Thucritus could only complete 
the performative act of the oath because he knew that Euxitheus was his son and that his 
mother was his lawful citizen-wife. Most critically, his phratrymen witnessed not simply 
the oath that he swore but his relationship with Euxitheus. Formal performances of 
identity, like the enrollment into the phratry and the oath sworn by a father, represented 
the realities of Athenian life, where relatives cared for one of their own, in Euxitheus’ 
own words. 
 Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletus also demonstrates that the phratry played a special 
role in maintaining lines of descent. In concluding his speech, the speaker, Euphiletus’ 
brother, stressed that he had already presented witnesses to testify that his father had 
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“reared [Euphiletus] from childhood, educated him, and introduced him to his 
phratrymen” (Isaeus. 12.3). The speaker thus closely connected the testimony of his 
phratrymen with issues surrounding Euphiletus’ parentage and his relationship with his 
family. In fact, the speaker claimed that his relatives and his phratrymen were the best 
people to bear witness to his brother’s birth in an Athenian court (Isaeus. 12.7).  
 Several passages from Attic oratory, particularly from the speeches of Isaeus 
centering around adoptions and inheritance claims, jibe with Euxitheus’ depiction of the 
relationship between phratry membership, legitimacy, and descent.  To give a brief 76
example, in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon, the speaker defended his claim to 
Philoctemon’s estate against those put forward by the advocates of two young men who 
claimed to be Euctemon’s legitimate children (Euctemon was the father of Philoctemon), 
and whom the speaker claimed were actually the children of a prostitute named Alce. The 
speaker’s depiction of the elder son’s failed introduction to the phratry is crucial here. He 
explained that the phratrymen had rejected the young man and that at his koureion a 
phrater had pulled the sacrificial victim from the altar to mark his objection (Isaeus. 
6.22). The speaker took the phratrymen’s refusal to carry out the ceremony as proof that 
the young man in question was not Philoctemon’s legitimate son. The phratrymen’s 
dismissal also represented their intimate knowledge of Euctemon’s life—they knew 
Euctemon’s family, including his son Philoctemon, and realized that the young man was 
actually the child of Alce and another man.  
 I discuss this subject further in my chapter on Athenian adoptions, so I have limited my discussion to 76
one case. In oratory, see particularly Isaeus. 7.15; Dem. 44.41. In drama, see Ar. Birds 1667-1670. 
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 Finally, the phratries also played a crucial role in Athenian marriages, particularly 
if a citizen needed to prove the legitimacy of his union in court. A citizen married in three 
stages: first, a father betrothed his daughter to a fellow citizen, after he had sworn that she 
was his legitimate child by his Athenian citizen-wife; second, the husband and wife 
consummated their marriage and began their life together as a married couple—this stage 
was often accompanied by private celebrations; third, the husband arranged a feast, the 
gamelia, to introduce his phratrymen to his new wife. While Lambert has dismissed the 
importance of this second stage as a proof of identity in court, I suggest here that the 
phratrymen oversaw citizens’ kinship networks by bearing witness to the reality of the 
couple’s relationship when they participated in the gamelia.   77
 When Euxitheus discussed his parents’ wedding, he did not simply call his 
phratrymen who had attended the gamelia as witnesses. First, he explained the 
circumstances under which his father Thucritus married his mother. She had actually been 
married once before to a man named Protomachus:  
ὁ Πρωτόµαχος πένης ἦν· ἐπικλήρου δὲ κληρονοµήσας εὐπόρου, τὴν µητέρα  
βουληθεὶς ἐκδοῦναι πείθει λαβεῖν αὐτὴν Θούκριτον τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐµόν, ὄνθ’  
ἑαυτοῦ γνώριµον, καὶ ἐγγυᾶται ὁ πατὴρ τὴν µητέρα τὴν ἐµὴν παρὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ  
αὐτῆς Τιµοκράτους Μελιτέως, παρόντων τῶν τε θείων ἀµφοτέρων τῶν ἑαυτοῦ 
καὶ ἄλλων µαρτύρων· 
Protomachus was a poor man: And when he became entitled to inherit an estate by 
marrying a wealthy heiress, he wished to give my mother in marriage and he 
persuaded my father Thucritus, an acquaintance of his, to take her, and my father 
married my mother having received her from her brother Timocrates of Melite, 
with both his uncles present and other witnesses (Dem. 57.41).   78
 See Lambert 1993, 181-185.77
 The literal translation of the beginning of this passage would read: “Protomachus was a poor man. And 78
when he inherited a wealthy heiress…”
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Note the structure which Euxitheus gave his narrative here. First, he gave a detailed 
account of Protomachus’ arrangement with Thucritus, and only then did he focus on the 
ritual events that sealed the marriage, including the handing over of the bride by her 
closest male relative with witnesses present. Only after this, did Euxitheus call the sons of 
Protomachus to testify in tandem with the phratrymen who attended the gamelia (Dem. 
57.43). Euxitheus believed that these two groups of witnesses were best equipped to 
confirm that Thucritus took Euxitheus’ mother in marriage in good faith, as the lawfully 
wedded wife of his friend Protomachus.  
 Isaeus’ On the Estate of Ciron provides an interesting parallel to Thucritus’ 
marriage and the gamelia he threw on behalf of his new wife. The speaker, Ciron’s 
grandson by a daughter, claimed his grandfather’s estate. Ciron’s nephew then put in a 
claim on the estate, alleging that the speaker had fabricated his parentage and that Ciron 
in fact had no daughter. In defending his rights to the estate and proving his mother’s 
identity, the speaker pointed to those performative acts which Ciron and the speaker’s 
father carried out on her behalf. He explained, 
Ὅτε γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὴν ἐλάµβανε, γάµους εἱστίασε καὶ ἐκάλεσε τρεῖς αὑτοῦ  
φίλους µετὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ προσηκόντων, τοῖς τε φράτερσι γαµηλίαν εἰσήνεγκε κατὰ
τοὺς ἐκείνων νόµους.  
For when my father took [my mother] in marriage, he [my father] gave the 
wedding breakfast and invited three of his friends along with his relatives, and he 
conducted the gamelia for his phratrymen in accordance with their laws (Isaeus. 
8.18).   79
 I base my translation here on Edwards’ to differentiate between the informal wedding  79
breakfast and the formal gamelia, at which the phratrymen would officially recognize the relationship 
between bride and groom. See Edwards 2007, 139. 
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In this passage, the speaker closely linked his father’s private wedding celebration with 
his friends and relatives, which he organized to acknowledge the beginning of his sexual 
relationship and married life with his new wife, with the gamelia which he arranged for 
his phratrymen. Note too that the speaker stipulated that his father was obligated to put on 
the gamelia for his mother by the law of the phratry. This law ensured that the phratry 
could easily control the kinship networks of its members and affirm the identities of the 
women whose duty it was to give birth to another generation of phratrymen. 
 As these Athenian legal cases demonstrate, the phratry played a vital role in the 
Athenian identification process. When a citizen introduced his children to their phratry, 
he was undertaking a complicated set of performances both with his family and his 
phratrymen as players: First, by swearing the oath to his phratrymen, the citizen was 
acknowledging that he had had this child by his lawfully-wedded wife; his relatives also 
bore witness to the reality of the citizen’s intimate relationships; and by accepting this 
oath, his phratrymen formally acknowledged that they knew this citizen on an intimate 
level. As Euxitheus himself argued, these were not connections which any one man could 
easily fabricate, but relationships that he would need to build over the course of his 
lifetime and that would be witnessed by his phratrymen many times over.  
Demes 
 Many modern scholars characterize the demes as the backdrop against which 
citizens carried out political performances, and the demes, unlike the phratries, were 
closely linked with the political and military activities of the city as a whole. Athenian 
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litigants at any rate often called their demesmen to witness their carrying out the duties 
required by political offices. Euxitheus, for example, stressed that he had passed multiple 
scrutinies in his deme and held many offices within it, including that of demarch, the 
administrator who served as a liaison between the deme and the state (Dem. 57.67). In 
fact, speakers in the Athenian courts and assemblies employed the common trope of 
pointing to their services both to the deme and state as proof that they were worthy of 
being called citizens.  
 A case can certainly be made that the Athenians believed that their demes were 
more than political units within the democracy. Citizens actively socialized with their 
demesmen, and Athenian litigants considered these intimate relationships critical proofs 
of identity in court. This position is controversial, however. Scholars such as Cohen and 
Vlassopoulos, and even Lambert to a certain extent, have claimed that citizens would not 
interact with their fellow demesmen on regular basis. Cohen in particular asserts that 
Athenians would not have had formed close bonds within their demes, especially within 
the larger demes that could have as many as 1500 members.  To support this claim, he 80
has contended that demesmen did not usually live within the deme territory and were 
widely dispersed throughout Attica, that deme assemblies were seldom held, and that 
Athenians did not typically identify themselves by their demotics.  Vlassopoulos also 81
carefully follows Cohen’s arguments, when he claims that Athens was simply too 
extensive a territory, its population too large and demesmen spread too far apart, to ever 
 Demes could range in size; the smallest demes might have 50 members, while the largest, like the deme 80
at Acharnae, might have between 1000 and 1500 members. See Hansen 1991, 102. 
 See especially Cohen 2002, 112-129. 81
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constitute a face-to-face society. Instead, Vlassopoulos considers Athens a true imagined 
community, in which it proved difficult if not impossible for Athenians to establish their 
civic identities.  In this section of the chapter, I question Cohen’s and Vlassopoulos’ 82
assertions that the demes did not constitute face-to-face communities within Athenian 
society. I will demonstrate that Athenians did in fact form relationships within their 
demes, so much so that they could call their demesmen to court to attest to their everyday 
activities and their close connections with one another as proofs of identity.  
  To support their view of the demes, Cohen and Vlassopoulos focused particularly 
on Euxitheus’ speech and asserted that Euxitheus’ description of the deme assembly of 
the Halimousians indicates that demesmen would have little interaction with one another 
outside of these deme assemblies. Euxitheus, for example, stated that the majority of the 
demesmen lived thirty-five stades from the city, where the assembly was held (Dem. 
57.10). Given that demesmen could be scattered geographically, Cohen in particular 
concluded that the demesmen would therefore be less likely to participate actively in 
deme activities, which often took place in the city center.  I believe a more 83
comprehensive case study supports the argument that Euxitheus’ description of his 
dysfunctional deme provides unique insights into the kinds of relationships that 
demesmen did form with one another and into the ways in which those relationships 
might prove beneficial or destructive. 
 See Vlassopoulos 2007, 36-37. Vlassopoulos adopts his theoretical framework particularly from B. An82 -
derson 2016; Cohen 2002; G. Anderson 2003. 
 Cohen 2002, 116-118. 83
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 Euxitheus’ vivid account of the assembly that expelled him from the ranks of the 
Halimousians especially demonstrates how factions might form within a deme. Euxitheus 
stressed that Eubulides was able to disenfranchise him because his opponent could rely 
on his own group of allies within the deme. When the deme held its assembly to review 
its registry, as had been commanded by the decree of Demophilus, Euxitheus explained 
that Eubulides, the demarch at the time, allowed the meeting to continue late into the 
evening. By the time Euxitheus’ name was called, the majority of the demesmen had 
departed the city where the meeting was taking place to return to their farms (Dem. 57. 
9-10). Eubulides then stood up and spoke against Euxitheus, and despite Euxitheus’ 
protests to allow him time to rebut Eubulides’ accusations, Eubulides took the vote (Dem. 
57.13). Euxitheus explained,  
διότι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐκ ἠγνόει Εὐβουλίδης ὅτι, εἰ λόγος ἀποδοθήσοιτο καὶ  
παραγένοιντό µοι πάντες οἱ δηµόται καὶ ἡ ψῆφος δικαίως δοθείη, οὐδαµοῦ  
γενήσονται οἱ µετὰ τούτου συνεστηκότες. 
The reason was, gentlemen of the jury, that Eubulides was not unaware that if a 
chance to speak was given and all my demesmen came to support me and the vote 
was justly conducted, those men who conspired with him would be nowhere! 
(Dem. 57.16).  
Euxitheus portrayed a deme divided against itself. Eubulides had his own group of men 
within the deme on whom he relied in his plot against his old enemy. Euxitheus suggested 
later in the speech that Eubulides persuaded these men to vote to disenfranchise him 
because they too had grudges with him. When Euxitheus had served as demarch, he had 
forced these men to pay rent on sacred lands and to refund money which they had 
embezzled from the public funds (Dem. 57.63). Euxitheus’ claims were based on the 
personal relationships which Eubulides would have needed to form with these men in his 
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conspiracy. He would have needed to seek them out and contrive to stretch out the deme 
assembly late into the evening with them, so that Euxitheus would be without his allies 
when he was under scrutiny. Euxitheus also stressed that if his own supporters within the 
deme had been present at the assembly, they would have stood up for him. Euxitheus’ 
narrative demonstrates that citizens did not need to know everyone within their demes on 
an intimate level, but Athenians did need to form enough relationships and alliances 
within their demes (and phratries) to ensure that they had people who would speak on 
their behalf if their identities were called into question. 
 Euxitheus also emphasized the intimate knowledge that his demesmen, including 
his opponent Eubulides, had concerning his family. Eubulides’ accusations against 
Euxitheus’ parents, that his father Thucritus spoke with a foreign accent and his mother 
sold ribbons in the agora, suggest his familiarity with Euxitheus’ family history (Dem. 
57.18). Eubulides took advantage of this knowledge to expel his rival from the deme and 
deny him his citizenship rights. 
 Notably, Euxitheus did not attempt to deny these allegations. He explained that his 
father Thucritus had been taken prisoner during the Decelean War and sold into slavery 
on Leucas (Dem. 57.18): 
Οἴεταί τις οὖν ὑµῶν ἐᾶσαί ποτ’ ἂν τοὺς δηµότας ἐκεῖνον τὸν ξένον καὶ µὴ πολίτην  
ἄρχειν παρ’ αὑτοῖς, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν κατηγορεῖν; οὐ τοίνυν κατηγόρησεν οὐδὲ εἷς, οὐδ’  
ᾐτιάσατο. ἀλλὰ µὴν καὶ διαψηφίσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐγένοντο τοῖς δηµόταις ὀµόσασιν  
καθ’ ἱερῶν, ὅτ’ ἀπώλετ’ αὐτοῖς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραµµατεῖον δηµαρχοῦντος  
Ἀντιφίλου τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Εὐβουλίδου, καί τινας ἀπήλασαν αὑτῶν· περὶ ἐκείνου δ’ 
οὐδεὶς οὔτ’ εἶπεν οὔτ’ ᾐτιάσατο τοιοῦτον οὐδέν. 
Does any one of you really think that the demesmen would ever have allowed that 
man, if he were an alien and not a citizen, to hold office among them, but that they 
would not accuse him? But no one did accuse him, nor even did they bring charges 
against him. But truly the demesmen, having sworn an oath, did vote on one 
another by necessity, when their registry was lost when Antiphilus the father of 
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Eubulides was demarch, and they expelled some of their members: but no one 
spoke concerning that man [Thucritus] nor did they accuse him of any such thing 
(Dem. 57.26).  
Euxitheus stressed that the demesmen were well aware of this history and never took 
steps to expel Thucritus from the deme. He repeated multiple times that “no one among 
[Thucritus’] demesmen nor among his phratrymen nor anywhere else ever accused him of 
being a foreigner, although he spoke with a foreign accent” (Dem. 57.19). Critically, 
Euxitheus demonstrated that many people who were intimately acquainted with 
Thucritus, most especially his phratrymen and his demesmen, observed that he had a 
foreign accent. Yet none of these people took action against him—in fact, they affirmed 
his identity many times. Thucritus’ demesmen would have been obligated to expel him 
from the deme when they reviewed their lost registry, if they had recognized him as an 
alien and not a citizen. That they admitted Thucritus and his son Euxitheus as members of 
the deme reflected on their personal knowledge of their family and their relationships 
with both father and son.  
 Also important to note is that Athenians stressed their intimate relationships with 
their demesmen in cases of adoption. In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Apollodorus, the speaker 
Thrasyllus defended his adoption by his uncle Apollodorus by emphasizing the close 
bonds between Apollodorus, Thrasyllus, and their demesmen.  While Apollodorus had 84
successfully introduced Thrasyllus to his phratrymen, the old man died before he could 
admit his nephew into his deme. Thrasyllus explained the measures Apollodorus took to 
ensure that his demesmen would vote his nephew one of their members: 
 I review this case further in my chapter on adoptions. 84
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πρὶν γὰρ ἐµὲ ἥκειν ἐκ τῆς Πυθαίδος, ἔλεγε πρὸς τοὺς δηµότας Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅτι 
πεποιηµένος εἴη µε ὑὸν καὶ ἐγγεγραφὼς εἰς τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ φράτορας, καὶ 
παραδεδώκοι τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ διεκελεύεθ᾽ ὅπως, ἄν τι πάθῃ πρότερον, ἐγγράψουσί 
µε εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραµµατεῖον Θράσυλλον Ἀπολλοδώρου καὶ µὴ ὡς ἄλλως 
ποιήσουσι. 
For before I returned from the Pythaid, Apollodorus told his demesmen that he had 
adopted me as his son and had enrolled me among his family members and 
phratrymen, and he entrusted his estate [to me], and he bid them that, if he should 
suffer anything before, register me in the lexiarchic register as Thrasyllus the son of 
Apollodorus and not to do otherwise (Isaeus. 7.27).  
Thrasyllus stressed that the Apollodorus took advantage of his personal relationships with 
his demesmen to ensure that his nephew would be admitted to the deme as his adopted 
son. He informed his fellow demesmen that he had already taken the necessary steps to 
identify Thrasyllus as his heir, introducing him to his family members and his 
phratrymen. Furthermore, the demesmen followed Apollodorus’ instructions and admitted 
Thrasyllus as a member, despite the objections of Thrasyllus’ opponents in the case at the 
actual assembly meeting. Thrasyllus explained, “such was the conspicuousness of my 
adoption among those men [the demesmen]” (Isaeus. 7.28). Thrasyllus’ case 
demonstrates that Athenians did not determine either civic or family identity by single 
relationships, like the one between Thrasyllus and Apollodorus. More critical to 
Thrasyllus’ suit were his connections to Apollodorus’ relatives, his phratrymen, and his 
demesmen.  
 Perhaps even more than either Euxitheus’ or Thrasyllus’ speeches, Lysias’ Against 
Pancleon clearly demonstrates the critical role that demes and their members played in 
establishing civic identity in Classical Athens.  The unnamed speaker recounted his 85
efforts to bring a certain Pancleon to court. He first attempted to call Pancleon before the 
 Vlassopoulos in particular has discussed this case. See Vlassopoulos 2007, 50-51; Vlassopoulos 2009, 85
358-360. 
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polemarch on the assumption that the man was a resident alien.  Pancleon objected to 86
the form of the suit, claiming that he was in fact a Plataean and therefore an Athenian 
citizen. The speaker explained, 
(2) εἰπόντος δὲ τούτου ὅτι Πλαταιεὺς εἴη, ἠρόµην ὁπόθεν δηµοτεύοιτο,  
παραινέσαντός τινος τῶν παρόντων προσκαλέσασθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν φυλήν,    
ἧστινος εἶναι σκήπτοιτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι Δεκελειόθεν,  
προσκαλεσάµενος αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς τῇ Ἱπποθωντίδι δικάζοντας, (3) 
ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ κουρεῖον τὸ παρὰ τοὺς Ἑρµᾶς, ἵνα οἱ Δεκελειεῖς προσφοιτῶσιν, 
ἠρώτων, οὕς τε ἐξευρίσκοιµι Δεκελειέων ἐπυνθανόµην εἴ τινα γιγνώσκοιεν 
Δεκελειόθεν δηµοτευόµενον Παγκλέωνα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδεὶς ἔφασκεν γιγνώσκειν  
αὐτόν, πυθόµενος ὅτι καὶ ἑτέρας δίκας τὰς µὲν φεύγοι τὰς δ’ ὠφλήκοι παρὰ τῷ  
πολεµάρχῳ, ἔλαχον καὶ ἐγώ. 
(2) And when this man said he was a Plataean, I asked him to which deme did he 
belong, when one of those present urged me to bring my case before his tribe, to 
which he might pretend to belong. And when he answered that he was from 
Decelea, I summoned him also before the court of Hippothontis, (3) and I went to 
the barber’s shop by the street of the Herms, where the Deceleans frequent, and I 
asked those whom I could find of the Deceleans if they knew any Pancleon who 
was a demesman from Decelea. And when no one said that they knew him, learning 
that he had also been a defendant in other suits and had been found guilty in suits 
before the polemarch, I also obtained leave to bring my suit [before the polemarch]
(Lys. 23.2-3).   
When Pancleon objected to the suit which the speaker had brought against him on the 
grounds that he was a citizen and not a metic, the speaker immediately sought to confirm 
his identity by inquiring about his deme. More significant, however, was the fact that 
Pancleon could not simply state his deme to establish himself as a citizen. The speaker 
sought out the Deceleans to speak with them, so that they themselves could verify his 
membership in the deme. Although Cohen and Vlassopoulos have both argued that 
demesmen seldom met, perhaps even just once a year at their deme assemblies, the 
speaker’s narrative contradicts this argument.  The Deceleans apparently frequented the 87
 In the fourth century BCE, the polemarch heard legal cases from metics. For a discussion of the pole86 -
march’s full duties see Harrison 1998, 10-13. 
 See Cohen 2002, 116-118; Vlassopoulos 2007, 36-37.87
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barber’s shop by street of the Herms, where they could form relationships with their 
fellow demesmen. In fact, the speaker’s arguments suggest that simply socializing with 
one’s demesmen in casual settings constituted a powerful identifying act to which 
demesmen could testify in court to confirm citizen status. Apparently, while the 
Deceleans did not recognize Pancleon as a demesman, they did have knowledge that 
Pancleon had participated as a litigant in other suits before the polemarch. The speaker 
took the Deceleans’ ignorance of any member named Pancleon and Pancleon’s 
appearances before the polemarch in court as proof that he was in fact a metic. He then 
produced the Deceleans whom he had questioned and the people who had brought suit 
against Pancleon before the polemarch as witnesses in court (Lys. 23.4).  
 When Pancleon objected to this form of lawsuit, apparently for the second time, 
the speaker took further measures to ensure the viability of his lawsuit and to establish 
Pancleon’s status as metic. The speaker reported that he sought out Euthycritus, the oldest 
citizen of Plataea, and asked him whether he knew a certain Pancleon, the son of 
Hipparmodorus. Euthycritus replied that he knew Hipparmodorus but denied that the man 
had any sons (Lys. 23.6). The speaker thus slyly suggested that Pancleon had adopted a 
false identity by claiming to be the son of a Plataean citizen. When he inquired of other 
Plataeans, they urged him to go to the cheese market on the last day of the month, 
because Plataeans gathered there (Lys. 23.6). When the speaker attended the market and 
spoke with the Plataeans, he recounted: 
(7) ἐλθὼν οὖν εἰς τὸν τυρὸν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡµέρᾳ ἐπυνθανόµην αὐτῶν, εἴ τινα  
γιγνώσκοιεν Παγκλέωνα πολίτην σφέτερον. καὶ οἱ µὲν ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔφασαν 
γιγνώσκειν, εἷς δέ τις εἶπεν ὅτι τῶν µὲν πολιτῶν οὐδενὶ εἰδείη τοῦτο ὂν τὸ ὄνοµα,  
δοῦλον µέντοι ἔφη ἑαυτοῦ ἀφεστῶτα εἶναι Παγκλέωνα, (8) τήν τε ἡλικίαν λέγων  
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τὴν τούτου καὶ τὴν τέχνην ᾗ οὗτος χρῆται.  
(7) Accordingly when I went to the cheese-market on this day I inquired of them 
[the Plataeans], if they knew any Pancleon, their fellow citizen. And some denied 
they knew him but one said that he knew no one of the citizens who had this name, 
but he said that a slave of his, Pancleon, had deserted, (8) describing both his age 
and business, which this man shares (Lys. 23.7-8). 
To confirm his suspicions concerning Pancleon’s identity, the speaker sought out the 
Plataeans, who were awarded citizenship in 427 BCE and then assigned to various 
demes. The speaker’s narrative suggests that the Plataeans served the same role as the 
phratry as a secondary identifying group that confirmed descent for Plataean citizens. 
That the Plataeans met once a month at the cheese market, just as the Deceleans 
frequented the street of the Herms, suggests that it was critical that Plataeans maintain 
relationships within that circle to maintain their civic identity. They also needed to 
establish connections with certain people within that social group, particularly a man like 
Euthycritus, the oldest Plataean citizen who seemed to hold standing among them. The 
speaker stressed, however, that although the Plataeans did not recognize a citizen named 
Pancleon, one of them did know a runaway slave by that name that resembled the 
Pancleon in this case in both age and manner. In the absence of any ally to speak on 
Pancleon’s behalf, the speaker took this as proof that he was not even a metic but a slave. 
He offered as witnesses Euthycritus, the Plataeans with whom he had spoken, and the 
man who claimed Pancleon as his slave (Lys. 23.8).  
 The speaker used Pancleon’s failure to form bonds within the deme of Decelea and 
among the Plataeans as proof of his non-citizen identity in court. The speaker’s account 
of his conversations with the Deceleans and Plataeans also demonstrates that simple 
actions, like socializing with demesmen in the street, constituted powerful performances 
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of identity within the Athenian community. Furthermore, the speaker’s interactions with 
the Deceleans in his inquiries about Pancleon suggests that demesmen had multiple 
avenues through which they could interact and develop relationships with one another 
which were not limited to annual deme assemblies. 
  Although modern scholars have often depicted the demes as the impersonal cogs 
in the larger machine of the democracy, I argue here demesmen formed interconnected 
communities where they often interacted with one another, not just in their annual deme 
assemblies but in their daily lives. Demesmen could take advantage of their intimate 
knowledge of one another’s lives to attack their political rivals in court, as in the case of 
Eubulides and Euxitheus. They also used these close relationships as evidence of their 
civic identities in court. In fact, one could not be an Athenian if he did not actively 
participate within the deme and within other identifying groups, as in the case of 
Pancleon. The speaker argued for his non-citizen identity by stressing his failure to 
engage with his demesmen or with his fellow Plataeans. It little mattered to the speaker’s 
case whether Pancleon was actually a Plataean. If no one stepped forward as a witness on 
his behalf, he was effectively a non-citizen. Athenians could not simply declare 
themselves citizens; their demesmen and phratrymen determined their civic identities, 
both in their rituals and in their everyday interactions with one another.  
The genos and orgeones  
 In the conclusion to his speech against Eubulides, Euxitheus summarized the 
witnesses whom he had summoned to attest to his citizenship. First, his relatives had 
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stood as witnesses in his trial; second, his fellow phratrymen; third, the members of his 
genos who worshipped both Apollo and Zeus; fourth, the men with whom he shared 
ancestral burial grounds; and fifth, the members of his deme, who admitted him as a 
member and elected him to numerous offices (Dem. 57.67). Modern scholars who have 
focused on the deme as the key identifying group in Classical Athens have often 
overlooked the emphasis which Athenians like Euxitheus placed on their relationships 
within smaller social groups such as the genos. In this section, I rely on key legal 
speeches to argue that, although not all Athenians could claim membership in a genos or 
orgeones, these phratry sub-groups still played key roles in the Athenian identification 
process. Citizens could call upon their fellow members in these groups to attest to their 
personal relationships with one another, and conversely Athenians’ rejection from these 
fraternities could serve as proof of their non-citizen identities.  
 Although modern scholars have debated about the origins of the genos and the 
nature of its activities in both the archaic and classical periods, evidence from both 
epigraphic and literary sources makes clear that a genos was a clan comprised of several 
dozen families.  Its members, the gennetai (οἱ γεννῆται), carried out shared cult 88
activities together, usually in reverence of a common ancestor. Although some scholars 
have suggested that aristocratic families exclusively belonged to a genos and exercised 
control of the phratry through such a group, no evidence from inscriptions or from 
 A full consideration of the genos falls outside the scope of this work. See especially Bourriot 1976; see 88
also Roussel 1976; Ismard 2010. Lambert also offers a good summary of the evidence; see Lambert 1993, 
60-74. 
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Athenian legal speeches supports this theory.  Certainly, in his speech against Eubulides, 89
Euxitheus simply listed his and his father’s membership in their genos with his 
membership in his phratry with no mention of any aristocratic connections within the 
organization (Dem. 57.67). Euxitheus did closely link the testimony of his fellow 
gennetai with his phratrymen when he called them to testify to his father’s family history 
and his descent from Athenian citizens. His arguments implied that the gennetai, like the 
phratrymen and demesmen, enjoyed close personal relationships with one another.   
  Likewise, the speaker Thrasyllus in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Apollodorus, a case 
centered on his identity as an adopted son, presented his adoptive father Apollodorus’ 
registration of him with the members of his phratry and genos as proof of his status 
(Isaeus. 7.13). Thrasyllus’ description of his joint admission into his new phratry and 
genos has led to some debate among modern scholars, since his statements might suggest 
that the genos kept its own separate register of members apart from the register of the 
phratry. I agree with Lambert’s suggestion that the phratry kept a single register for 
membership, which the genos naturally shared, since all gennetai were members of the 
same phratry.  More critical to my own argument is Thrasyllus’ depiction of the genos as 90
an organization the structure of which closely mirrored that of the phratry and deme. Its 
members held annual meetings in conjunction with the phratry. The gennetai voted to 
admit new members just as phratrymen and demesmen did, and they shared a register of 
these members with the phratry. If the gennetai rejected a new member or his child, that 
 See Andrews 1961a, 1-15; Andrewes 1961b, 129-40; Wade-Gery, 1931, 129-143. 89
 Lambert 1993, 66-68.90
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man had the right to appeal their decision before the Athenian courts, just as he could 
with his phratry and deme. The Athenians considered rejection by the gennetai as a 
calamity and proof of non-citizen status. Thus the genos served as a key identifying group 
for its members, and the gennetai were crucial witnesses in court for men like Euxitheus 
and Thrasyllus. Thrasyllus in particular stressed his intimate relationship with his 
adoptive father’s fellow gennetai, claiming that they accepted him into their ranks 
because “they did not distrust that man [Apollodorus] nor were they unfamiliar with 
[Thrasyllus], because [he] had been born from [Apollodorus’] sister” (Isaeus. 7.17).  91
Thrasyllus stressed that the members of Apollodorus’ genos knew the intimate details of 
his family life and their unanimous vote to grant him membership was proof positive of 
his identity.  
 Finally, in his supporting speech for his brother-in-law Theomnestus against 
Neaira, the speaker Apollodorus also provided crucial evidence for the role of the 
gennetai in affirming citizen identity.  Apollodorus described how Phrastor, the first 92
husband of Phano, Neaira’s illegitimate daughter, desperate because he was ill without an 
heir, had attempted to introduce his child by her to the members of his phratry and genos 
illegally. As Apollodorus explained, 
ὡς γὰρ εἰσῆγεν ὁ Φράστωρ εἰς τοὺς φράτερας τὸν παῖδα ἐν τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ ὢν τὸν ἐκ  
τῆς θυγατρὸς τῆς Νεαίρας, καὶ εἰς τοὺς Βρυτίδας ὧν καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ Φράστωρ  
γεννήτης, εἰδότες οἶµαι οἱ γεννῆται τὴν γυναῖκα ἥτις ἦν, ἣν ἔλαβεν ὁ Φράστωρ τὸ  
πρῶτον, τὴν τῆς Νεαίρας θυγατέρα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόπεµψιν τῆς ἀνθρώπου, καὶ διὰ τὴν  
 The full Greek text reads: Τοῦ νόµου δὴ οὕτως ἔχοντος καὶ τῶν φρατέρων τε καὶ γεννητῶν  91
ἐκείνῳ <τε> οὐκ ἀπιστούντων ἐµέ τε οὐκ ἀγνοούντων ὅτι ἦν ἐξ ἀδελφῆς αὐτῷ γεγονώς,  
ἐγγράφουσί µε εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γραµµατεῖον ψηφισάµενοι πάντες, ἐπιθέντος ἐκείνου τὴν πίστιν καθ’ ἱερῶν 
(Isaeus. 7.17).  
 I explore this case in more detail in my chapter on women’s civic identity.92
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ἀσθένειαν πεπεισµένον αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν παῖδα, ἀποψηφίζονται τοῦ  
παιδὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐνέγραφον αὐτὸν εἰς σφᾶς αὐτούς.  
For when Phrastor in his illness attempted to introduce this child, although he was 
his by the daughter of Neaira, to his phratrymen and to the Brytidae, of which 
genos Phrastor was a member, the gennetai, knowing, I think, whom his wife was, 
whom Phrastor had married first of all, that she was the daughter of Neaira, and his 
divorce from this woman, and that on account of his illness he had been persuaded 
to receive this child again, they voted against this child and did not register him 
into their ranks (Dem. 59.59).  
Apollodorus’ description of the gennetai’s rejection of Phrastor’s son correlates with the 
account given by Thrasyllus in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Apollodorus. The gennetai 
admitted new members in conjunction with the phratry, and they could reject men 
presented to them if they suspected they were not in fact Athenian citizens. Crucial here 
is Apollodorus’ emphasis on the gennetai’s knowledge of Phrastor and Neaira’s personal 
lives. Apollodorus surmised that the members of Phrastor’s genos would have been quite 
familiar with his personal travails and his divorce from his wife Phano. While 
Apollodorus was most definitely attempting to paint Phrastor in the worst possible light, 
he presented a plausible account of Phrastor’s relationships with the members of his 
phratry and genos.  
 What was remarkable in Apollodorus’ description of Phrastor’s attempts to 
introduce his son to these crucial identifying groups was that Phrastor appealed the 
decision of the gennetai and entered into arbitration with them (Dem. 59.60). The 
decision of his fellow gennetai also determined his son’s admission into his phratry, and 
so Phrastor had to act quickly. When he and his fellow gennetai came before the 
arbitrator, he was challenged to swear an oath that his son was his legitimate offspring 
from a lawfully wedded citizen-wife. Phrastor refused the oath, and the gennetai 
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prevailed (Dem. 59.61). Apollodorus presented them as witnesses in his case against 
Neaira, and he proclaimed that the gennetai’s refusal to admit the child and their victory 
in the arbitration proved that Phrastor’s child was illegitimate.  
 Apollodorus’ description of the arbitration between Phrastor and the members of 
his genos demonstrates the gennetai’s crucial role in the Athenian identification process. 
First, the gennetai’s decisions about membership may have influenced the decisions of 
the phratrymen. After all, Apollodorus gave no description of Phrastor’s son’s admission 
into his phratry. Second, Apollodorus strongly implied that the gennetai were aware of 
Phrastor’s family situation. When they called on him to swear an oath, they did so 
knowing that Phrastor could not swear that the child was his legitimate son. The gennetai, 
like phratrymen and demesmen, would have shared close connections with one another. 
Third, Apollodorus presented Phrastor’s fellow gennetai as crucial witnesses for his own 
case against Neaira. Their refusal to admit her grandson into their ranks cast doubt on 
both Neaira and her daughter Phano’s identities. 
  Finally, several passages from the speeches of Isaeus suggest that the Athenians 
considered other sub-phratry associations, particularly the orgeones, as key identifying 
groups for Athenian citizens. Lambert suggests that membership in the orgeones might 
have been less common than membership in the gene, since we have relatively more 
evidence of genos membership in Athenian legal speeches.  This group seems to have 93
 Lambert 1993, 74-77. 93
 '71
shared a similar structure and admission procedures with the genos, phratry, and deme.  94
The orgeones, like the genos, centered on cult activity and formed to worship lesser 
deities and especially heroes. Citizens introduced their legitimate children to their 
orgeones, the members of which then voted whether to admit them (Isaeus. 2.14).  The 95
speaker in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Menecles, defending his adoption by his former 
brother-in-law Menecles, presented his acceptance by Menecles’ phratrymen, demesmen, 
and the members of his orgeones as proof of his identity as Menecles’ adoptive son 
(Isaeus. 2.14). He thus treated the orgeones as other Athenian litigants treated the genos, 
as an identifying group on par with the phratry and deme. Further, the speaker stressed 
that the members of Menecles’ orgeones knew him personally and the events surrounding 
his adoption and called them as witnesses on his behalf, just as he did with his 
phratrymen and demesmen (Isaeus. 2.16).  Participation in organizations such as the 96
genos and orgeones, although not a requirement of citizenship, demonstrated the 
complexity of the Athenian identification process.  
Conclusion 
 Also interesting to note is that the speaker in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Astyphilus, claiming the estate of 94
his half-brother, presented evidence of Astyphilus’ introduction to the thiasioi of Heracles, and called the 
members of this fraternity as witnesses on his behalf (Isaeus. 9.30). Although modern scholars have 
linked the activities of the orgeones and the thiasioi, I believe this connection is tenuous. Thiasioi seems 
here to have been a general term used for an association or even a band of revelers, and the speaker in On 
the Estate of Astyphilus mentioned no special admissions procedure for the group, and he did not link 
them with his phratrymen or demesmen. 
 See Ferguson 1944. 95
 The full Greek text reads: Καὶ ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω ταῦτα, τῆς µὲν ποιήσεως ὑµῖν τοὺς φράτερας καὶ τοὺς  96
ὀργεῶνας καὶ τοὺς δηµότας παρέξοµαι µάρτυρας, ὡς δ’ ἐξῆν ποιήσασθαι, τὸν νόµον αὐτὸν ὑµῖν  
ἀναγνώσεται, καθ’ ὃν ἡ ποίησις ἐγένετο. Καί µοι τὰς µαρτυρίας ἀνάγνωθι ταύτας καὶ τὸν νόµον (Isaeus 
2.16).
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 Scholars like Cohen and Vlassopoulos have argued that the Athenians’ everyday 
activities effectively blurred their identities. Slaves and metics were indistinguishable in 
appearance from citizens, and they often engaged in the same activities as citizens. 
Vlassopoulos in particular has argued that metics and slaves carried out the same 
identifying performative acts as citizens.  I do not disagree on this point, but I suggest 97
that the Athenians purposefully developed personal relationships within key identifying 
groups for this reason. Take, for example, Euxitheus’ plea to the jury in his own case. His 
demesmen had affirmed his and his father’s identities many times when they confirmed 
their membership in the deme. If Eubulides had allowed the deme assembly to continue 
in the morning, Euxitheus claimed his relatives and his own friends within the deme 
would have spoken on his behalf. Note also Thrasyllus’ defense of his adoption by his 
uncle Apollodorus. He did not argue simply that Apollodorus had acknowledged him as 
his adoptive son before his phratrymen and demesman. Rather, he stressed that 
Apollodorus went to the members of his phratry and deme, told them about his wish to 
adopt Thrasyllus as his son, and even though he died before he could introduce his 
nephew to his deme, his demesmen followed his wishes because they knew his adoption 
was valid. Clearly, Athenians valued their relationships within these key identifying 
groups. The notion of citizens living in an anonymous society, where they had little 
contact with their demesmen, and were content to live with “blurred identities,” seems 
improbable given the surviving evidence from the speeches of the Attic orators.  
 See Vlassopoulos 2009, 347-363.97
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 Although it is tempting to follow the example of the author of the Constitution of 
the Athenians and focus on one or two institutions, like the phratry and the deme, as 
central identifying groups, this was not the reality which Athenians presented when they 
defended their identities in court. Instead, they relied on complicated networks of 
associations to establish their status in court, and these networks included smaller 
fraternities like the genos and orgeones. Athenian litigants also made clear that these 
groups were inexorably linked with one another: in several cases, membership in the 
genos guaranteed membership in the phratry, and of course, membership in the phratry 
was a requirement, whether legal or traditional, of membership in a deme. To ignore any 
institution in this chain, and the relationships that Athenians developed as members of 
these groups, would be a gross oversight. It was this complex web of associations and 
personal connections that governed civic identity in Classical Athens. To be a citizen was 
to be a member of an oikos, of a genos, of a phratry, of a deme, and it was the careful 
observance of the formal and informal performative acts required by all these groups that 
offered the best safeguard of identity and citizenship. 
 '74
CHAPTER III 
Adoption in the Athenian Identification Process  
Introduction 
(27) ἔλεγε πρὸς τοὺς δηµότας Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅτι πεποιηµένος εἴη µε ὑὸν καὶ 
ἐγγεγραφὼς εἰς τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ φράτορας, καὶ παραδεδώκοι τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ 
διεκελεύεθ᾽ ὅπως, ἄν τι πάθῃ πρότερον, ἐγγράψουσί µε εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν 
γραµµατεῖον Θράσυλλον Ἀπολλοδώρου καὶ µὴ ὡς ἄλλως ποιήσουσι. (28) 
κἀκεῖνοι ταῦτα ἀκούσαντες, τούτων ἐν ἀρχαιρεσίαις κατηγορούντων καὶ 
λεγόντων ὡς οὐκ ἐποιήσατό µε ὑόν, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἤκουσαν καὶ ἐξ ὧν ᾔδεσαν, 
ὀµόσαντες καθ᾽ ἱερῶν ἐνέγραψάν µε, καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐκέλευε.  
(27) Apollodorus told the demesmen that he had adopted me as his son and had 
registered me among his kinsmen and his phratrymen, and he entrusted his 
property (to me), and he bid them, if he suffered anything before (my return), to 
enroll me on the lexiarchic register as Thrasyllus the son of Apollodorus and not 
to do otherwise. (28) And those men heard his commands and when these men 
(my opponents) brought accusations during the annual election of magistrates 
and claimed that he did not adopt me as his son, from the things they heard and 
the facts they knew, swearing an oath on the sacrificial victims (the demesmen) 
registered me, just as (Apollodorus) commanded (Isaeus. 7.27-28).   
  Isaeus’ speech On the Estate of Apollodorus deals with a wealthy Athenian 
citizen, Apollodorus, who decided to adopt his nephew Thrasyllus as his heir when his 
own son fell ill and died. Thrasyllus, however, was traveling to the Pythaid festival when 
Apollodorus’ deme held its annual assembly, the meeting at which citizens introduced 
adopted children. When he realized that he faced a terminal illness and so would be 
unable to introduce Thrasyllus to his demesmen the following year, Apollodorus 
instructed the members of his deme to complete the adoption. I have reviewed this 
passage in my earlier chapter on civic identity, but here I take the opportunity to point out 
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the extraordinary nature of Thrasyllus’ defense of his adoption. Given our knowledge of 
methods by which Athenians established their civic identity, we might expect Thrasyllus 
to be defending his citizenship in his speech. For example, in the scene above, Thrasyllus 
emphasized the solemnity of the scene in which the demesmen all together swore the 
customary oaths on the sacrificial victims to adopt him as one of their members, a ritual 
that we most associate with the formal acknowledgement of citizenship. Thrasyllus also 
presented the members of his phratry and genos to testify that they too had admitted them 
among their members as Apollodorus’ adopted child and also maintained an intimate 
relationship with both men. Furthermore, throughout his defense of his identity as an 
adopted son, Thrasyllus stressed the same kind of performances, both formal and 
informal, by which Athenians affirmed their citizenship. In his speech, Thrasyllus framed 
his adoption not simply as a private family affair but as a public institution controlled by 
the phratry and deme. 
 Thrasyllus’ account of his extraordinary adoption illustrates the crucial role that 
this process played within Athenian society in the fourth century BCE. Athenian citizens 
who were unable to have natural-born children adopted heirs to ensure the survival of 
their estates and to prevent the kind of legal struggles which Isaeus documented in his 
legal speeches centering on inheritance cases. Modern scholars have often relegated 
studies of adoption to brief mentions in legal handbooks or in commentaries. In this 
chapter, however, I bring adoption into the spotlight and argue that it was more than just a 
mechanism by which wealthy Athenian citizens guarded against attacks on their estates. I 
consider Athenian adoption procedures identical to the Athenian identification process 
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that controlled citizenship. In Athenian courts, the proofs of adoptive identity and civic 
identity—membership in key identifying groups and the performances carried out within 
them—aligned perfectly. By examining legal cases that center on adoption, we can gain a 
greater understanding of citizenship as an institution.  
 In this chapter, I first discuss the three methods of adoption open to Athenian 
citizens and the procedures for each while touching on the limited scholarship that 
focuses on Athenian adoption. In particular, I will question past scholars who have 
considered adoption a private transaction between two Athenian families. These 
researchers have argued that Athenians carried out adoption in two distinct phases: the 
adoptive parent and child would enter into a private agreement with one another, and only 
then did the father introduce his new son to his phratry and deme. I will contend that 
private agreements played no role in the process. Instead, I consider adoption as a public 
institution in which adoptive fathers followed identical procedures as natural fathers to 
affirm their sons’ civic identities. The adoptive father needed to secure his adopted son’s 
admission into his phratry and deme. Just as crucially, the adoptive father and son had to 
undertake everyday performative acts, such as the father arranging for his new son’s 
marriage and the adoptive son taking over the management of the estate, to ensure their 
legal relationship to one another. To illustrate the complexity of the adoption process and 
its place in the Athenian identification process, I will analyze two selected speeches of 
Isaeus: On the Estate of Menecles, in which the unnamed speaker outlined his close 
relationship with his adopted father Menecles over twenty years, and On the Estate of 
Apollodorus, summarized above. 
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Procedures of adoption in Classical Athens 
 Athenian citizens did not adopt to foster or mentor young children as is generally 
the case in the modern world. Adoption provided Athenians an effective means of 
establishing the identity of heirs to their estates and ensuring the survival of their 
household in the absence of legitimate offspring. Athenians could employ three methods 
of adoption: 1) adoption inter vivos, in which a citizen could adopt a fully grown adult, 
usually a close male family member, by introducing this relative to the same key 
identifying groups to which he would present his natural children; 2) testamentary 
adoption, or adoption by will, in which an Athenian could adopt an adult in a written will 
and so establish an heir and ensure the protection of his property; and, 3) posthumous 
adoptions, in which the relatives of a deceased citizen could create an heir on his behalf, 
again usually with the intention of safeguarding the man’s estate. Adoptions inter vivos 
and testamentary adoptions could be invalidated, if the adoptive father were found to be 
senile, insane, ill, or under the influence of a woman.  98
 Older Athenian citizens usually undertook adoptions inter vivos when they could 
no longer expect natural children. In this kind of adoption the adopted son could enter 
into the estate immediately after his adoptive father’s death, exercising the same right of 
entering immediately into possession of the estate (ἡ ἐµβατεύσις) as a natural-born son. 
The Athenians, however, had no mechanisms in place to reverse adoptions inter vivos, a 
 Our best evidence for this law originates from the two cases I discuss in this chapter. See Isaeus. 2.14; 98
Isaeus. 2.19; Isaeus. 2.43; Isaeus. 7.1; Isaeus. 7.14; Isaeus.7.43. See also Griffith-William’s discussion of 
this law: Griffith-Williams 2013, 43. 
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severe disadvantage.  Even in cases where a father had his own natural-born son after he 99
had adopted another Athenian, the two sons would become co-heirs and each take a half 
share in the estate on their father’s death.    100
 Young men, often those about to set out on campaigns or about to travel, usually 
employed testamentary adoptions, since they could renounce these adoptions on their safe 
return to Athens in the expectation that they would marry an Athenian citizen-wife and 
have natural legitimate children.  Only in the event of the adopter’s death would an heir 101
adopted by will come into his or her inheritance. In testamentary adoptions, the heir by 
will needed to put in a claim on the estate before the Athenian courts; once the court had 
ruled on the validity of his claim, the heir could be introduced into his adoptive father’s 
phratry and deme. In legal cases which centered on testamentary adoptions, litigants 
would often attack the validity of the will, either by claiming that the document was a 
 See especially Thompson 1981; Thompson laid out the different types of adoptions undertaken by 99
Athenian citizens. See also Scafuro 2011, 15-17. 
 See especially Isaeus. 6.63, where the speaker lays out this provision of the law. 100
 We know of twelve testamentary adoptions in fourth century Athens, and in six of these adoptions, the 101
testator died while away in war or traveling. See especially Isaeus 4, On the Estate of Nicostratus, Isaeus 
5, On the Estate of Dicaeogenes, Isaeus 6, On the Estate of Philoctemon, Isaeus 9, On the Estate of Asty-
philus, Isaeus 10, On the Estate of Aristarchus, Isaeus 11, On the Estate of Hagnias. 
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forgery or that it did not reflect the true intentions of the estate owner.  Since these legal 102
speeches focused less on the roles of the phratry and deme, they fall outside of the scope 
of my study.  
 Finally, in posthumous adoptions, an Athenian family could name an heir to an 
estate even decades after the estate owner’s death if the owner had neglected to adopt a 
child while he still lived and had left no will.  A representative of the relatives would 103
introduce the adopted son to his new phratrymen and demesmen, and the members would 
admit them in accordance with the same procedures they used in other cases of 
adoption.  The Athenians appear to have considered posthumous adoption quite 104
unusual.  Moreover, its exact procedures, aside from the admittance into the phratry and 105
deme, are difficult to determine. Seven legal cases featuring posthumous adoptions have 
 See in particular Isaeus’ On the Estate of Cleonymus: Pherenicus and Posieidippus claimed Cleony102 -
mus’ estate, claiming that he had named them as his heirs in the will. The nephews of Cleonymus put 
forth a claim, as well. Interestingly, they did not argue that the will was a forgery but that Cleonymus had 
written the will at a time when he was particularly angry with their guardian, Deinias. The nephews con-
tended that in his later years, Cleonymus had treated them as sons and accordingly, they were the rightful 
heirs.  
See also Isaeus’ On the Estate of Nicostratus: a certain Chariades claimed the estate, claiming that he and 
Nicostratus were close friends while they were performing military service and so Nicostratus had named 
him his heir in a will. Nicostratus’ first cousins, Hagnon and Hagnotheus, claimed the estate as his closest 
kin and claimed that Chariades no companion of Nicostratus and the will was a forgery. 
Finally, see Isaeus’ On the Estate of Astyphilus: Cleon, Astyphilus’ first cousin, claimed that he had 
named Cleon’s son as his heir in a will. The speaker, Astyphilus’ half-brother, claimed the estate and  
argued that the will was a forgery. 
 See especially Dem. 44.19-24, in which the speaker complained of the posthumous adoptions under103 -
taken by one branch of his family to deprive the other branch (the speaker and his siblings) of its inheri-
tance. 
 See especially Dem. 43.13-15, where the speaker describes the posthumous adoption of Macartatus 104
and his acceptance into his adoptive father’s phratry. 
 See especially Isaeus. 6.3, Dem. 43.11; Dem. 44.19. See also Todd 1993, 225. 105
 '80
survived, and in each speech the adoption was completed under different circumstances 
and often questioned only after the adoptive son himself had died.   106
 Accordingly, in this chapter I focus on legal disputes involving adoptions inter 
vivos for which the procedures are clear and the interested parties still living. I examine in 
particular two cases that best illustrate the relationships that adopted children needed to 
cultivate with their adoptive fathers and within their new phratries and demes to establish 
an unassailable new civic identity: Isaeus’ speeches On the Estate of Menecles and On the 
Estate of Apollodorus. 
Modern scholarship 
 Modern studies on the Athenian institution of adoption have often been limited to 
legal handbooks, works on the Greek family and family law, and commentaries on Isaeus, 
who specialized in inheritance cases in which litigants were especially likely to question 
the legitimacy of their opponents’ adoptions or else force them to defend their own status 
as adopted heirs.  Moreover, scholars who have examined adoption have considered it 107
within the context of family relationships and property law and not as an institution that 
granted citizenship.  
 For example, in his legal handbook, Harrison argued that adoptions were 
contracts between two Athenian citizens in which the adopted father acknowledged that 
 See Rubinstein 1993, 25-28. 106
 For legal handbooks, see especially J. Jones 1956; MacDowell 1986; Todd 1993; Harrison 1998. For 107
works on family structure and law, see especially Lacey 1989; see also Cox 2014. For commentaries on 
and translations of Isaeus, see Wyse 1904; Edwards 2007; Griffith-Williams 2013. Griffith-Williams has a 
good discussion of the modern reception of Isaeus; see Griffith-Williams 2013, 27-33. 
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he would entrust his property to his new son. Although Harrison allowed that citizens 
generally introduced their adopted children into their phratry and deme, he argued “this 
agreement between the parties was sufficient to validate the adoption.”  He thus 108
construed adoption as a private agreement rather than as a larger institution controlled by 
the same key groups that granted citizenship. In his own legal handbook, MacDowell 
pushed Harrison’s arguments further and described adoption as a simple arrangement 
struck between two Athenian families. Take MacDowell’s description of the legal 
position of an adopted son: “By his adoption he entirely lost his membership and right of 
succession in his own family and became in all legal respects the son of his adopter.”  109
MacDowell omitted entirely that an adopted son would be admitted into his new father’s 
phratry and deme and so acquire an entirely new civic identity. To both Harrison and 
MacDowell, adoption was primarily an economic transaction by which an Athenian 
citizen could transfer his property to another, an agreement in which groups like the 
phratry and deme had little interest.  
 W.E. Thompson, in an article that focused solely on testamentary adoption as an 
institution, questioned the assertions in the legal guides of Jones, Harrison, and 
MacDowell that Athenian wills were simple mechanisms by which Athenians could 
dispose of their property. Thompson further argued against Harrison’s claim that 
Athenian jurors inherently distrusted adoptions by will and habitually awarded disputed 
estates to the next of kin. Most critical to my own work, Thompson asserted that 
 Harrison 1998, 89. 108
 MacDowell 1986, 100. 109
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Athenian jurors listening to inheritance cases considered testamentary adoptions an 
important religious and social institution by which citizens ensured that their heirs would 
care for their households and would perform the proper religious rites when they passed 
away.  Thompson construed Athenian adoption not as a private agreement but as a 110
critical public institution meant to protect the Athenian family and their cults.   
 Like Thompson, Lene Rubinstein, in her study of adoption in the fourth century 
BCE, considered the process in the wider context of Athenian society. Rubinstein’s work 
catalogued the thirty-six cases of adoption of which we have knowledge from Athenian 
history. She described each kind of adoption in detail and the reasons why Athenian 
citizens adopted. Rubinstein criticized scholars who argued that an adoptive father and 
son came to a private agreement as the first step in the adoption process.  She argued 111
that the introduction to the phratry and deme constituted the entire adoption process with 
no prior private legal agreement necessary. In this chapter, I push Rubinstein’s arguments 
further and consider adoption procedures as identical to the Athenian identification 
process. 
The myth of private contracts 
 Before I move on to my analysis of Isaeus’ speeches, I first want to dispel further 
the notion that Athenians needed to enter into a private agreement as the first step in an 
 See especially Thompson 1981, 18-21. 110
 Scholars who argued that private agreements constituted Athenian adoptions by law include: 111
Beauchet 1969, 10-18; Bruck 1909, 54; Becker 1930, 301-306; Brindesi 1961, 45; Polacek 1967, 
162; Todd 1993, 89.
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adoption. By focusing on this argument, researchers have relegated adoption to studies on 
the family and property law and have missed the opportunity to consider adoption as a 
critical public institution. I believe that scholars have argued this point because they have 
misunderstood two key excerpts from the two legal speeches of Isaeus that I analyze in 
this chapter.  In Isaeus’ speech On the Estate of Menecles, the elderly Menecles 112
approached the brothers of his former wife to adopt one of them: 
(11) λόγους οὖν πρὸς ἡµᾶς ἐποιεῖτο, καὶ ἔφη δοκεῖν αὑτῷ καλῶς ἔχειν, ἐπειδὴ 
οὕτως αὐτῷ ἡ τύχη συνέβη ὥστε ἐκ τῆς ἀδελφῆς τῆς ἡµετέρας παῖδας αὐτῷ µὴ 
γενέσθαι, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς οἰκίας ὑὸν αὑτῷ ποιήσασθαι, ὅθεν καὶ φύσει παῖδας 
ἐβουλήθη ἂν αὑτῷ γενέσθαι: “ὑµῶν οὖν” ἔφη “βούλοµαι τὸν ἕτερον ποιήσασθαι, 
ὁποτέρῳ ὑµῶν καλῶς ἔχει.” (12) καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς ἀκούσας ταῦτα [ἐπειδὴ 
προετίµησεν αὐτοὺς πάντων], ἐπῄνεσέ τε τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι δέοιτο 
ἥ τε ἡλικία καὶ ἡ παροῦσα ἐρηµία ἐκείνου τοῦ θεραπεύσοντος αὐτὸν καὶ 
ἐπιδηµήσοντος: “ἐµοὶ µὲν οὖν” ἔφη “συµβαίνει ἀποδηµία, ὡς σὺ οἶσθα: ὁ δὲ 
ἀδελφὸς οὑτοσί” ἐµὲ λέγων “τῶν τε σῶν ἐπιµελήσεται καὶ τῶν ἐµῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ 
τοῦτον ποιήσασθαι.” καὶ ὁ Μενεκλῆς καλῶς ἔφη αὐτὸν λέγειν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου 
τούτου ποιεῖταί µε. 
(11) He addressed us, and he said that it seemed fair to him, since such a fate had 
befallen him that he could have not children by our sister, to adopt a son from the 
same house from which he had wished to have children: He said, ‘Accordingly, I 
wish to adopt one of the two of you, to whichever one of you this seems 
agreeable.’ (12) My brother, having heard this, praised his suggestions, and he 
said that his old age and present loneliness demanded someone to attend him and 
 Other examples of adoptions inter vivos from Attic oratory do not specify the adoption pro112 -
ceedings. We have five examples of adoptions inter vivos in Attic oratory. The two adoptions 
most commonly discussed in scholarship on Athenian adoptions and on which I will also focus 
appear in Isaeus’ speeches On the Estate of Menecles (Menecles adopted the son of Eponymus, 
the brother of his former wife) and On the Estate of Apollodorus (Apollodorus adopted his half-
nephew, Thrasyllus). See also Dem. 44.19, Dem. 44.46—the speaker first asserted (Dem. 44.19) 
that the adoption of Leocrates by the owner of the estate in question, Archiades, had been carried 
out as a posthumous adoption, but he seems to have contradicted himself later in the speech 
(Dem. 44.46), where he implied the adoption was inter vivos. Because of the uncertainty sur-
rounding the nature of this particular adoption, I pass it over in this chapter. See also Dem. 41.3-5
—Polyceutus adopted Leocrates and married him to one of his two daughters. The two men quar-
reled, and then Polyceutus took away his daughter from Leocrates and gave her in marriage to 
Spudias. The speaker gave no details as to the procedures surrounding the adoption. Finally, see  
[Plut]. Vit.X.Orat.838-839 and Dio.Hal. Isocr.18—Pseudo-Plutarch in his Life of the Ten Orators 
described Isocrates’ marriage to Plathane late in life and his adoption of her son Aphareus but 
made no mention of the specific adoption procedures he followed. Dionysus of Halicarnassus 
mentioned in his Life of Isocrates that his ancestor Aphareus was an adoptive son of Isocrates, but 
he also gives no details as to the adoption procedures. For further discussion, see Rubinstein 
1993, 33-36. 
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to remain home; he said, ‘It happens that I am away [often] n  , as you know; but 
my brother here,’ (meaning me), ‘will care for your affairs and for mine, if you 
wish to adopt him.’ And Menecles agreed with him, and in this way he adopted 
me (Isaeus. 2.11-12). 
 Most critical to my own argument, the speaker did not describe anything that 
resembled a private contract in this passage. Instead, he recounted an informal encounter 
between himself, his brother, and their former brother-in-law Menecles. Menecles had 
married the speaker’s sister, but when he realized that he was impotent, he convinced his 
wife to seek a divorce and marry a man who could give her children. Years after his 
divorce, Menecles sought out his wife’s two brothers to ask whether one of them might 
become his adopted son and heir to his estate. The speaker did not specify where this 
conversation took place, whether he and Menecles had drawn up a written agreement, or 
whether there were any witnesses other than the three men themselves, evidence that 
proved crucial in Athenian contracts (Isaeus. 2.11-12). Furthermore, the speaker made 
clear in the opening of his case that his opponents had accused the speaker’s sister, 
Menecles’ former wife, of exercising undue influence in Menecles’ adoption (Isaeus. 2.1). 
By presenting this conversation, in which Menecles approached the speaker and his 
brother of his own free will and in his right mind, the speaker could effectively counter 
his opponents’ accusations against his sister.  
 Scholars have also cited a second passage from Isaeus’ On the Estate of  
Apollodorus, the speech I discussed above, to argue that adoptive fathers and sons entered 
into private contracts with one another. The speaker Thrasyllus described how 
Apollodorus went to his half-sister, Thrasyllus’ mother, to ask her whether he could adopt 
her son:  
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Ἀπολλοδώρῳ γὰρ ἦν ὑός, ὃν ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἤσκει καὶ δι᾽ ἐπιµελείας εἶχεν, ὥσπερ 
καὶ προσῆκον ἦν. ἕως µὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἔζη, διάδοχον τῆς οὐσίας ἤλπιζεν αὐτὸν 
καταστήσειν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐτελεύτησε νοσήσας τοῦ ἐξελθόντος ἐνιαυτοῦ 
µηνὸς Μαιµακτηριῶνος, ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀθυµήσας καὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ 
καταµεµψάµενος οὐκ ἐπελάθετο ὑφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὖ πεπονθὼς ἦν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐλθὼν ὡς τὴν ἐµὴν µητέρα ἑαυτοῦ δὲ ἀδελφήν, ἣν περὶ πλείστου πάντων 
ἐποιεῖτο, λαβεῖν ἠξίωσέ µε ὑὸν καὶ ᾔτησε καὶ ἔτυχεν. 
Apollodorus had a son, whom he both brought up and cherished, just as was 
fitting. And as long as he lived, he expected to make him the heir to his property. 
But when [his son] became sick and died in the month of Maemacterion last year, 
depressed by the present events and viewing his age with regret, [Apollodorus] 
did not forget those by whom even from the beginning he had been treated well. 
But coming to my mother, his own sister, whom he held in the greatest esteem, 
he deemed it right to take me as son, asked her, and received [permission] 
(Isaeus. 7.14).  
Again, Thrasyllus did not describe a private contract in this scene. He did not specify 
where the conversation took place, whether a written agreement was drawn up, or 
whether there were any witnesses to these events. Furthermore, as in the case with 
Menecles’ adoptive son, Thrasyllus also needed to counter his opponents’ arguments that 
his mother, Apollodorus’ half-sister, had influenced Apollodorus too much in his decision 
to adopt her son. In this particular passage, Thrasyllus took care in describing the despair 
Apollodorus experienced at the death of his son and the desperation he felt when he 
realized that he would be unable to have any more children before his death. Thrasyllus 
also stipulated that Apollodorus approached Thrasyllus’ mother concerning the adoption, 
and neither she nor her children approached him. Finally, if Thrasyllus were describing 
some kind of private agreement in this passage, he would be describing one made 
between Apollodorus and his sister, not between Apollodorus and Thrasyllus.  
 The speakers in On the Estate of Menecles and On the Estate of Apollodorus both 
described not private contracts but informal conversations between themselves and their 
adoptive fathers as a prelude to the actual adoption proceedings. The casual nature of 
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these conversations becomes even clearer when we consider them in comparison to the 
examples of actual contracts that have survived in Attic oratory. In Hyperides’ speech 
Against Athenogenes, the speaker Epicrates detailed the contract he entered into with a 
man named Athenogenes for the purchase of three slaves and the perfumery which they 
operated. Epicrates described how Athenogenes produced a written agreement with the 
details of the contract and deposited it with Lysicles of Leuconoe (Hyp. 3.8-9). Epicrates 
also later produced the document as evidence in his lawsuit (Hyp. 3.12).  Likewise, in 113
Demosthenes’ Against Olympiodorus, the speaker Callistratus brought his brother-in-law 
Olympiodorus to court on the grounds that he had broken their contract to share the estate 
of Comon, a wealthy relative who had died intestate. Callistratus described how he and 
his brother-in-law drew up a written agreement, swore oaths to one another, and then 
deposited the agreement with Androcleides of Acharnae (Dem. 48.9-11). Callistratus also 
produced a number of witnesses to the written agreement (Dem. 48.11).  Finally, the 114
laws governing maritime contracts stipulated that to bring a lawsuit against another 
merchant for breach of contract, an Athenian merchant would need to produce a written 
agreement in court that had been made in the Athenian market in front of witnesses.     115
 The conversations described in Isaeus’ two speeches lack the key features of  
contracts described in the speeches of Hyperides and Demosthenes. First, Isaeus’  
 For a more detailed discussion of Hyperides’ Against Athenogenes and Athenian contract law, see 113
Phillips 2009.
 Athenian contract law did not require the presence of witnesses, although Athenians regularly provided 114
witnesses in court to prove the validity of the contract. On the importance of witnesses in Athenian con-
tract law, see Phillips 2009, 105. 
 See MacDowell 1986, 232-234; see also Cohen 2016, 100-114. See also Dem. 32.1, Dem. 33.1-3, 115
Dem.  34.3-4, and Dem. 34.42.   
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speakers never described any written agreements with Menecles and Apollodorus, and so 
they could never deposit such a document with any third party. Also, the two speakers  
did not provide any witnesses to their supposed agreements with their adoptive fathers. 
Although witnesses were not a requirement for legal contracts, it would certainly be in 
the best interest of both parties to have witnesses present so that they could prove the 
validity of their contracts in court.  
 The dearth of actual evidence that adoptions were private legal contracts gives 
even more import to the argument Lene Rubinstein first presented that Athenian 
adoptions were valid only with the introduction of the adopted son into his adopted 
father’s phratry and deme.  Moreover, when they defended their identities as adopted 116
children in court, Menecles’ son and Thrasyllus presented the following as proofs that 
their adoptions were valid: their witnessed personal relationships within their phratry, 
deme, and other key identifying groups like the orgeones and genos; and the informal 
performative acts they carried out as adoptive sons, including managing their estates, 
caring for their fathers in old age, and even representing them in legal conflicts. 
Athenians established their identities as adopted children not through private contracts 
but through public performances carried out with their phratrymen and demesmen as 
witnesses, using the same methods by which they confirmed their civic identities.  
The estates of Menecles and of Apollodorus  
 Isaeus’ speeches depicting the disputes about the estates of Menecles and  
 See Rubinstein 1993, 34-45. 116
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Apollodorus provide excellent insight into the important roles that interpersonal  
relationships within the phratry and deme and everyday activities played in establishing 
the identities of adopted children. In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Menecles, the childless 
Menecles adopted the brother of his ex-wife, an unnamed son of Eponymous. This was 
an unusual arrangement in that Athenians often adopted within their immediate family, 
and the speaker’s opponents seem to have taken advantage of this fact by suggesting that 
Menecles’ ex-wife, the speaker’s sister, cajoled him to go through with the adoption. 
Menecles lived for twenty years after the adoption, and in that period of time Menecles 
treated the speaker as his son; the speaker claimed that Menecles lived with him, 
arranged his marriage, and gave him management over his estate. Likewise, the speaker 
emphasized that he and his wife cared for Menecles in his old age and carried out his 
funeral rites. After the old man’s death, Menecles’ brother and nephew, the speaker’s 
opponents, attempted to claim Menecles’ estate. Philonides, the speaker’s father-in-law, 
blocked their claim on the grounds that Menecles had adopted a son. Menecles’ relatives 
then indicted Philonides on a charge of false witness. The unnamed speaker spoke in 
Philonides’ defense in this particular speech.  117
 The speaker’s account of his history with Menecles is particularly striking 
because he repeatedly stressed that Menecles carried out the procedures for the adoption 
under the most ideal circumstances:  
(13) Ὡς οὖν κατὰ τοὺς νόµους ἐγένετο ἡ ποίησις, τοῦτο ὑµᾶς βούλοµαι διδάξαι… 
(14) ἐµὲ ποιεῖται, οὐκ ἐν διαθήκαις, ὦ ἄνδρες, γράψας, µέλλων ἀποθνῄσκειν, ὥσπερ 
ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν πολιτῶν, οὐδ’ ἀσθενῶν· ἀλλ’ ὑγιαίνων, εὖ φρονῶν, εὖ νοῶν  
 For an excellent overview of the case, see Edwards 2007, 27-32; see also Wyse 1904, 232-237. 117
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ποιησάµενος εἰσάγει µε εἰς τοὺς φράτερας παρόντων τούτων, καὶ εἰς τοὺς δηµότας
 µε ἐγγράφει καὶ εἰς τοὺς ὀργεῶνας.  
(13) Accordingly that the adoption proceeded in accordance with the laws, I wish 
to teach you this…(14) He adopted me, gentlemen, not having written in a will, 
about to die, as some other citizens have done, nor even being ill; but being in 
good health, of sound mind, with good will, he adopted me and introduced me to 
his phratrymen, with these men [my opponents] present, and he enrolled me 
among his demesmen and the members of his orgeones (Isaeus. 2.13-14).  
  
The speaker first considered his adoptive father’s state of mind and pointed out that 
Menecles was not ill when he took the speaker as his son, a condition which could 
invalidate the adoption. Furthermore, the speaker argued that Menecles was of sound 
mind precisely because he followed the correct procedures for the adoption and 
completed the formal performances that established adoptive and civic identity. He 
introduced the speaker to his orgeones, his phratry, and his deme with witnesses present, 
including the speaker’s present opponents. If the opponents had actually believed that 
Menecles had been under the influence of a woman or was ill, they could have raised 
objections to the adoption with his phratrymen or demesmen.  That they stood witness 118
to the adoption and failed to lodge a protest was a powerful proof of the speaker’s 
identity as Menecles’ adopted son.  
 As proof of his adoptive identity as an adopted son, the speaker further 
emphasized the informal performances of daily life: he claimed that Menecles and he had 
lived as father and son for over twenty years before the older man died. Moreover, the 
members of Menecles’ orgeones, phratry, and deme had an intimate knowledge of this 
relationship. As the speaker explained: 
 For a nice parallel, see Dem. 57.49. Euxitheus argued that Eubulides ought to have objected to his 118
membership in the deme at a much earlier date. 
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(15) Ἐπεβίω γὰρ ἐκεῖνος µετὰ τὴν ποίησιν οὐκ ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα ἢ δύο, ἀλλὰ τρία καὶ
εἴκοσιν ἔτη· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, τοσούτῳ ὄντι, οὐδὲν ἐκεῖνος µετέγνω τῶν  
πεπραγµένων ἑαυτῷ, διὰ τὸ παρὰ πάντων ὁµολογεῖσθαι ὅτι ἦν ὀρθῶς 
βεβουλευµένος. (16) Καὶ ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω ταῦτα, τῆς µὲν ποιήσεως ὑµῖν τοὺς  
φράτερας καὶ τοὺς ὀργεῶνας καὶ τοὺς δηµότας παρέξοµαι µάρτυρας… 
(15) For that man [Menecles] lived on after the adoption not for one year or two, 
but for twenty three years. And in this time, such a long time, he never regretted 
the things which he did, because it was agreed by all that he had decided rightly. 
(16) And that I speak the truth, I shall call for you as witnesses of the adoption 
the members of my phratry, of my orgeones, and of my deme (Isaeus. 2.15-16).  
Here the speaker painted an intimate portrait of his relationship with Menecles and with 
the members of these identifying groups. By living with him in full view of their  
community, Menecles made clear that that he did not regret his decision to adopt the 
speaker. Moreover, note the speaker’s phrasing when he declared, “It was agreed by all 
that he had decided rightly [in adopting me]” (Isaeus. 2.15). I would argue that the group 
of people to whom he referred in this passage were his phratrymen and demesmen, given 
that their testimony immediately followed this passage. Critically, the speaker treated the 
phratrymen and demesmen’s approval of their relationship as a key proof of his identity 
as adoptive son.  
 Repeatedly throughout his defense, the speaker focused on informal performative 
acts and the realities of the life he had led as Menecles’ adopted son and particularly as a 
member of Menecles’ deme. As further proof of his close relationship with his adoptive 
father, he recounted the arrangements that Menecles made for his marriage: 
πραχθέντων δὲ τούτων ἐσκόπει ὁ Μενεκλῆς γυναῖκά µοι, καὶ ἔφη µε χρῆναι 
γῆµαι: καὶ ἐγὼ λαµβάνω τὴν τοῦ Φιλωνίδου θυγατέρα. κἀκεῖνός τε τὴν πρόνοιαν 
εἶχεν ὥσπερ εἰκός ἐστι πατέρα περὶ ὑέος ἔχειν, καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ 
γόνῳ ὄντα πατέρα ἐµαυτοῦ ἐθεράπευόν τε καὶ ᾐσχυνόµην, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἡ 
ἐµή, ὥστε ἐκεῖνον πρὸς τοὺς δηµότας ἐπαινεῖν ἅπαντας. 
And after this, Menecles sought a wife for me, and said it was right that I marry; 
and I took the daughter of Philonides as wife. He had the concern for me which it 
is fitting that a father have for a son, and in the same way I attended and revered 
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him as if he were my own father, both myself and my wife, so that he praised us 
to all his demesmen (Isaeus. 2.18). 
 The speaker described a reciprocal relationship between himself and Menecles, 
one in which Menecles showed him the care and attention he would show to a natural-
born son, and both the speaker and his wife showed Menecles the respect he was due as 
the speaker’s father. The speaker’s mention of Menecles’ demesmen is no coincidence 
here. The speakers’ pointed reference suggests that Menecles and his family enjoyed a 
close relationship with their demesmen who served as crucial witnesses for even the most 
casual performances of everyday life.   
 The speaker returned to this theme by contrasting his own devotion to Menecles 
with his opponents’ mistreatment of his adoptive father. While Menecles’ brother and 
nephew had engaged with him in a lengthy legal battle concerning his estate and the sale 
of some property, the speaker recounted,  
Καὶ ἐγὼ µὲν ὁ ποιητὸς ἐκεῖνόν τε ζῶντα ἐθεράπευον καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἡ ἐµὴ γυνή,  
θυγάτηρ οὖσα τουτουὶ Φιλωνίδου, καὶ τῷ ἐµῷ παιδίῳ ἐθέµην τὸ ὄνοµα τὸ  
ἐκείνου, ἵνα µὴ ἀνώνυµος ὁ οἶκος αὐτοῦ γένηται, καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἔθαψα ἀξίως 
ἐκείνου τε καὶ ἐµαυτοῦ καὶ ἐπίθηµα καλὸν ἐπέθηκα <καὶ τὰ τρίτα> καὶ τὰ ἔνατα  
καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἐποίησα τὰ περὶ τὴν ταφὴν ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα, ὥστε τοὺς  
δηµότας ἐπαινεῖν ἅπαντας. 
I, his adopted son, tended that man while he lived, both myself and my wife, the 
daughter of this Philonides here, and I named my own little son after him, so that 
his house might not become desolate, and when he died I buried him in a manner 
which befit both him and myself, and then I erected a fine monument, I 
performed all the rites around his grave as best I could, so that all our demesmen 
praised me (Isaeus. 2.36). 
The speaker again stressed his and his wife’s devotion to Menecles, both while he lived 
and after his death. He had cared for Menecles, named his son after Menecles (continuing 
a tradition whereby firstborn sons were named after their grandfathers), and conducted 
his adoptive father’s funeral when he died. Funeral rites were often a source of contention 
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in inheritances cases; litigants often used their completion of the last rites as proof that 
they had the strongest claim to an estate.  Furthermore, the speaker stressed that all his 119
demesmen praised him for his efforts. Cumulatively, these everyday actions became 
powerful performances of both adoptive and civic identity which the speaker carried out 
before his entire community.  
 The speaker also provided proofs that he was Menecles’ rightful adopted son that 
fall into that second category of informal performances that I discussed in my 
introduction. With these performative acts, the speaker engaged with formal Athenian 
institutions outside of typical political performances. In a dramatic turn, the speaker 
called on his opponents to act as witnesses on his behalf. Before Menecles’ death, 
Menecles’ brother and his son, the opponents in the present case, sued him for a piece of 
property he was attempting to sell. The two parties agreed to enter into arbitration with 
one another, with the opponent’s brother-in-law and unnamed mutual friends acting as 
arbitrators. As the speaker dramatically asked: 
Καίτοι εἴ γε µὴ κατὰ τοὺς νόµους ἐγεγένητο ἡ ποίησις, µηδὲ κληρονόµος ἦν ἐγὼ 
τῶν Μενεκλέους ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τούτων δεδοκιµασµένος, τί ἔδει αὐτοὺς ὀµνύναι 
ἐµοὶ ἢ παρ’ ἐµοῦ λαµβάνειν ὅρκους; Οὐδὲν δήπου. Οὐκοῦν ὁπότε  ἐποίησαν  
ταῦτα, φαίνονται αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἐµοὶ µαρτυροῦντες  ὅτι κατὰ τοὺς νόµους 
 ἐποιήθην [ἡ ποίησις] καὶ δικαίως εἰµὶ κληρονόµος τῶν Μενεκλέους.  
And yet if the adoption had not been carried out in accordance with the laws, and 
I had not been recognized as Menecles’ heir by these men themselves, what need 
would there be for them to swear an oath to me or to receive one from me? 
Surely none! When they did these things, they themselves appear to bear witness 
on my behalf that I was adopted in accordance with the laws and I am the rightful 
heir of Menecles (Isaeus. 2.39). 
  
Here the speaker built on his earlier argument that he had been living as Menecles’ son 
for many years before his death. Not only had he cared for the old man and managed his  
 See especially Isaeus. 5.38-39; see also Isaeus. 6.39-41; Dem. 57.40 and 57.69-70.119
 '93
estate, he also had acted as his representative in this earlier legal battle. The speaker and 
his opponents had both acted as actors when they took part in the arbitration, a formal 
performance of adoptive and civic identity. If his opponents truly felt that Menecles had 
carried out the adoption under the influence of a woman or while he was insane, they 
would have been obligated to lodge a protest at this point in time (if not even earlier at his 
original introduction into the phratry and deme). As the speaker argued, the opponents’ 
failure to act was an equally strong indicator of his identity as the actions which 
Menecles carried out on his behalf. 
 In his closing argument, the speaker claimed that he had to defend his claim to 
Menecles’ estate to protect not only his identity as an adoptive son but his reputation as a 
citizen. When the speaker and his opponents had entered into arbitration, the arbitrators 
found against Menecles; the older man was forced to hand over the majority of his 
property (Isaeus. 2.31).  The speaker claimed that his opponents already possessed the 120
majority of the estate from this earlier judgement, and now he only sought to defend his 
adoption. In a passionate plea to the jurors, he exclaimed:  
µὴ οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, πεισθέντες ὑπὸ τούτων ἀφέλησθέ µου τὸ ὄνοµα, τῆς 
κληρονοµίας ὃ ἔτι µόνον λοιπόν ἐστιν, ἄκυρον δὲ τὴν ποίησιν αὐτοῦ 
καταστήσητε. 
Do not, gentlemen, be persuaded by these men and rob me of my name, the only 
remainder of my inheritance, and annul [Menecles’] adoption of me! (Isaeus. 
2.47).  
The speaker understood that the right of inheritance served as a powerful legal proof of 
his adoptive identity. He would certainly face fewer legal and financial difficulties if he 
 The speaker, perhaps purposefully, presents the events surrounding this previous lawsuit in which 120
Menecles and his opponents were involved in a confusing manner. For a clear discussion of this, see 
Wyse 1904, 260-263. 
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were to hand over the estate to his opponents, but he would be implicitly agreeing with 
them that he had no right to the property. Although the speaker had taken pains to  
mention his service to Menecles’ phratry and deme both as a gymnasiarch and as a 
soldier, he did not focus on these actions as the most important evidence for his case 
(Isaeus. 2.42). He concentrated instead on his loyalty to Menecles and his desire to live 
on as his adopted son, despite the fact that his estate was virtually worthless.   
 In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Menecles, the speaker did not consider his adoption a 
private transaction between adoptive father and son. In fact, his description of his 
adoption by Menecles is identical to the narratives of the Athenian identification process 
presented by speakers like Euxitheus in Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides. First, Menecles 
introduced the speaker to the members of his orgeones, phratry, and deme. The speaker 
cultivated relationships within these key identifying groups, most particularly the deme, 
which he mentioned several times over the course of his speech. Furthermore, Menecles 
and he had lived as father and son for over twenty years. Menecles arranged the speaker’s 
marriage, and the speaker managed Menecles’ estate and cared for the old man along with 
his wife. He presented the adoption as a series of performative acts, both formal and 
informal, that he and Menecles had carried out together over time in full view of their 
community.  
 As I mentioned above, the proofs of his adoptive identity that Menecles’ son 
offered align perfectly with the evidence of his civic identity that Euxitheus presented in 
Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides. Like Menecles’ adopted son, Euxitheus stressed the 
official performances that determined his civic identity, most critically his admission into 
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his father’s phratry and deme. Likewise, Euxitheus also considered informal performative 
acts as equally important in his defense, proofs of status that fell outside of the political 
and religious spectrum. Like the speaker in On the Estate of Menecles, Euxitheus stressed 
his interpersonal relationships with his relatives and his demesmen. Furthermore, in the 
closest parallel to the arguments of Menecles’ son, Euxitheus stressed the division of 
property and management of his father’s estate as proof of his citizen identity. In his 
speech, he highlighted the fact that his uncles had inherited his father Thucritus’ estate 
when he had disappeared during the Decelean War; they had returned control of the estate 
over to his father when he was redeemed from slavery (Dem. 57.19). The speaker in 
Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletus employed the same argument, claiming that no could 
think him as insane as to falsely claim Euphiletus as his brother and so cut his inheritance 
in half (Isaeus. 12.4). The arguments from these three legal cases taken together indicate 
that adoption was not a private transaction within Athenian families. Rather, we can 
characterize it as a public institution controlled by and carried out before the same key 
groups that controlled citizenship. Most critically to my own argument, Athenian litigants 
considered the quotidian performances of daily life of immense importance in 
establishing both their adoptive and civic identities. 
 I turn now to Isaeus’ speech On the Estate of Apollodorus, a second speech that 
gives perhaps even greater insight into the key roles of the phratry and deme in the 
adoption process. In this case a certain Archedamus acted as de-facto guardian for his 
stepson Apollodorus after Apollodorus’ uncle had mismanaged the estate.  Many years 121
 For an excellent overview of the case, see Griffith-Williams 2013, 33-40. 121
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later, after his own son had died, Apollodorus adopted Thrasyllus (the speaker in the 
case), Apollodorus’ half-nephew and the grandson of Archedamus. Apollodorus 
successfully introduced Thrasyllus to the members of his genos and of his phratry but 
died before he could admit him into the deme. The representatives of the wife of 
Pronapes, Apollodorus’ first cousin, challenged the adoption, on the grounds that it did 
not reflect Apollodorus’ true intent, perhaps because he had been under the influence of 
his half-sister, Thrasyllus’ mother. In several ways, this speech may seem more typical 
than the one in the case surrounding Menecles’ estate. Apollodorus adopted a close 
family member, his half-nephew, and his adoption came under legal attack in part 
because there were some significant irregularities in his admission into the deme. His 
defense, like that of Menecles, relied in large part on his family’s close relationship with 
Apollodorus and on his close relationships within Apollodorus’ phratry and deme. He 
proved these interpersonal connections by emphasizing informal performative acts, 
mundane activities like the management of money and his uncle’s estate.   
 The speaker Thrasyllus opened his speech by asserting his adoptive identity  
based on the official public performances that Apollodorus had carried out. To defend his 
own adoption, he contrasted adoptions inter vivos with testamentary adoptions, claiming 
that the adoptions by will were more likely to come under attack in court because they 
were done in private: 
 (1) Ὤιµην µέν, ὦ ἄνδρες, προσήκειν οὐ τὰς τοιαύτας ἀµφισβητεῖσθαι ποιήσεις,  
εἴ τις αὐτὸς ζῶν καὶ εὖ φρονῶν ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ἀγαγὼν εἰς τοὺς συγγενεῖς 
ἀπέδειξε καὶ εἰς τὰ κοινὰ γραµµατεῖα ἐνέγραψεν, ἅπανθ’ ὅσα προσῆκεν αὐτὸς  
ποιήσας, ἀλλ’ εἴ τις τελευτήσειν µέλλων διέθετο, εἴ τι πάθοι, τὴν οὐσίαν ἑτέρῳ καὶ
ταῦτ’ἐν γράµµασι κατέθετο παρά τισι σηµηνάµενος. (2) Ἐκεῖνον µὲν γὰρ τὸν  
τρόπον ποιησάµενος φανερὰς κατέστησε τὰς αὑτοῦ βουλήσεις, ὅλον τὸ πρᾶγµα  
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ἐπικυρώσας, δόντων αὐτῷ τῶν νόµων· ὁ δ’ ἐν διαθήκαις σηµηνάµενος 
ἀδήλους ἐποίησε, δι’ ὃ πολλοὶ πεπλάσθαι φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἀµφισβητεῖν ἀξιοῦσι  
πρὸς τοὺς ποιηθέντας. 
(1) I should think, gentlemen, that such adoptions ought not to be disputed, if [the 
adopter] himself, while he was alive and being of sound mind performed the 
adoption, led [his adopted son] to the holy shrines, introduced [him] to his 
kinsmen and inscribed [his name] on the public registers, all such things as were 
befitting in an adoption…(2) For in this way the adopter makes his wishes clear, 
having confirmed everything, with the laws granting him this right; on the other 
hand, the one who seals up his wishes in a will makes them unclear, on which 
account many, claiming that the will is a forgery, will deem it right to dispute it 
with the adopted sons.  
In this passage, Thrasyllus neatly summarized the formal and informal performances by 
which Athenians validated both adoptive and civic identity. Thrasyllus listed 
Apollodorus’ actions in a sequence: in the religious realm, Apollodorus led Thrasyllus to 
the family shrines; in the political realm, he registered him with his phratry and deme; 
and outside of these institutions, he introduced him to his relatives. Note, too, that 
Thrasyllus did not single out any of these performative acts as the most critical to 
establishing his status as adopted son. Athenians considered all of these performances 
taken together as safeguards against legal attacks on adoptive and civic identity.  
 Furthermore, as Thrasyllus himself noted, Athenians often attacked testamentary 
adoptions by claiming that the will was a forgery or did not reflect the true intentions of 
the estate owner. Litigants could also challenge adoptions by calling the adoptive father’s 
state of mind into question; some common tactics included claiming that the adoptive 
father was senile, insane, ill, or under the influence of a woman. Apollodorus could best 
protect Thrasyllus and his estate by ensuring that his state of mind would be unassailable 
in court, and he did so by undertaking the same actions, in front of the same set of 
witnesses, by which Athenians established their civic identities. 
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 When Thrasyllus turned to the direct proofs of his identity, he focused particularly 
on the management of Apollodorus’ estate, an informal performance of identity, and the 
key role it played in his adoption. When his own son died, Apollodorus, depressed, went 
to his sister and asked her permission to adopt her son Thrasyllus (Isaeus. 7.14). 
Thrasyllus recounted, 
Οὕτω δ’ ἐπείσθη ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διὰ ταχέων ὥστ’ εὐθέως µε λαβὼν 
ᾤχετο ἔχων πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ διοικεῖν παρέδωκεν, ὡς αὐτὸς µὲν  
οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι πρᾶξαι τούτων δυνηθείς, ἐµοῦ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα οἵου τε ἐσοµένου ποιεῖν. 
Καὶ ἐπειδὴ Θαργήλια ἦν, ἤγαγέ µε ἐπὶ τοὺς βωµοὺς εἰς τοὺς γεννήτας τε καὶ φράτερας. 
  
And he was so intent on completing this quickly, that straightaway he took me 
home and entrusted all his affairs to me, on the grounds that he himself was no 
longer able to do any of these things, and that I was able to do all these things. 
And when the Thargelia came around, he led me to the altars in front of the 
members of his genos and his phratrymen (Isaeus. 7.15). 
According to Thrasyllus’ account, he had already taken over the control of Apollodorus’ 
estate before the adoption had taken place. He was effectively acting as Apollodorus’ 
adopted son, living in his home with the old man, tending to him, and caring for his 
estate, just as his grandfather Archedamus had done when Apollodorus was a child. The 
informal performance came before Apollodorus’ official acknowledgement that he had 
adopted Thrasyllus as his son. This passage indicates that the reality of Thrasyllus’ life 
with Apollodorus validated his later introduction to the genos and phratry.  
 Thrasyllus further argued that other relatives of Apollodorus had recognized his 
right to inherit his adoptive father’s estate. In the present case, Apollodorus’ first cousin, 
the wife of Pronapes, argued that Thrasyllus’ adoption was invalid and so claimed the  
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estate. She had already inherited the estate of her brother, also named Apollodorus, along 
with her nephew, Thrasybulus (Isaeus. 7.19).  As Thrasyllus argued, if his adoption 122
were really invalid, Thrasybulus also should have joined the wife of Pronapes in her 
present lawsuit against him: 
Οὕτως µὲν οὐχ οἱ γεννῆται µόνον καὶ φράτερες γεγόνασι µάρτυρες τῆς ἐµῆς  
ποιήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θρασύβουλος οὐκ ἀµφισβητῶν αὐτὸς ἔργῳ δεδήλωκεν ὅτι  
τὰ πεπραγµένα Ἀπολλοδώρῳ κυρίως ἔχειν νοµίζει καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόµους·   
οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε τοσούτων χρηµάτων οὐκ ἐλάγχανε.   
Thus not only are the member of my genos and of my phratry witnesses of my 
adoption, but also Thrasybulus who, by not disputing the estate, himself by his  
deed made clear that he believes the actions of Apollodorus to be valid and in  
accordance with the laws. For he would not ever let so great a fortune slip by 
(Isaeus. 7.26).  
 Whereas before Thrasyllus stressed the performances of Apollodorus to validate 
his adoptive identity, in this passage he emphasized Thrasybulus’ failure to act.  
Thrasybulus’ choice not to join in the present lawsuit was his tacit admission that  
Thrasyllus was Apollodorus’ rightful heir. Moreover, Thrasyllus listed Thrasybulus’ 
inaction along with the witness testimony of his gennetai and phratrymen as equally 
important proofs of identity. If we were to characterize the Athenian adoption process, 
and the Athenian identification process as a whole, from this passage, we would conclude 
that both consisted of a range of performative acts. To protect their adoptive identity, 
Athenians needed to perform as many of these actions as they could in front as many 
people as they could muster, preferably their relatives, their phratrymen, and their 
demesmen. Conversely, we could also note a range of performances not carried out and 
 The circumstances under which the wife of Pronapes and Thrasybulus inherited the other Apollodorus’ 122
state are a bit confusing. For further clarification, see Wyse 1904, 560-563 (Wyse believed that Thrasyllus 
was telling a blatant lie with this argument); see also Griffith-Williams 2013, 61-68. 
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find that these failures to act were equally important in establishing both adoptive and 
civic identity.  
 In his defense, Thrasyllus also concentrated on his close relationships as informal 
performances of identity. Thrasyllus relied on his connections within Apollodorus’ genos, 
phratry, and deme to overcome some distinct irregularities in his admission into these key 
identifying groups. For one thing, Apollodorus introduced Thrasyllus to his phratrymen 
during the Thargelia, while the Apatouria traditionally was the phratry festival at which 
new members were admitted.  Thrasyllus was able to gloss over this deviation from 123
tradition by stressing Apollodorus’ and his own intimate connections with the members of 
their genos and phratry:  
καὶ τῶν φρατόρων τε καὶ γεννητῶν ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἀπιστούντων ἐµέ τε οὐκ 
ἀγνοούντων, ὅτι ἦν ἐξ ἀδελφῆς αὐτῷ γεγονώς, ἐγγράφουσί µε εἰς τὸ κοινὸν 
γραµµατεῖον ψηφισάµενοι πάντες, ἐπιθέντος ἐκείνου τὴν πίστιν καθ᾽ ἱερῶν.  
Since [Apollodorus’] phratrymen and the members of his genos did not distrust me 
and were not ignorant that I was the son of his sister, they inscribed my name onto 
the public register, all of them having voted, after [Apollodorus] had pledged on the 
sacrificial victims (Isaeus. 7.17).  
The phratrymen not only recognized Thrasyllus as Apollodorus’ heir, but they were 
familiar with him, his family, and their connections to Apollodorus wholly apart from the 
adoption proceedings. The members of the genos and phratry performed this ritual—
Apollodorus swearing on the sacrificial animal and the members voting Thrasyllus into 
their ranks—as an acknowledgement of his relationship with his adoptive  
father. As Thrasyllus argued, that the phratrymen knew the reality of his life together with 
Apollodorus was more important than the ritual itself. Whether the ceremony took place 
 For an excellent discussion of the Apatouria festival, see Lambert 1993, 144-161. 123
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at the Thargelia or at the Apatouria little mattered; his intimate connections with the 
members of his genos and phratry constituted powerful informal performances of 
identity.  
 As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, Thrasyllus’ description of his 
admittance into Apollodorus’ deme revealed other serious irregularities in his adoption. 
After Apollodorus introduced him into his familial phratry, Thrasyllus was forced to 
travel to Delphi for the Pythiad festival. Apollodorus, perhaps sensing that he was near 
death, met with his demesmen, informed them that he had adopted a son, and instructed 
them to enroll him in the deme if he died before Thrasyllus returned (Isaeus. 7.27-28). 
Apollodorus realized that he could best safeguard Thrasyllus’ identity as his adopted son 
by taking advantage of his personal ties within his deme. Just as in his description of his 
enrollment into his genos and phratry, Thrasyllus here stressed that the demesmen carried 
out their rituals as an acknowledgment of their personal relationships with one another. It 
little mattered that Apollodorus was not at the annual meeting to admit Thrasyllus; the 
demesmen’s personal relationship with both men constituted the most powerful 
performative act. That the demesmen enrolled him despite both Apollodorus’ death and 
over the objections of his opponents at the annual deme assembly would also serve as 
compelling evidence that Thrasyllus was Apollodorus’ rightful heir.  
 As in the case of Menecles’ son, Thrasyllus presented proofs of his adoptive 
identity that closely align with evidence offered by litigants defending their civic identity. 
Like Thrasyllus, Euxitheus in Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides stressed that his relatives 
had acknowledged his right to inherit his father’s estate as key evidence in his case (Dem. 
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57.19). Furthermore, both Thrasyllus and the speaker in Isaeus’ On the Estate of 
Euphiletus referred to Athenian greed to strengthen their defense. Both men argued that 
no Athenian citizen would fail to lay claim to a valuable property or devalue his own 
inheritance by claiming another person as an heir (Isaeus. 12.4). Lastly, Apollodorus’ 
intimate relationship with his phratrymen and demesmen closely mirrors the portrait of 
these key identifying groups presented by the speaker in Lysias’ Against Pancleon. In 
Lysias’ work, the speaker argued that Pancleon could not be a citizen because he had no 
personal connections within any of these organizations (Lys. 23.3). In contrast, 
Thrasyllus’ description of Apollodorus’ interactions with the members of his deme 
exemplifies the ideal relationship of an Athenian with the members of these key 
identifying groups. Just as if he were defending his family’s civic identity, Apollodorus 
leveraged his connections within these institutions to protect his own interests and those 
of his adopted son.  
 Although modern scholars have characterized adoption as a private contract 
between adoptive father or as a process meant solely to designate an heir to a property, 
Thrasyllus’ account of his own adoption suggests otherwise. Apollodorus’ adoption of  
Thrasyllus was not unilateral. Both father and son needed to undertake a series of 
performances, in the political and religious realms and outside of them, to safeguard their 
identity in case the adoption was questioned in court. Furthermore, they needed to 
complete these actions in front of witnesses, most especially their relatives and the 
members of their genos, phratry, and deme. Lastly, by law Thrasyllus could only be 
considered Apollodorus’ son if these key identifying groups recognized the validity of the 
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adoption. In short, the procedures by which Athenians confirmed adoptions were exactly 
the same as the methods by which they established citizenship. Any study of legal cases 
centering on citizenship should also take into account speeches that concentrated on 
adoption.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that Athenian adoption involved the same processes 
that Athenians used to establish their civic identities. To view adoption as a private matter 
between the adoptive parent and child ignores the considerable evidence from key legal 
cases of the public nature of the institution. Adoptive identity, just as citizenship, required 
the recognition of the community. These cases also indicate that Athenians believed that 
the state had a vested interest in adoptions. As Thrasyllus himself argued, Apollodorus 
and he were exemplary citizens. Apollodorus never made any attempts to hide his wealth 
but gladly paid taxes to the state. The older man also performed his liturgies 
exceptionally well and won accolades when he sponsored a chorus (Isaeus. 7.40). 
Thrasyllus himself acted as a gymnasiarch (Isaeus. 7.36) and carried out his military 
service as a member of Apollodorus’ tribe (Isaeus. 7.41). He contrasted his own public 
spirit and that of Apollodorus with the greed of his opponents, claiming: 
Καὶ ἐκείνων οὖν ἕνεκα καὶ ἡµῶν εἰκότως ἂν ποιήσαισθε πρόνοιαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ 
τούτων µὲν τριηραρχοῦντα οἶκον πέντε ταλάντων ἀνῃρηκότων καὶ πεπρακότων καὶ 
ἔρηµον πεποιηκότων, ἡµῶν δὲ καὶ λελῃτουργηκότων ἤδη καὶ λῃτουργησόντων, ἐὰν 
ὑµεῖς ἐπικυρώσητε τὴν Ἀπολλοδώρου γνώµην ἀποδόντες ἡµῖν τοῦτον τὸν κλῆρον. 
And accordingly for the sake of those men [our family] and for our sake fittingly 
you should take thought, especially since these men [my opponents] have 
snatched up, sold off, and left desolate [ie. without an heir] an estate which 
supported a trierarchy worth five talents, while we have already performed 
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liturgies and will perform liturgies [in the future], if you ratify the decision of 
Apollodorus by granting us his estate (Isaeus. 7.42). 
In this passage, Thrasyllus painted a complicated portrait of the responsibilities of all the 
parties involved in the adoption process. As he argued, Apollodorus as an estate owner 
had an obligation to ensure that his heirs would continue to use his property to benefit the 
state as a whole. Accordingly, the older man could not leave his property to the wife of 
Pronapes and her representatives, since they had already squandered another property and 
so deprived the Athenian population of key services. Furthermore, adopted children were 
required to use their wealth to the state’s advantage, as described above. Lastly, the 
Athenian jurors had a responsibility to block the claims of litigants who only sought to 
enrich themselves by asserting ownership of valuable estates and to ensure that the true 
wishes of adoptive fathers were respected.  
 It was no coincidence that Thrasyllus linked the duties of adopted children with 
the duties of citizens, since adoption was an integral part of the Athenian identification 
process as a whole. It allowed childless Athenians to safeguard their estates and ensure 
that their heirs would continue to serve the state. Through adoption, citizens could also 
guarantee that their heirs would continue to carry out the cult duties of the household and 
complete the funeral rites for their adoptive fathers. Finally, adoption was an institution 
that played out not just in the political and religious aspects of Athenian life but in daily 
activities as well. As the cases of Menecles and Apollodorus illustrate, the intimate 
relationship and routine interactions between adoptive father and son were key 
components of the adoption process. Menecles’ adopted son stressed that he and his wife 
loved Menecles and cared for him as he aged; he even named his young son for 
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Menecles. Thrasyllus also described his close connection with Apollodorus and the trust 
which the old man placed in him when he gave him control over his estate. Importantly, 
these were relationships which played out in front of key identifying groups like the 
phratry and deme, and both speakers claimed their intimate connections within these 
groups as key proofs of their adoptive identities. Their struggles to prove their adoptive 
identities in court are indicative of the challenges that Athenians as a whole encountered 
in negotiating their citizen identities during their lifetimes and even after death.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Neaira and Phano: Attacks on Women’s Citizenship in Classical Athens 
Introduction 
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταπεινὸν ἡ τιτθή, τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐ φεύγω· οὐ γὰρ εἰ πένητες ἦµεν,  
ἠδικήκαµεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ µὴ πολῖται· οὐδὲ περὶ τύχης οὐδὲ περὶ χρηµάτων ἡµῖν ἐστὶν  
ὁ παρὼν ἀγών, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ γένους. πολλὰ δουλικὰ καὶ ταπεινὰ πράγµατα τοὺς  
ἐλευθέρους ἡ πενία βιάζεται ποιεῖν, ἐφ’ οἷς ἐλεοῖντ’ ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 
δικαιότερον ἢ προσαπολλύοιντο. ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούω, πολλαὶ καὶ τιτθαὶ καὶ ἔριθοι  
καὶ τρυγήτριαι γεγόνασιν ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους  
συµφορῶν ἀσταὶ γυναῖκες, πολλαὶ δ’ ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιαι νῦν. 
For even if a nurse is a lowly thing, I shall not flee the truth; for we would be 
doing wrong, not if we were poor, but if we were not citizens. Nor even is the 
present trial concerning our fortune nor our money but our descent. Poverty forces 
free people to do many slavish and lowly tasks, for which they should be pitied, 
gentlemen, more justly than they should be utterly destroyed. For as I hear, many 
citizen wives became nurses and spinsters and vineyard workers because of the 
misfortunes of the city in those times, and many who were poor then are rich now 
(Dem. 57.45). 
  
 In Against Eubulides, the speaker Euxitheus, defending himself against a charge of 
ξενία, devoted a large portion of his speech to establishing his mother’s citizen status. 
Although Euxitheus proclaimed that his family’s wealth and fortune had no bearing on a 
lawsuit centered on his descent, he did feel compelled to respond to Eubulides’ 
accusations that his mother sold ribbons in the marketplace and worked as a wet-nurse, 
occupations apparently associated with non-citizens (Dem. 57.34-35). Eubulides’ 
allegations demonstrate that the Athenians considered daily activities and work history as 
potent proofs of women’s civic identities. As Euxitheus himself acknowledged, Athenian 
jurors deemed certain occupations “slavish and lowly,” and if citizen-wives engaged in 
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these activities, they were actually putting their status, and the status of their children, at 
risk. Modern scholars often note that it was not technically illegal for citizen-women to 
work outside the home (and indeed, Euxitheus made this exact point), but nevertheless, 
this kind of attack, which was not uncommon, seemed to carry great weight with an 
Athenian jury.  
 In Attic oratory, perhaps the best model of a woman attacked for her daily 
activities and work history would be Neaira, the infamous prostitute against whom 
Theomnestus (aided by his brother-in-law, the orator Apollodorus) brought a charge of 
ξενία as an indirect attack against his political enemy, Stephanus. To attack Neaira and 
prove that she was living illegally as an Athenian citizen, Apollodorus devoted much of 
his supporting speech to Neaira’s work history as a prostitute who lived in Corinth, 
Megara, and Athens. Furthermore, Apollodorus attacked Phano, Neaira’s alleged 
daughter, based on her daily activities, which he believed were proofs of her non-citizen 
identity.  
  In legal speeches, orators such as Apollodorus often cited everyday activities as 
proofs of women’s identities. For example, Apollodorus proved Neaira’s alien status by 
providing witnesses that she had dined and drunk openly with men, behaviors associated 
with prostitutes. These were everyday activities which fall into the second category of 
informal performances I discussed in my introduction. Furthermore, Apollodorus pointed 
to other performative acts in which Neaira and her family engaged with formal 
institutions outside of typical political performances. For example, Apollodorus argued 
that Stephanus’ failure to recover Phano’s dowry from her first husband served as proof 
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that Phano was illegitimate. He also emphasized Phano’s treatment by her male relatives 
and their reluctance to defend her in court on numerous occasions as proof that she and 
her son were non-citizens. These performative acts fall under the first category of 
everyday performances I discussed in my introduction. Both types of performances were 
crucial to determining women’s identities and the identities of their male relatives. 
Although they did not enjoy political power, women in many ways were central to the 
Athenian identification process. 
 In this chapter, I focus on both Neaira and Phano in arguing that women’s daily 
activities were indices of their civic identities. Conversely, their failure to carry out 
everyday duties or aberrant behavior could be taken as proof that they were non-citizens. 
Furthermore, Athenian women were forced to rely on their male relatives to carry out 
certain actions, often in political and religious settings, to establish their civic identities. 
If the male relatives failed to carry out expected rituals or traditions, they, like their 
female relatives, could be vulnerable to attacks in court. Ultimately, I argue that 
Apollodorus’ attacks against Neaira and Phano demonstrate that Athenian families—
fathers, mothers, sons, daughters—essentially shared one civic identity. If a mother’s or 
daughter’s civic identity was cast into doubt, even on the basis of daily activities that fell 
outside the political and the religious spheres, the status of the entire family could be 
threatened. 
 In this chapter, first I examine the scholarship on women’s social status, since 
modern scholars have often debated whether we can even consider Athenian women 
citizens. Having established that the Athenians did have a clear conception of women’s 
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civic identity, I will move on to scholarship that focuses on the methods available to 
Athenian citizen-women to establish their identities within their communities. Then in an 
examination of idealized portraits of Athenian citizen women, I describe the everyday 
activities by which Athenians affirmed women’s status. After that, I use the speech 
featuring Neaira and Phano to argue that Apollodorus’ proofs of the women’s non-citizen 
status exemplify the categories of evidence by which women proved their identities in 
Classical Athenian courts. Finally, I will demonstrate that women’s status as citizens (or 
non-citizens) was crucial to the civic identity and standing of the family as a whole.  
Scholarship on the citizen status of women 
 Litigants like Euxitheus in Against Eubulides clearly considered it crucial to 
establish their mothers’ civic identities as proof of their own civic status in court. 
Euxitheus even laid out his mother’s descent from Damostratus of Melite and called his 
relatives to testify to her identity, completely separate from his proofs for his father’s 
descent (Dem.57.37). It seems surprising then that modern scholars, unable to maintain a 
consistent definition of Athenian citizenship, have continued to debate whether women 
were citizens in Classical Athens.   124
 Modern scholars have often struggled to include women in their definition of 
citizenship.  They will often acknowledge that legislation like Pericles’ Citizenship Law 125
of 451/0 BCE and texts like the Constitution of the Athenians indicate that the Athenians 
 For a good summary of this scholarship, see Osborne 2011, 91. 124
 See also Finley 1981; Todd 1993; Walter 1993; Manville 1990; Cartledge 2000; Hall 2007; Ober 2009; 125
Rhodes 2009. 
 '110
considered women citizens, but they struggle to implement this idea throughout their 
arguments. For example, in his classic textbook, Mogens Hansen initially adopted a 
gender-neutral definition of Athenian citizenship: “At Athens, in the fourth century at any 
rate, a citizen could be defined as someone whose parents were Athenian citizens.”  126
Like many other modern scholars, however, Hansen conceptualized the Greek polis and 
the people who lived within it as a strictly political enterprise in which women could not 
take part.  Hansen focused on political rights as the defining privilege of citizenship. He 127
argued that these rights “were more than just a ‘privilege’: they constituted ‘the essence 
of citizenship’.”  Hansen thus departed from his original inclusive definition of the 128
citizen body and focused instead on the exclusionary nature of Athenian citizenship. He 
contrasted the full rights enjoyed by adult male citizens with the limited rights of metics 
and slaves.  Furthermore, in his consideration of the rights and duties of citizenship, 129
Hansen made no further mention of female citizens, presumably because they lacked 
what he termed “the essence of citizenship”.  
  Hansen, with his inconsistent view of Athenian citizenship, was not alone in being 
unable to reconcile the role that female citizens played in the polis with their non-
participation in democratic institutions. Philip Manville also initially provided a gender-
neutral definition of citizenship: “To be an Athenian citizen, as an Athenian himself might 
 Hansen 1991, 94. 126
 See Osborne 2011, 91. 127
 See Hansen 1991, 97. 128
 Josiah Ober, too, focused on the exclusionary nature of citizenship in his consideration of the citizen 129
body as the Athenian “in-group” which stood in opposition to foreigners and slaves, the “out-group.” See 
Ober 2009, 261. 
 '111
say, was to be someone who metechei tes poleos: someone who shares in the polis.”  130
Manville was then quick to exclude women from the citizen body, closely following 
Aristotle’s definition of citizenship in the Constitution of the Athenians—that citizens 
were males who had reached the age of eighteen ([Arist]. Ath.Pol.42.1). Also like 
Hansen, Manville viewed the question of Athenian citizenship through Aristotle’s lens in 
the Politics, one that focused almost exclusively on the role of citizens within the 
political realm. Manville, however, did go so far as to acknowledge that “other Athenian 
groups, women and children, deserve a brief mention because of their ambiguous position 
in the society.”  He conceded, for example, that women held an interest in the state 131
through their male children, who would become citizens.   132
 Josine Blok offers key critiques of these earlier views of Athenian citizenship. 
Blok criticizes scholars who have centered their definitions of citizenship around 
Aristotle’s Politics and the Constitution of the Athenians, since this focus limits their 
work to only the political aspects of citizenship. In her definition of citizenship, Blok 
focuses not on the old Aristotelian standbys but on Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides.  133
As Blok argues, the speaker Euxitheus emphasized not the political offices that he had 
held but the local cults in which both he and his father were involved. In Blok’s 
estimation, the Athenians defined citizenship not by the holding of political office but by 
 See Manville 1990, 6-7. Josine Blok later criticized Manville in this definition, pointing out that Athe130 -
nians also described female citizens as “sharing in the polis.” See Blok 2017, 33 n. 94. 
 Manville 1990, 12-13. 131
 P.J. Rhodes held a similar opinion: see Rhodes 2009, 60. See also Finley 1981 and Todd 1993.132
 See especially Blok 2017, 1-43. 133
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participation in the state religion and local cult. Blok thus considers Athenian women full 
citizens because they could freely participate in the religious institutions of the state.  
 Blok also draws attention to a third vein of scholarship whose adherents have 
generally not gained traction with traditionalists. This third group of scholars, who have 
most influenced my arguments in this chapter, seeks to answer the key question: how 
could women be considered citizens in Classical Athens if they did not participate in the 
governing of the state? In a 1995 article, Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood argued that 
women did not act as a complement to and an equal of men within the space of the 
household but were subordinate to men.   She believed that women’s position in the 134
household mirrored their positions in the legal and political spheres. Sourvinou-Inwood 
further asserted that only in the state religion and local cults did women play an equal and 
complementary role to their male counterparts. Long before Blok, Sourvinou-Inwood 
considered women’s participation in religious cults a crucial means of establishing their 
citizen identity.   135
 Cynthia Patterson has further considered Athenians’ perceptions of female 
citizenship in the Athenian law courts in her examination of Against Neaira.  Patterson 136
argued that Apollodorus purposefully linked the private with the public realm in his 
depiction of Neaira and Phano as conniving women who manipulated men like 
Stephanus, Phrastor, and Theogenes to gain access to the citizen body. In Patterson’s 
 See Sourvinou-Inwood 1995, 111-120. 134
 See also Cohen 2002, 46-48, where Cohen emphasizes the crucial role which Athenian citizen-women 135
played in state and local cults.
 Patterson 1994, 199-216.  136
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estimation, Apollodorus placed legitimate marriage at the center of the Athenian civic 
ideology of the fourth century BCE. Patterson’s arguments are significant to my own in 
two ways: first because she acknowledged that the Athenians had a clear conception of 
female citizenship as seen through Apollodorus’ negative depiction of Neaira and Phano 
as absurd caricatures of Athenian citizen-wives; second, because Patterson recognized 
that the Athenians considered everyday behaviors crucial to establishing citizen identity.  
 In a departure from previous scholars, Adele Scafuro began her seminal article 
with the assumption that women were citizens. She instead focused on the methods by 
which women established their citizenship given their non-participation in political 
institutions. Scafuro argued that an Athenian woman established and proved her civic 
identity “by witnesses to her descent at kin and communal events and by participation in 
some of those events.”  Scafuro’s arguments are significant to my own work because 137
she recognized that, like men, women needed to establish their identities throughout their 
lives in multiple communal events and not only in a religious context. Furthermore, 
Scafuro observed that women often relied on their male relatives to participate in these 
communal events on their behalf.  
 In this chapter, I build on this third vein of scholarship in particular in my own 
consideration of women’s citizenship in Classical Athens. Like Sourvinou-Inwood and 
Blok, I consider Athenian women to be citizens whose participation in religious cults 
served as a potent proof of their citizen identity, but not the only or most important proof. 
 Scafuro 1994, 162. See also Cohen 2002, 38-39. See also Blok 2017, 41-43; Josine Blok built on Sca137 -
furo’s arguments and claimed convincingly that women often took prominent roles in the celebration of 
public sacrifices or other religious ceremonies reserved for ἀσταί. As I wrote above, to Blok, a woman’s 
participation in the state religion and local cults constituted her citizen identity.
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Here I argue that Athenians considered observed activities of daily life as equally 
important proofs of both citizen and non-citizen status, especially for female citizens who 
could not participate in key identifying institutions like the deme and phratry. In the next 
section, I support my argument by demonstrating the prevalence of quotidian activities as 
evidence litigants offered in court to both prove and disprove women’s civic status.  
The ideal woman: Xenophon’s wife  
 In the past thirty years, scholars have cast some doubt on the traditional depiction 
of  Athenian women as confined in the home and barred from participation in   
social, political, and economic institutions. For example, David Cohen has argued 
convincingly that the ideological portrait of the citizen-wife presented in drama and  
oratory differed greatly from reality.  He noted that Athenian women worked in 
agriculture and wet-nursing, actively participated in state and local religious festivals, and 
regularly visited friends and neighbors.  In Cohen’s view, the women in Aristophanes’ 138
comedies, women who actively engaged in their communities, are more representative of 
the realities of Athenian life than Xenophon’s meek wife who was kept indoors in his 
Oeconomicus, to name one example.   139
 The recognition that Athenian women played a more active role in Athenian 
society than originally thought should not, however, minimize the complexity and 
precariousness of their citizenship status. For all of his insights, Cohen passed over the 
 See D. Cohen 1989, 3-15.138
 See D. Cohen 1989, 8. See also: Cohen 2002, 30-48.139
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dangers that Athenian citizen-women could face when they deviated from societal norms. 
For example, to demonstrate the variety of professions that Athenian women could take 
up, Cohen cited two passages from Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides, in which Euxitheus 
described his mother’s work as a ribbon-seller and a wet-nurse (Dem. 57.30-31).  Yet 140
he overlooked that the prosector Eubulides treated this work history as proof of this 
woman’s non-citizen status. By crossing the threshold of the home into the marketplace, 
Euxitheus’ mother not only jeopardized her own civic identity but also her son’s. In this 
section, I examine the ideological portraits of the ideal Athenian citizen-wife whose 
domain was the home and whose master was her husband, and the dangerous depictions 
of non-citizen women who worked outside the home and dominated their husbands and 
lovers.    
 Scholars like Adele Scafuro and Josine Blok have described in detail the 
communal events in which Athenian women participated to establish their citizen status. 
As Scafuro noted, when a citizen had a daughter, he would acknowledge her legitimacy 
at the purification rituals (ἀµφιδρόµια) performed after her birth and on her name-giving 
day (celebrated on the seventh or tenth day after her birth).  When a citizen gave his 141
daughter in marriage, her husband’s phratrymen would celebrate the occasion at the 
wedding feast (γαµηλία).  When the daughter’s own children were married to other 142
 See D. Cohen 1989, 7.140
 See Scafuro 1994, 162-164. See also Isaeus 3 .30: Xenocles claimed the estate of Pyrrhus on behalf of 141
his wife, Phile, whom he claimed was Pyrrhus’ child. He called as witnesses her uncles, who testified that 
they were present at her ten-day naming ceremony (Isaeus. 3.30). 
 See Dem. 30.21; Dem. 57.54; Isaeus. 8.19.  142
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Athenian citizens, and when her sons were admitted into their father’s genos, phratry and 
deme, these events too would serve as proof of her citizen identity.  Blok has also 143
catalogued the numerous festivals in which Athenian women played crucial roles, most 
notably the Thesmophoria.  144
 Perhaps Xenophon described the daily activities which ideal Athenian citizen-
wives were expected to perform in the home most succinctly in his Oeconomicus: 
(35) Δεήσει µέντοι σε, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔνδον τε µένειν καὶ οἷς µὲν ἂν ἔξω τὸ ἔργον ᾖ  
τῶν οἰκετῶν, τούτους συνεκπέµπειν, οἷς δ’ (36) ἂν ἔνδον ἔργον ἐργαστέον, τούτων 
σοι ἐπιστατητέον, καὶ τά τε εἰσφερόµενα ἀποδεκτέον καὶ ἃ µὲν ἂν αὐτῶν δέῃ  
δαπανᾶν σοὶ διανεµητέον, ἃ δ’ ἂν περιττεύειν δέῃ, προνοητέον καὶ φυλακτέον  
ὅπως µὴ ἡ εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν κειµένη δαπάνη εἰς τὸν µῆνα δαπανᾶται. καὶ ὅταν ἔρια 
εἰσενεχθῇ σοι, ἐπιµελητέον ὅπως οἷς δεῖ ἱµάτια γίγνηται. καὶ ὅ γε ξηρὸς σῖτος 
ὅπως καλῶς ἐδώδιµος γίγνηται ἐπιµελητέον. 
(35) You will need to remain indoors, I said, and to send out those of the servants 
whose work is outdoors, (36) and you must manage those who must work indoors, 
and you must receive the things that have come [into the household], and you must 
distribute those things that must be spent, and you must watch over those things 
that need to be put away and guard them so that the sum that has been laid away for 
the year is not spent in a month. And when wool is brought in to you, you must see 
to it that cloaks are made for those who need them. And you must take care that the 
dry corn is in a good edible condition (Xen. Oec.7.35-36). 
Generally, when Classical scholars have examined this passage, they consider 
Xenophon’s orders a reflection of the standards of Athenian society: a woman was kept 
cloistered, her duty to remain in the household and manage it discreetly and efficiently in 
partnership with her husband. I would argue, however, that Xenophon has given a 
detailed description of the ideal work history for an Athenian housewife, a work history 
that in large part defined her identity. The tasks that a wife undertook, managing the 
household stores and supervising the maids when they spun wool and weaved cloaks, 
 See Dem. 59.59: Conversely, the rejection of Phano’s son by her husband Phrastor’s genos is taken as 143
proof of her illegitimacy. 
 See Blok 2017, 204-206. See also Isaeus. 8.20. 144
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were not simply mundane chores—they were also the critical performances she needed to 
carry out to maintain her status in society.  
 Numerous ancient authors described the boundary between the household and the 
outside world which only men were empowered to cross without fear of retribution. The 
ideal citizen-woman, whether wife or daughter, was expected to remain in the home. For 
example, in a number of his tragedies, Euripides portrayed women as apologizing for 
leaving the house because women were expected to remain indoors.  Even within the 145
household, the citizen-wife respected the boundaries laid down by her husband. Often, 
women had their own quarters within the home.  When her husband had guests over or 146
even held symposia, the citizen-wife might help prepare for the gathering but then retire 
to these rooms.   147
 The model citizen-wife was also defined by her relationships with her male 
relatives, particularly her husband. Both wife and husband had specific performances that 
they needed to carry out in their marriage. The citizen-wife tended the home and obeyed 
the husband, who gave orders and took reasonable measures to control his spouse’s 
behavior. Consider Lysias’ On the Murder of Eratosthenes, in which the speaker 
Euphiletus depicted his adulterous wife as the consummate actress who perfectly 
mimicked the conduct of the ideal citizen-wife.  He painted a perfect picture of his 
marriage—his wife was a frugal housekeeper (Lys. 1.7); she took care of their child by 
 See Eur. Tr.645; Eur. Heracl.474; Eur. Andr.943; Eur. Or.108; Eur. El.343.145
 See Lys. 1.9. 146
 See Ar. Lys.130-134, 1060-1071; Pl. Symp.176e.  147
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breastfeeding it and tending to it when it cried (Lys. 1.9); she acted pleased when her 
husband returned from the country to the house (Lys. 1.12). Even when Euphiletus 
described an argument with his wife during which he ordered her downstairs to care for 
their child, he noted that she complied as a good citizen-wife should (Lys. 1.13). He 
declared, “I was so foolish that I thought my wife was the most chaste of all the wives in 
the city.”  Euphiletus accounted for his own failure to recognize his wife’s affair by 148
pointing to her behavior. How could he suspect anything of her, when she seemed a 
paragon of wifely virtues?  
 The ideal citizen-wife was also defined by her relationships with other men, or 
rather, her lack of relationships with men outside her immediate family. Women were not 
allowed to socialize with men outside their family, and societal standards dictated that 
male visitors not call on a household without the man of house being present. In Lysias’ 
Against Simon, the speaker claimed, “My sister and nieces…have lived such orderly lives 
that they feel shame to be seen even by their male relatives” (Lys. 3.6).  In another 149
fragmentary speech of Lysias, Against Diogeiton, the unnamed speaker described a 
mother’s hesitance  to speak in front of her male relatives even to defend her two sons 
who stood to lose their inheritance: 
εἰποῦσα ὅτι, εἰ καὶ µὴ πρότερον εἴθισται λέγειν ἐν ἀνδράσι, τὸ µέγεθος αὐτὴν    
ἀναγκάσει τῶν συµφορῶν περὶ τῶν σφετέρων κακῶν δηλῶσαι πάντα πρὸς ἡµᾶς. 
 Lys. 1.10. The Greek reads: ἀλλ’ οὕτως ἠλιθίως διεκείµην, ὥστε ᾤµην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα πασῶν 148
σωφρονεστάτην εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.
 The full Greek reads: πυθόµενος γὰρ ὅτι τὸ µειράκιον ἦν παρ’ ἐµοί, ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν 149
οἰκίαν τὴν ἐµὴν νύκτωρ µεθύων, ἐκκόψας τὰς θύρας εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὴν γυναικωνῖτιν, ἔνδον  
οὐσῶν τῆς τε ἀδελφῆς τῆς ἐµῆς καὶ τῶν ἀδελφιδῶν, αἳ οὕτω κοσµίως βεβιώκασιν ὥστε καὶ  
ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ὁρώµεναι αἰσχύνεσθαι.
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She said that, even if she were not accustomed to speak among men before [this 
occasion], the magnitude of their misfortunes would force her to make all of their 
evils clear to us (Lys. 32.11). 
In the speaker’s estimation, only the greatest danger to her children would compel the 
ideal citizen-wife to break her silence and speak out among a group of men, even if they 
were friends and relatives.  
 As we will see, Apollodorus played on Athenian civic ideology surrounding  
marriage and the portrait of the ideal citizen-wife in his prosecution of Neaira. Again and 
again, he depicted Neaira and her daughter Phano as disregarding the societal norms that 
controlled women’s behavior. In Apollodorus’ narrative, Neaira, born a slave, worked as a 
prostitute traveling through Corinth, Megara, and Athens, shattering the stereotype of the 
Athenian wife who managed the household and kept indoors. She kept company with 
strange men, drinking and dining with them late into the night, actions that would horrify 
the meek ladies depicted in Lysias’ speeches. Neaira’s daughter Phano later behaved so 
deplorably to her first husband that he divorced her on the grounds that no good citizen-
wife would act in such a manner. Thus, Apollodorus’ narrative highlights the dangers that 
women could encounter if their everyday behavior failed to conform to the standards of 
Athenian society.  
Neaira  
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 Although scholars, writers, and translators have taken different approaches to 
Against Neaira, they all generally agree about the extraordinary nature of the speech.  150
From a legal perspective, the speech is the sole surviving prosecution on the charge of 
ξενία, and it is one of two surviving speeches that prosecutes a woman (the other being 
Antiphon’s Against the Stepmother). Furthermore, the laws restricting marriages between 
aliens and Athenian citizens (both male and female) survive only as quoted in Against 
Neaira. From a social perspective, the content of the speech also provides some 
extraordinary details about the lives of ἑταίραι (prostitutes) in both Athens and other city-
states. Apollodorus’ arguments, especially those on Phano, also give modern scholars a 
clear picture of the social and religious roles that Athenian citizen women were expected 
to fill.  
  Scholars who studied Against Neaira in the early twentieth century concentrated 
on what they considered Apollodorus’ “real motive” for bringing his prosecution.  For 151
example, Macurdy dated the speech to 340 BCE and argued that Apollodorus, allied with 
Demosthenes, planned to propose that the Athenians divert the Theoric fund to the war 
effort against the Macedonians. Apollodorus brought the suit against Neaira to 
disenfranchise her lover Stephanus, his old political enemy, and remove him from the 
political scene, so that he could not stand against Apollodorus and Demosthenes. In 
 See Macurdy 1942, 269-270; Hansen 1976; Carey 1991; Carey 1992; Trevett 1992, especially chapter 150
3; Patterson 1994; Kapparis 1999, 1-2; Hamel 2003; Glazebrook 2005, 161; Bakewell 2008/2009. Al-
though Kapparis’ commentary has proven tremendously helpful in writing this study, I have chosen not to 
discuss it in my survey of scholarship on Against Neaira. In my view, Kapparis’ work is a synthesis of 
materials relevant to Neaira rather than an argumentative study. 
 Macurdy 1942, 258. See also Hansen 1976 for a discussion of the Theoric fund in Against Neaira.  151
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Macurdy’s interpretation, “[Neaira] is really of no importance in the case expect for the 
purpose of discrediting Stephanus.”  Macurdy dismissed Apollodorus’ arguments 152
against Neaira almost entirely by claiming that he had proven Neaira a prostitute but not 
an alien, since it was not illegal for women citizens to work as prostitutes.  In her 153
cursory examination of the attacks against Neaira, Macurdy overlooked that Apollodorus 
played on Athenian prejudices and relied on extra-legal proofs of identity in his depiction 
of Neaira and her daughter Phano.  
 In more recent scholarship, Patterson has considered Against Neaira as a 
representation of Athenian civic ideology. As Patterson argues, Apollodorus drew on the 
ideology of the Athenian family and household to portray Neaira and her (alleged) 
daughter Phano as pernicious women who usurped the rights of citizenship and so 
threatened Athenian societal norms.  Patterson’s work has perhaps most influenced my 154
own study of Against Neaira. She has repeatedly argued that the Athenians considered 
women full citizens and not simply place markers by whom Athenian men could beget 
legitimate sons.  Patterson has also argued that the Athenian family and interpersonal 155
relationships defined citizenship at least in part. Although Patterson has done much to 
advance the study of Athenian women’s civic identities, in her article on Against Neaira, 
 Macurdy 1942, 268. Phano is even less important in Macurdy’s arguments—she appears three times in 152
the article. 
 Macurdy 1942, 267. 153
 Patterson 1994, 199-200. 154
 I also discussed this above. See Patterson 1994, 201-203. See also Patterson 1987, where Patterson 155
discusses the terminology for women citizens. 
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she completely passes over Apollodorus’ accusations against Neaira and does not 
consider the informal performances to which he pointed to prove Neaira an alien.  156
 Most recently, Glazebrook has placed Apollodorus’ depiction of Neaira in the 
wider context of Attic oratory. She argues that Apollodorus exploited common 
stereotypes of alien women and prostitutes to render Neaira completely despicable to the 
Athenian jurors. Most in line with my own work, Glazebrook considers Neaira almost a 
stock character in Athenian legal speeches and compares her portrayal with the 
characterizations of women like Phile’s mother in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Ciron (3), Alce 
in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon (6), Olympiodorus’ unnamed companion in 
Demosthenes’ Against Olympiodorus (48), and Plangon in Against Boeotus I and II (39 
and 40). Like researchers before her, however, Glazebrook considers Apollodorus’ 
accusations as titillating stories meant to scandalize his Athenian audience rather than as 
serious legal arguments that he supported with proofs of Neaira’s identity.  157
 In modern studies of Against Neaira, scholars have generally dismissed 
Apollodorus’ attacks against Neaira and Phano, because he relied in large part on extra-
legal proofs and informal performances of identity to establish the status of both women. 
Here I take an altogether different approach. Drawing on the themes I have already 
established in the foregoing chapters, I consider Apollodorus’ arguments against Neaira 
and Phano as serious attacks supported by informal proofs of their identity that Athenian 
jurors would nevertheless find compelling. As with Apollodorus’ argument against 
 She claims that “the details of Neaira’s legal and social status or of earlier litigation concerning that 156
status are outside of the scope of this essay.” See Patterson 1994, 207.
 See Glazebrook 2005, 163-164. 157
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Neaira, Athenian litigants commonly discredited women by claiming that they were non-
citizens.  They often based their arguments on the everyday activities of these women 158
and their male relatives, particularly if the women had engaged in aberrant behavior. 
Furthermore, as Apollodorus argued against Phano, litigants often emphasized women’s 
relationships with their male relatives, especially if the women had exercised undue 
influence over men (as in inheritance cases), or if men failed to protect their female 
relatives in court. Thus the speech against Neaira lays out categories of evidence that 
were commonly used to prove that a woman was a non-citizen. 
   To begin: in his case against Neaira, Apollodorus (acting as advocate for 
Theomnestus) had to prove two central points: first, that Neaira was a non-citizen, and 
second, that she had been living as a citizen-wife with Stephanus against the laws of 
Athens. Here I consider Neaira’s status as a slave and prostitute in full detail, since 
Apollodorus was attempting to prove that Neaira was an alien by following established 
legal categories that centered on women’s behavior in everyday life. 
 We can gain a richer understanding of the prosecution against Neaira by examining 
once more Euxitheus’ defense of his mother in Against Eubulides. I believe Euxitheus’ 
arguments concerning his mother’s status best exemplify the proofs of identity by which 
Athenians could establish women’s civic identities in court: 
ἀλλ’ εἰ µὲν ξένη ἦν, τὰ τέλη ἐξετάσαντας τὰ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, εἰ ξενικὰ ἐτέλει, καὶ  
ποδαπὴ ἦν ἐπιδεικνύντας· εἰ δὲ δούλη, µάλιστα µὲν τὸν πριάµενον, εἰ δὲ µή, τὸν  
ἀποδόµενον ἥκειν καταµαρτυροῦντα, εἰ δὲ µή, τῶν ἄλλων τινά, ἢ ὡς ἐδούλευσεν ἢ 
ὡς ἀφείθη ἐλευθέρα. νῦν δὲ τούτων µὲν ἀπέδειξεν οὐδέν, λελοιδόρηκεν δέ, ὡς  
ἐµοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὔ.  
 In some extraordinary circumstances, speakers might even argue that their opponents had fabricated 158
the existence of certain female relatives to damage their case. See especially Isaeus’ On the Estate of 
Philoctemon and the pseudo-Demosthenic Against Macartatus. 
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But if she were an alien, [they ought] to have examined the tolls in the market, 
[and] to have demonstrated whether she paid the metic-tax, and from where she 
came; and if she were a slave, the one who sold her [ought] to have come to give 
testimony against her, and if not he, the one who bought her, and if not those men, 
someone else to testify that she lived as a slave or that she had been set free. But 
now he has shown none of these things, but, as it seems to me, he has done nothing 
but slander (Dem. 57.34).  
Conveniently, Euxitheus precisely laid out the proofs that his opponent Eubulides should 
have offered to prove that his mother was a metic. Furthermore, if a litigant were 
attempting to prove that his opponent was a metic, he might also provide evidence that 
the opponent had participated in a trial before the polemarch, the Athenian official who 
presided over metic affairs.  Notably, the critical proofs that separated a citizen woman 159
from a metic were not based on any political or religious performances but on daily 
occurrences.  
 Likewise, if Euxitheus’ mother were a slave, Eubulides ought to have provided her 
owner as a witness against her, or at the very least, someone who could bear witness “that 
she lived as slave.” Although Eubulides had indeed accused Euxitheus’ mother of some 
serious breaches in behavior by working outside the home, apparently, he had failed to 
produce witnesses to her actions. Eubulides’ argument then prompts the question: what 
did “living as a slave” mean to an Athenian jury? For Athenian women, crossing that 
boundary between home and the outside world could constitute slavish behavior. 
Consider the differences between the idealized portrait of the citizen-wife presented by 
Xenophon and Lysias and Apollodorus’ caricature of the former slave Neaira. The perfect 
wife worked in the home supervising the household slaves, and she was subservient to 
 See especially Lys. 23.3; Dem. 59.40. 159
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her husband. She never ventured outside without a chaperone, and she never associated 
with men outside her family. As if Apollodorus were checking off a list, he depicted 
Neaira breaking every one of these societal norms. She worked outside the home and 
traveled across several city-states on her own initiative. She was promiscuous; she fled 
from Phrynion, an Athenian man who partially owned her, to take up with Stephanus. 
Furthermore, Neaira openly dined and drank in the company of strange omen and acted 
in every way a prostitute and a slave.  
 In sum, Athenian litigants could prove someone a slave first by pointing to certain 
legal proofs; for example, to establish Neaira was a former slave, Apollodorus summoned 
witnesses to testify that many people had owned her over the course of her life. He also 
provided evidence that Stephanus had participated in an arbitration where Neaira was 
treated as a slave woman. In this kind of performative act, Stephanus engaged with a 
formal institution, like publicly appointed arbitrators, outside of typical political 
performances. An Athenian might also prove someone a slave in court by pointing to 
their behaviors, those truly everyday performances of identity. Apollodorus, for example, 
repeatedly stressed that Neaira had openly dined with men outside her family. While this 
was not illegal, Apollodorus treated this as particularly damning evidence against Neaira.  
 To open his case, Apollodorus needed to establish that Neaira was indeed a slave 
and had engaged in slavish behaviors. He called Philostratus as his first witness to testify 
that Neaira had belonged to a madam named Nicarete and that she had stayed in his home 
with Metaneira at the behest of Lysias: 
ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑ.  
Φιλόστρατος Διονυσίου Κολωνῆθεν µαρτυρεῖ εἰδέναι Νέαιραν Νικαρέτης οὖσαν,  
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ἧσπερ καὶ Μετάνειρα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατάγεσθαι παρ’ αὑτῷ, ὅτε εἰς τὰ µυστήρια  
ἐπεδήµησαν ἐν Κορίνθῳ οἰκοῦσαι·καταστῆσαι δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς αὑτὸν Λυσίαν τὸν  
Κεφάλου, φίλον ὄντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐπιτήδειον.   
Witness testimony:  
Philostratus the son of Dionysus of the deme Colonus bears witness that he knew 
Neaira used to be the slave of Nicarete, to whom Metaneira also belonged, and that 
they stayed in his house when [they came] for the Mysteries [and] that they were 
residents in Corinth. And [he bore witness] that Lysias the son of Cephaleus, his 
close friend and associate, established them in his house (Dem. 59.23). 
Notably, Philostratus was the first witness whom Apollodorus called in his speech, which 
suggests that the evidence he provided formed the basis for Apollodorus’ case against 
Neaira. Although Neaira had been active as a prostitute in Corinth before she met 
Philostratus, this was her first visit to Athens. Philostratus was thus one of the first 
Athenians to meet Neaira and to witness her relationship with Nicarete, her mistress, and 
with her fellow slave, Metaneira. Philostratus’ testimony established Nicarete’s legal 
ownership of Neaira, a legal proof of identity that did not center on normal political or 
religious performances. In fact, Lysias seems to have used the Mysteries as an excuse to 
bring his lover Metaneira to Athens. Philostratus simply testified that Neaira had stayed 
in his home and that she had a slave-master relationship with Nicarete. 
 At a later point in the speech, Apollodorus also called one Philagrus to testify that 
Phrynion, an Athenian, had purchased Neaira from Timanoridas the Corinthian and 
Eucrates the Leucadian, the two men who had purchased her from Nicarete (Dem. 59.32). 
Apollodorus gave his audience a clear picture of Neaira’s history as a slave and the long 
list of people who had owned her. First, Nicarete had purchased her as a small girl and 
trained her as a prostitute. Timanoridas and Eucrates then purchased Neaira for their own 
pleasure; they later sold her when they wished to marry and presumably lead more 
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respectable lives (Dem. 59.30). Third, Phrynion, another customer and lover of Neaira, 
purchased her and brought her to Athens. Apollodorus called these witnesses not simply 
to slander Neaira, although the description of Neaira’s pleas to her numerous lovers to 
help her buy her freedom from Timanoridas and Eucrates would seem quite damning. 
Rather, in these passages Apollodorus laid out a chain of custody over Neaira, tracing the 
people who had bought and sold her, from Corinth to Megara and finally to Athens 
herself.  
  Apollodorus carefully followed the formula that he had laid out in the opening of 
his supporting speech; he established that Neaira had belonged to multiple owners, while 
he proved that she had lived and worked as a slave. After his initial description of her 
early childhood, Apollodorus recounted how Neaira first came to Athens as a companion 
to Metaneira, another prostitute and the lover of Lysias the orator, when she came to be 
initiated in the Mysteries. Lysias, unable to house Neaira, Metaneira, and their mistress 
Nicarete in his own home with his wife and elderly mother, had them room with 
Philostratus of Colonus, an unmarried man (Dem. 59.22). Here Apollodorus established 
the relationship between Nicarete, Neaira, and Metaneira. They were not relatives or 
friends but mistress and slaves. Furthermore, he contrasted Nicarete, Neaira and 
Metaneira with Lysias’ lawful wife and mother. The women were not even allowed to 
stay in the same house as two respectable Athenian citizen-women; only an unmarried 
man could house them without scandal. Apollodorus’ narrative suggests that citizen-
women and foreign prostitutes like Neaira simply did not operate in the same circles of 
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society. These explicit details of the complicated transactions involving Neaira and her 
companions made his accusations against Neaira even more vivid for an Athenian jury. 
  Apollodorus provided further evidence that Neaira had “lived as a slave.” He 
called a certain Euphiletus and Aristomachus to testify that Neaira had come to Athens as 
the companion of Simus the Thessalian to attend the Panathenaea festival. The two men 
also bore witness that Neaira and Simus had lodged with a certain Ctesippus and that 
Neaira drank with them while many other men were present at Ctesippus’ house (Dem.  
59.25). Again, Apollodorus treated the Panathenaea festival as a simple excuse for Neaira 
to come to Athens and ply her trade. Apollodorus clearly considered the fact that she 
openly celebrated and drank with guests in the house of Ctesippus as the true proof of her 
slave origins. Again, he stressed the private events that occurred in the home and not her 
participation or non-participation in any political or religious activities to prove Neaira’s 
identity. As Apollodorus argued, Neaira had not only crossed the invisible boundary 
between the home and the outside world, but her open interactions with men breached 
almost all Athenian social norms that controlled women’s behavior.  
 Apollodorus also established that Neaira had lived and worked as a prostitute in 
her native Corinth. In the third deposition of the case, Apollodorus called on the actor 
Hipparchus to bear witness to two kinds of informal performances that Neaira had carried 
out as a prostitute. First, he testified that he and the poet Xenocleides had hired Neaira as 
a prostitute in Corinth, evidence of her work history that fell outside the political and 
religious spectrums. Second, Hipparchus claimed that she drank publicly with him and 
Xenocleides, a truly quotidian performative act (Dem. 59.26; 59.28). I do not believe that 
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Apollodorus was simply attempting to slander Neaira by producing Hipparchus as a 
witness, although that was surely one of the reasons he called on him to testify. Rather, 
Hipparchus established that she had worked as a prostitute in Corinth for a substantial 
amount of time, enough time that she acquired some fame. Like her fellow slave 
Metaneira, who had attracted Lysias as a lover, Neaira also consorted with famous men 
from across Greece.   
 Apollodorus called other witnesses to testify that Neaira continued to work as a 
prostitute after Phrynion had purchased her from Timanoridas and Eucrates and brought 
her to Athens. He claimed that Phrynion lived an extravagant lifestyle with Neaira, 
bringing her to many dinners and celebrations. Apollodorus then called Chionides of 
Xypetê and Euthetion of Cydathenaeum to testify about one particularly wild party: 
(33) καὶ ὡς ἄλλους τε πολλοὺςἐπὶ κῶµον ἔχων ἦλθεν αὐτὴν καὶ ὡς Χαβρίαν τὸν  
Αἰξωνέα, ὅτεἐνίκα ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος τὰ Πύθια τῷ τεθρίππῳ ὃἐπρίατο παρ
ὰ τῶν παίδων τῶν Μίτυος τοῦ Ἀργείου, καὶ ἥκωνἐκ Δελφῶν εἱστία τὰ ἐπινίκια ἐπὶ  
Κωλιάδι. καὶ ἐκεῖ ἄλλοι τεπολλοὶ συνεγίγνοντο αὐτῇ µεθυούσῃ καθεύδοντος τοῦ
Φρυνίωνος, καὶ οἱ διάκονοι οἱ Χαβρίου τράπεζαν παραθέµενοι. (34) 
καὶ ὅτι ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ λέγω, τοὺς ὁρῶντας ὑµῖν καὶπαρόντας µάρτυρας παρέξοµαι.  
καί µοι κάλει Χιωνίδην Ξυπεταιόνα καὶ Εὐθετίωνα Κυδαθηναιᾶ. 
(33) And, having her [Neaira] with him, [Phrynion] went to many homes for 
revelry and to the house of Chabrias of Aexonê, when, in the archonship of 
Socratidas [373 BCE], he won at the Pythian games with the four-horse chariot 
which he bought from the sons of Mitys the Argive, and returning from Delphi he 
gave a victory feast at Colias. And there many other men had intercourse with her 
when she was drunk, while Phynion slept, even the serving men of Chabrias 
waiting the table. (34) And that I tell the truth, I shall present as witnesses for you 
those who saw [these things] and were present. And call for me Chionides of 
Xypetê and Euthetion of Cydathenaeum (Dem. 59.33-34).  
Apollodorus seems to have treated this episode as the climax of his narrative of Neaira’s 
life as a courtesan before she fell in with Stephanus. But consider the extraordinary 
nature of Chionides and Euthetion’s testimony. Both men witnessed that Neaira engaged 
in sex with many men at Chabrias’ victory feast, openly and before many witnesses. We 
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could easily dismiss this testimony as slander, meant to tarnish Neaira’s reputation. Yet 
we also need to consider the details that Apollodorus listed about this incident.  
 Not only did Apollodorus specify that Chabrias of Aexonê threw this particular 
party; he also identified the occasion for which he organized the feast—to celebrate his 
victory at the Pythian games—and stated the archon year. Why would Apollodorus 
provide such extensive detail, even naming the people from whom Chabrias purchased 
his four-horse chariot? Apollodorus considered Neaira’s behavior during Chabrias’ party 
evidence of her slave status. He supported his argument by carefully naming the date and 
location of the party and by presenting multiple witnesses who were present and observed 
Neaira’s actions. Apollodorus’ narrative was not meant simply to titillate his audience and 
prejudice them against Neaira. He treated this story as an extra-legal proof of Neaira’s 
alien status, proof that revolved around Neaira’s everyday activities outside of the 
political and religious realms. 
 Before I move on to Apollodorus’ final proofs that Neaira was a non-citizen, let me 
review his accusations against her thus far. In the first part of his narrative of Neaira’s 
life, Apollodorus had established first that she had belonged to a series of owners and 
second that she performed the work of a slave. In a close parallel to Apollodorus’ 
accusations that Neaira worked as a prostitute, the unnamed speaker in Isaeus’ On the 
Estate of Pyrrhus offered similar evidence about his opponent’s sister. The speaker acted 
as the prosecutor in a case of ψευδοµαρτυρία (false witnessing) against a certain 
Nicodemus, who had testified in an earlier trial that his sister was the lawful wife of 
Pyrrhus, and so her daughter Phile should rightfully inherit the estate. The speaker 
 '131
represented his mother, Pyrrhus’ sister, and claimed the estate on her behalf. The speaker 
was attempting to prove that Phile’s mother had been a prostitute and that, as a result, 
Phile herself was illegitimate. He made some particularly pointed remarks about her 
mother’s history: 
(13) Ὡς µὲν ἑταίρα ἦν τῷ βουλοµένῳ καὶ οὐ γυνὴ τοῦ ἡµετέρου θείου, ἣν οὗτος  
ἐγγυῆσαι ἐκείνῳ µεµαρτύρηκεν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν γειτόνων  
τῶν ἐκείνου µεµαρτύρηται πρὸς ὑµᾶς· οἳ µάχας καὶ κώµους καὶ ἀσέλγειαν  
πολλήν, ὁπότε ἡ τούτου ἀδελφὴ εἴη παρ’ αὐτῷ, µεµαρτυρήκασιν γίγνεσθαι περὶ  
αὐτῆς. (14) Καίτοι οὐ δή πού γε ἐπὶ γαµετὰς γυναῖκας οὐδεὶς ἂν κωµάζειν  
τολµήσειεν· οὐδὲ αἱ γαµεταὶ γυναῖκες ἔρχονται µετὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ τὰ δεῖπνα, οὐ
δὲ συνδειπνεῖν ἀξιοῦσι µετὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, καὶ ταῦτα µετὰ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων. 
(13) And that she was a prostitute for anyone who wished and not the wife of our 
uncle [Pyrrhus], whom this man [Nicodemus] has testified that he gave in 
marriage to that man [Pyrrhus], this has been witnessed for you by his other 
relatives and his neighbors. And they have born witness concerning her, that there 
were fights and revelries and much wantonness, whenever that man’s sister was at 
[Pyrrhus’] house. (14) And yet no one, I think, would dare to serenade to lawfully 
wedded wives; nor would lawfully wedded wives go with their husbands to feasts, 
nor even would they deem it right to dine with strangers, and especially with 
chance-comers! (Isaeus. 3.13-14).  
Consider the evidence which the speaker emphasized in this passage. First, he stressed 
that Pyrrhus’ own relatives and his neighbors, the people closest to him and who knew 
him best, testified to the chaos which Nicodemus’ sister inspired. The speaker thus 
suggested that this woman’s behavior was not that of the ideal citizen-wife, meek and 
mild, but that of a prostitute who engaged in wild partying. He also slyly hinted that she 
was only sporadically present at his house (Note the phrase: “Whenever that man’s sister 
was at [Pyrrhus’] house”) and thus could not be his lawful wife. The speaker proved the 
woman’s identity by providing witnesses to her everyday behavior.  
 Consider then the speaker’s second point: that no one in Athenian society would 
dare to sing to a citizen-wife, nor would a citizen-wife attend banquets with her husband 
in the company of strangers. The speaker purposefully played off the ideological portrait 
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of the ideal citizen-wife, claiming that Nicodemus’ sister had broken so many Athenian 
societal taboos that she could not possibly be a citizen. No law prevented the woman 
from carousing or attending banquets with her husband. In fact, the speaker’s language 
suggests otherwise; he claimed that “no would dare to serenade [οὐδεὶς ἂν 
κωµάζειν τολµήσειεν] lawfully wedded wives…nor even would [citizen-wives] deem it 
right to dine with strangers [συνδειπνεῖν ἀξιοῦσι µετὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων].” Societal norms 
dictated that Athenian citizen-women behave in certain ways. If citizen-women engaged 
in aberrant behavior, however, then this behavior could be used as evidence against them 
in an Athenian court. Nicodemus’ sister may very well have been a true Athenian citizen-
wife, just one who engaged in outlandish behavior. This, however, not only jeopardized 
her own civic status but the status of her daughter even many years later.   
 To return to the accusations against Neaira: Apollodorus’ next set of proofs against 
the notorious prostitute centered not on her presence at parties and feasts but on her 
involvement in the Athenian courts. As Apollodorus narrated, Neaira eventually ran away 
from Phrynion because he treated her so poorly. She ultimately became partners with the 
Athenian Stephanus, with whom she traveled to Athens and settled there. When Phrynion 
learned that she was living in Athens, he attempted to seize her from Stephanus: 
ἀφαιρουµένου δὲ τοῦ Στεφάνου κατὰ τὸν νόµον εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, κατηγγύησεν  
αὐτὴν πρὸς τῷ πολεµάρχῳ. καὶ ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τούτων αὐτὸν µάρτυρα ὑµῖν τὸν τό
τε πολέµαρχον παρέξοµαι. καί µοι κάλει Αἰήτην Κειριάδην.  
And when Stephanus had declared her [Neaira] to be free (lit. took her away to 
freedom) in accordance with the law, [Phrynion] compelled her to give securities 
before the polemarch. And that I speak the truth, I shall present as a witness of 
these things for you the polemarch at the time. Call for me Aeetes of Ceiriadae 
(Dem. 59.40).   160
 For more on the legal action of ἀφαίρεσις εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, see Harrison 1998, 178-180. See also  160
MacDowell 1986, 80. 
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  The fact that Neaira had appeared before the polemarch did not necessarily prove 
that she was a slave or a metic. Neaira’s advocates gave securities before the polemarch 
as a preliminary action, before the case went to arbitration or to trial where Neaira’s 
status would be officially decided.  Apollodorus, however, seems to have treated 161
Neaira’s appearance before the polemarch as proof of her non-citizen identity because the 
polemarch was responsible for hearing legal cases concerning metics and slaves in 
Athens. In another legal case, Lysias’ Against Pancleon, the unnamed speaker seems to 
have made similar assumptions about the status of his opponent when he learned that 
Pancleon had been involved in other actions before the polemarch. The speaker even 
produced as witnesses those who had brought lawsuits against Pancleon before the 
polemarch to establish that he had strong reason to believe that Pancleon was a metic 
(Lys. 23.3-4). Like the speaker in Against Pancleon, in his own case against Neaira 
Apollodorus took advantage of the jurors’ prejudices against those who appeared in court 
before the polemarch.  
  Apollodorus treated the arbitrators’ decision in the dispute between Phrynion and 
Stephanus about Neaira as another powerful proof of her non-citizen identity. Once 
Neaira had appeared before the polemarch, Phyrnion brought a suit against Stephanus for 
stealing Neaira from him and for receiving the items that she had stolen from Phrynion 
 In fact, later in the speech (as I shall discuss in more detail), Apollodorus himself admitted that when 161
this particular action against Neaira came to arbitration, the arbitrators found in her favor and declared her 
a free person. Apollodorus seems to treat Phrynion’s attempts to claim Neaira as a slave as unlawful. For 
more, see Kapparis 1999, 248-250. 
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during her escape from Megara (Dem. 59.45). The two men’s friends, however, 
convinced them to come to arbitration, and Apollodorus described their decision in detail:  
γνώµην ἀπεφήναντο, καὶ οὗτοι ἐνέµειναν αὐτῇ, τὴν µὲν ἄνθρωπον ἐλευθέραν εἶναι 
καὶ αὐτὴν αὑτῆς κυρίαν, ἃ δ’ ἐξῆλθεν ἔχουσα Νέαιρα παρὰ Φρυνίωνος χωρὶς  
ἱµατίων καὶ χρυσίων καὶ θεραπαινῶν, ἃ αὐτῇ τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ ἠγοράσθη, ἀποδοῦναι  
Φρυνίωνι πάντα· συνεῖναι δ’ ἑκατέρῳ ἡµέραν παρ’ ἡµέραν·ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πως  
ἀλλήλους πείθωσι, ταῦτα κύρια εἶναι· τὰ δ’ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν ἔχοντα ἀεὶ  
παρέχειν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ µὴ µνησικακεῖν. 
[The arbitrators] gave their opinion, and these men [Stephanus and Phrynion] 
abided by it, first that the woman was free and her own mistress, second that the 
things which Neaira had taken from Phrynion, apart from the clothing and gold and 
maids that were purchased for the woman herself, all these she was to return to 
Phrynion: third that she was to remain with each man on alternating days: But if 
they agreed with one another about some other arrangement, this arrangement was 
to be binding; and finally that the one who had her was to provide her necessities at 
all times and that for the future the men were to be friends with one another and 
bear no malice (Dem. 59.46).  
We can interpret Apollodorus’ description of the arbitrators’ terms in two distinct ways. 
First, we could assume that Apollodorus artfully juxtaposed the ideological portrait of the 
citizen and his dutiful citizen-wife with his depiction of Neaira and her two lovers. While 
the model Athenian household revolved around one citizen and his wife, Neaira was 
compelled to split her time with two men. Furthermore, the arbitrators forced both men to 
come to terms with one another, with the result that Stephanus became less a husband to 
Neaira than a share-owner.  
  On the other hand, we could view the arbitrators’ decisions concerning Phrynion 
and Stephanus’ living situation with Neaira as not particularly unusual. It appears that 
men regularly divided the costs associated with keeping a prostitute. Even earlier in his 
speech against Neaira, Apollodorus described the circumstances under which 
Timanoridas and Eucrates purchased Neaira from Nicarete because the old woman had 
demanded such exorbitant sums from them for the enjoyment of Neiara’s company (Dem.  
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59.29). While Timanoridas and Eucrates kept Neaira as a slave, apparently Phrynion and 
Stephanus agreed to provide for Neaira and liberate her (Dem. 59.46). In a similar 
circumstance, in Lysias’ fragmentary On A Wound By Premeditation (4), the unnamed 
speaker was brought before the Areopagus council to defend himself for wounding the 
plaintiff because the two men were fighting for possession of a female slave.  The 162
speaker explained that while the two men were enemies, their friends reconciled them 
and acted as arbitrators on their behalf. He claimed that when the men exchanged 
property, they agreed to share ownership of the slave-girl, much like the case between 
Phrynion and Stephanus. Thus, Apollodorus could simply have been describing a 
situation with which Athenian jurors would be quite familiar—two citizens foolishly 
quarreling over the services of a beautiful slave-woman. In any case, Apollodorus, 
through his detailed descriptions of Neaira's legal entanglements, demonstrated that 
although Neaira was a free woman, she was a former slave and certainly not a citizen of 
Athens. 
  In his final proof of Neaira’s status, Apollodorus returned once again to his earlier 
trope concerning her eating and drinking habits. He brought witnesses to testify that once 
Phrynion and Stephanus had been reconciled with one another, they and their friends and 
gathered to feast and drink with one another in each of their houses. Apollodorus 
pointedly observed that Neaira herself also ate and drank with the men, “just as if she 
 Whether she was a prostitute remains unclear but seems likely given the circumstances of the case. 162
See especially Lys. 4.8. 
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were a prostitute.”  In his final argument against Neaira, Apollodorus relied on Neaira’s 163
activities and her (too) intimate relationships with Phrynion, Stephanus, and their circle 
of friends. In Apollodorus’ opinion, and presumably in the minds of the Athenian jurors, 
when Neaira openly dined and drank with Phrynion and Stephanus, and when she 
consorted with their friends, she acted like a prostitute and therefore was a prostitute and 
a former slave. Apollodorus thus directly equated her actions in the private homes of her 
lovers with her status as a non-citizen.  
  Quite conveniently for the modern reader, Apollodorus provided a neat summary 
of his accusations against Neaira before he moved on to attack her daughter Phano: 
Ὅτι µὲν τοίνυν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δούλη ἦν καὶ ἐπράθη δὶς καὶ ἠργάζετο τῷ σώµατι ὡς  
ἑταίρα οὖσα, καὶ ἀπέδρα τὸν Φρυνίωνα εἰς Μέγαρα, καὶ ἥκουσα κατηγγυήθη ὡς 
ξένη οὖσα πρὸς τῷ πολεµάρχῳ, τῷ τε λόγῳ ἀποφαίνω ὑµῖν καὶ µεµαρτύρηται. 
(1) That first of all she was a slave and (2) that she was twice sold and (3) that 
she made her living by prostitution as a courtesan, and (4) that she ran away from 
Phrynion to Megara, and (5) that having come here she gave securities before the 
polemarch on the grounds that she was an alien, I have shown you in my speech 
and it has been witnessed (Dem. 59.49).     164
Apollodorus’ accusations against Neaira, and his proofs which supported them, align 
almost perfectly with the list of proofs that Euxitheus claimed his opponent Eubulides 
would need to furnish to prove his mother a slave. Apollodorus established that Neaira 
had been a slave by proving the identities of her numerous owners and the number of 
times she had been bought and sold. He had proven that she had lived as a slave by 
 See Dem. 59.48. The full Greek text reads: Ὡς δ’ ἀπηλλαγµένοι ἦσαν, οἱ παρόντες ἑκατέρῳ ἐπὶ τῇ  163
διαίτῃ καὶ τοῖς πράγµασιν, οἷον οἶµαι φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἑκάστοτε, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἑταίρας οὔσης αὐτοῖς  
τῆς διαφορᾶς, ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ᾖσαν ὡς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν, ὁπότε καὶ Νέαιραν ἔχοιεν, καὶ αὑτηὶ συνεδείπνει καὶ 
συνέπινεν ὡς ἑταίρα οὖσα. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτ’ ἀληθῆ λέγω, κάλει µοι µάρτυρας τοὺς συνόντας αὐτοῖς,  
Εὔβουλον Προβαλίσιον, Διοπείθην Μελιτέα, Κτήσωνα ἐκ Κεραµέων.
 The numbering is my own. 164
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pointing to her activities as a prostitute, openly dining and drinking with strangers. He 
had also provided witnesses that she had bought her own freedom with the aid of 
Phrynion. Finally, although he did not claim that Neaira had paid the metic-tax, as 
Euxitheus suggested Eubulides might argue against his own mother, Apollodorus was 
able to furnish witness testimony that Neaira had appeared before the polemarch to 
establish that she had been living as a metic in Athens for a long period of time. Most 
critically to my own arguments, Apollodorus’ proofs of Neaira’s identity all centered 
around her everyday activities, her personal relationships, and her appearances before 
formal institutions outside of common political activities. Membership or participation in 
civic institutions or lack thereof never came into play.  
Phano 
  Scholars like Konstantinos Kapparis and Cynthia Patterson have considered 
Apollodorus’ accusations against Neaira separately from his claims against her daughter, 
Phano. As Patterson noted, Apollodorus’ suit against Neaira seems quite strong, given the 
number of witnesses he provided to attest to her activities as a prostitute. His case against 
Phano appears quite weak in comparison, especially because he was unable to identify 
her as Neaira’s daughter with any certainty.  Despite this distinction, I believe there are 165
important similarities between Apollodorus’ characterizations of Neaira and Phano that 
go to the essence of how women’s civic identities were established in Athens. In 
particular, in the case of both women, Apollodorus, manipulating civic ideology 
 See Patterson 1994, 207-208. See also Kapparis 1999, 33-34. 165
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surrounding Athenian women, harped on their failures to conform to societal standards 
and act like model citizen-wives. He also emphasized the failures of their male relatives, 
particularly Stephanus and Phano’s husbands, to protect Neaira and Phano’s reputations, 
and thus their status as citizens, adequately. Apollodorus concentrated his arguments 
against both Neaira and Phano on their everyday activities and their personal 
relationships. Consequently, Apollodorus’ accusations against both women are more 
closely linked and his case against Phano stronger than modern scholars have yet to 
acknowledge.  
  Having established that Neaira was indeed a non-citizen, Apollodorus moved on 
to the second point of his speech: that Neaira had passed herself off as a citizen-wife and 
enjoyed the privileges of Athenian citizenship. We might expect Apollodorus to present 
evidence that Stephanus had contracted a marriage with Neaira’s family (ἐγγύην…
ποιεῖσθαι) or that he threw a wedding-feast (γαµηλία) for his phratrymen.  Apollodorus, 166
however, offered no direct proofs that Neaira had assumed the identity of an Athenian 
citizen-wife. Instead, he claimed that Stephanus had passed off Neaira’s children as his 
own by an unnamed former wife. Apollodorus further declared that Stephanus gave her 
daughter Phano in marriage as a citizen-wife to two Athenian citizens.    167
  Given his inability to establish that Stephanus had formally married Neaira, we 
might expect Apollodorus to provide proof that Stephanus had failed to introduce his sons
 For examples of the marriage contract (ἐγγύη) as proof of a woman’s identity, see Isaeus. 3.16; Isaeus. 166
6.22; Isaeus. 8.14; Isaeus. 9.29; Isaeus. 10.19. For examples of the wedding feast (γαµηλία) as proof of 
identity, see Isaeus. 3.76; Isaeus. 8.18; Dem. 57.43. 
 For Neaira’s alleged sons, Proxenus, Ariston, and Antidorides, see Dem. 59.38; Dem. 59.121; Dem. 167
59.124. 
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—the deceased Proxenus and the living Ariston and Antidorides—to his phratry and 
deme. Apollodorus, however, mentioned Neaira’s alleged sons only three times in the 
course of his speech, and his hesitance to attack them directly may suggest that all three 
men had successfully faced the intense scrutinies of these identifying groups, powerful 
proofs of their citizen identities. Apollodorus’ disregard for Neaira’s sons might also 
indicate that they had never been introduced to Stephanus’ phrartymen and demesmen at 
all. Whatever the case was, Apollodorus turned the full force of his argument against 
Phano. Again, we might expect Apollodorus to provide proof that there were irregularities 
with Phano’s birth or her naming ceremony, for example.  Yet he failed to establish any 168
firm connection between Neaira and Phano as mother and daughter. 
  To prove that Phano was an alien, Apollodorus focused first on her everyday 
behaviors and failure to conform to Athenian norms in her daily life. In Apollodorus’ 
view, Phano did not act like an Athenian citizen-wife, and so she was not a citizen. 
Second, Apollodorus stressed Phano’s often tempestuous personal relationships with her 
father and husbands. In Apollodorus’ narrative, these men—Stephanus, Phrastor, and 
Theogenes—failed to complete crucial performative acts on Phano’s behalf to affirm her 
status to their community. By neglecting Phano, her male relatives ultimately endangered 
the citizen status of her entire family. 
  In his first arguments against Phano aimed at establishing her non-citizen status, 
Apollodorus concentrated on her failure to act like a model citizen-wife in her first 
marriage to Phrastor:  
 The speaker in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Pyrrhus employed this tactic: see Isaeus. 3.30-34. 168
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(50) ὡς δ’ ἦλθεν ὡς τὸν Φράστορα, ἄνδρα ἐργάτην καὶ ἀκριβῶς τὸν βίον 
συνειλεγµένον, οὐκ ἠπίστατο τοῖς τοῦ Φράστορος τρόποις ἀρέσκειν, ἀλλ’ ἐζήτει 
τὰ τῆς µητρὸς ἔθη καὶ τὴν παρ’ αὐτῇ ἀκολασίαν, ἐν τοιαύτῃ οἶµαι ἐξουσίᾳ  
τεθραµµένη. (51) ὁρῶν δὲ Φράστωρ αὐτὴν οὔτε κοσµίαν οὖσαν οὔτ’ ἐθέλουσαν  
αὑτοῦ ἀκροᾶσθαι, ἅµα δὲ καὶ πεπυσµένος σαφῶς ἤδη ὅτι Στεφάνου µὲν οὐκ εἴη  
θυγάτηρ, Νεαίρας δέ, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἐξηπατήθη, ὅτ’ ἠγγυᾶτο ὡς Στεφάνου  
θυγατέρα λαµβάνων καὶ οὐ Νεαίρας, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἐξ ἀστῆς αὐτὴν γυναικὸς  
οὖσαν πρότερον πρὶν ταύτῃ συνοικῆσαι, ὀργισθεὶς δ’ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἅπασιν, καὶ  
ὑβρίσθαι ἡγούµενος καὶ ἐξηπατῆσθαι, ἐκβάλλει τὴν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐνιαυτὸν συνοι
κήσας αὐτῇ, κυοῦσαν, καὶ τὴν προῖκα οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν. 
(50) And when [Phano] came to the house of Phrastor, a hard-working man and 
one who earned his livelihood by frugal living, she did not understand how to 
adjust to his habits, but she desired the customs of her mother and the 
intemperance in her house, having been brought up, I suppose, in such 
licentiousness. (51) And Phrastor, seeing that she was neither a decent woman 
nor would she willingly heed him, and at the same time having learned clearly 
now that she was not the daughter of Stephanus but the daughter of Neaira, and 
[having learned] he was deceived in the first place, when he was betrothed, 
receiving [Phano] not as the daughter of Neaira, but as the daughter of Stephanus 
from an Athenian citizen wife to whom he had been married before. And angry 
on account of all these things, and believing that he was insulted and deceived, 
[Phrastor] threw the woman [Phano] out, after he had lived with her for about a 
year, while she was pregnant, and he did not give back her dowry (Dem.  
59.50-51).      
  
Apollodorus’ logic here, while complicated, ultimately demonstrates the connections between 
everyday behavior and women’s civic identity in Athenian society. As Apollodorus claimed, 
Phano first subverted societal norms by failing to conform to her husband’s moderate lifestyle. 
As in his arguments against Neaira, here Apollodorus manipulated the portraits of the ideal 
citizen and his citizen-wife. He depicted Phrastor as the pragmatic Athenian citizen who 
managed his household frugally and who demanded a wife who would respect and obey him. In 
comparison with her sober husband, Phano, as portrayed by Apollodorus, would be all the more 
alarming to an Athenian audience—a woman so accustomed to the hedonistic lifestyle of her 
mother Neaira, the notorious courtesan, that she could never carry out the tame daily duties of 
the true citizen-wife. Moreover, Phrastor divorced Phano when she was pregnant with his child, 
quite an extreme action unless he suspected his wife or her family of serious wrong-doings.  
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 Furthermore, Apollodorus took care to link Phano’s behavior with her identity as Neaira’s 
daughter. Consider the phrasing Apollodorus adopted when he described Phrastor’s reaction to 
Phano: “Phrastor, seeing that she was not a decent woman …, at the same time (ἅµα δὲ καὶ ) 
[learned] clearly now (πεπυσµένος σαφῶς ἤδη) that she was not the daughter of Stephanus but 
the daughter of Neaira” (Dem. 59.51). Apollodorus implied that, when he observed her poor 
character, Phrastor immediately realized that Phano was the daughter of Neaira. In this scenario, 
a woman could fail in her marital duties only if she had been exposed to a vice-laden 
environment, perhaps as the child of a notorious prostitute. Of course, Apollodorus may have 
stretched the truth a bit for the Athenian jurors. In his commentary, Kapparis suggested that 
Phrastor and Phano were simply incompatible with one another, a situation that Apollodorus may 
have manipulated in his later speech against Neaira.  Apollodorus’ language implies, however, 169
that an Athenian audience would find it natural to equate immoral behavior with non-citizen 
status.  
 Critically, Phrastor’s testimony that he refused to return Phano’s dowry to her family was 
damning evidence that established she was an illegitimate alien. Although dowries were not a 
legal requirement of marriage, Athenians considered it normal practice to provide a woman with 
at least a small dowry. As Linn Foxhall has noted, a woman had some property rights over her 
dowry, and she could veto sales or investments that might deplete or decrease its value.  170
Furthermore, her dowry served as both a financial contribution to a wife’s new household and as 
a guarantee that her husband would not be able to divorce her easily. A husband was obligated to 
 See Kapparis 1999, 34-35. 169
 See Foxhall 1989. 170
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return his wife’s dowry to her family if he divorced her (Dem. 59.52). Phrastor’s refusal to return 
Phano’s dowry thus had serious implications about her identity as an Athenian citizen. 
 Modern scholars have often dismissed the importance of the dowry as proof of women’s 
legitimacy and citizen status, but many Athenian litigants held up the dowry as proof of a 
woman’s civic identity.  In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Pyrrhus, discussed above, the unnamed 171
speaker treated Nicodemus’ failure to provide his sister with a dowry as a proof of her non-
citizen status. He even expressed surprise that Nicodemus would overlook such a critical step in 
marrying his sister to Pyrrhus (Isaeus. 3.28). Moreover, in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Menecles, the 
unnamed speaker was forced to address his opponent’s allegations that his sister had brought no 
dowry to her marriage. His opponent in the case had apparently claimed that Menecles had 
adopted the speaker under the influence of a woman, the speaker’s sister, who was Menecles’ 
second wife. His opponent seems to have further discredited the sister by claiming that she 
brought no dowry to the marriage.  Interestingly, as his very first piece of evidence, the speaker 172
presented witness testimony that his father had given twenty minae as his sister’s dowry (Isaeus. 
2.5). In this context, Apollodorus’ continued emphasis on Phrastor’s failure to return Phano’s 
dowry is quite understandable. Most critically to my own argument, Apollodorus relied on legal 
evidence—a financial transaction like a dowry, which fell outside the political and the religious
—as proof of Phano’s non-citizen identity.  
 See Isaeus. 1.39; Isaeus. 2.5; Isaeus. 3.8; Dem. 30.21. 171
 In fact, the speaker addresses that his opponents repeatedly brought up the issue of his sister’s dowry. 172
The Greek reads: καὶ ἡµεῖς εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ὁ πατὴρ οὐδενὶ ἂν ἔδωκεν ἥδιον ἢ ἐκείνῳ, δίδοµεν αὐτῷ, 
οὐκ ἄπροικον, ὡς οὗτος λέγει ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἴσην προῖκα ἐπιδόντες ἥνπερ καὶ τῇ πρεσβυτέρᾳ  
ἀδελφῇ ἐπέδοµεν· καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου τούτου, πρότερον ὄντες αὐτοῦ φίλοι, κατέστηµεν οἰκεῖοι. Καὶ ὡς  
ἔλαβεν εἴκοσι µνᾶς ὁ Μενεκλῆς ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδελφῇ προῖκα, τὴν µαρτυρίαν ταύτην πρῶτον βούλοµαι  
παρασχέσθαι (Isaeus. 2.5). 
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 With Phrastor’s refusal to return Phano’s dowry, Apollodorus began to establish a pattern 
which he would repeat throughout his attack on Phano. Again and again, the men closest to 
Phano failed to protect her rights as a citizen-woman. Apollodorus thus treated Phano’s personal 
relationships, and especially her male relatives’ negligence, as proofs that Phano was in fact not a 
citizen. To his credit, though, Stephanus did attempt to sue Phrastor for his daughter’s dowry, but 
Phrastor threatened him with a countersuit—he would bring Stephanus before the Thesmothetae 
for marrying an alien woman to an Athenian citizen (Dem. 59.52). Stephanus then dropped his 
lawsuit against Phrastor and apparently never recovered Phano’s dowry from him. In dramatic 
fashion, later in the speech, Apollodorus used Stephanus’ hesitation to stand up to Phrastor on 
Phano’s behalf as evidence against Neaira (Dem. 59.62). Phano’s strained relationships with her 
male relatives were thus potent proofs that cast doubt on her citizenship status and that of her 
mother. Apollodorus bet that an Athenian jury would suspect a woman whose former husband so 
disrespected her that he refused to return her dowry and whose father could not or would not 
assert her rights in court.  
 Apollodorus treated Phrastor as a central character in the next part of his narrative 
involving the failure of Phano’s former husband to uphold his ex-wife’s rights and the rights of 
their son. After Phano had given birth, at an unspecified later time, Phrastor became quite ill. 
Neaira and Phano then nursed Phrastor and regained his trust (Dem. 59.55). Because he was 
childless and was engaged in an old feud with his relatives who stood to inherit his estate, 
Phrastor decided to accept Phano’s son as his legitimate offspring (Dem. 59.56), an event that 
had great potential to derail Apollodorus’ case. By admitting that the child was legitimate, 
Phrastor implicitly acknowledged Phano’s citizen status and strengthened his relationship with 
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his former wife. Apollodorus needed to explain why Phrastor chose to reconcile with Phano and 
why he would feel compelled to acknowledge her illegitimate child. In his elaborate backstory, 
Apollodorus wove together the elements of the family melodramas most common in inheritance 
cases to discredit both Neaira and Phano.  By alleging that both women unduly influenced an 173
ill man engaged in a bitter feud with his relatives, Apollodorus shored up his portrayal of mother 
and daughter as two foreign harlots bent on breaking all social conventions and infiltrating the 
Athenian citizen body. 
 Not only did Phrastor acknowledge Phano’s child as his legitimate son, he also 
introduced this child to his genos, one of the key identifying groups in which Athenian citizens 
could be enrolled. Apollodorus discredited Phrastor’s relationships with Phano and his son by 
focusing on Phrastor’s personal connections within his genos. As Apollodorus described, when 
Phrastor attempted to introduce his son to his phratrymen and to the members of his genos, the 
Brytidae, the gennetai initially refused to admit Phrastor’s son because they knew that the child’s 
mother was the daughter of Neaira (Dem. 59.59). In his case against Neaira, Apollodorus called 
the gennetai as witnesses to testify that they had hindered Phrastor when he attempted to 
introduce his son to them (Dem. 59.61). Kapparis dismissed the testimony of the gennetai, on the 
grounds that the men were responding to rumors and had no substantial proof that Phano was a 
non-citizen.  Very possibly, however, this testimony could not be dismissed so easily. We have 174
 See both Isaeus’ On the Estate of Cleonymus (1) and On the Estate of Apollodorus (7). The speakers 173
describe intense family feuds that pushed family members to adopt or change their wills to ensure that 
certain relatives would not inherit their estate. See also Isaeus’ On the Estate of Menecles (2) and On the 
Estate of Apollodorus (7) for cases where adoptions were questioned due to the influence of a woman. In 
On the Estate of Philoctemon (6), Isaeus also described a case where the metic Alce seduced an older 
Athenian citizen, Euctemon, and convinced him to adopt her own sons and introduce them into his phra-
try. 
 See Kapparis 1999, 35-36. 174
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ample evidence that Athenians considered the members of the genos, phratry, and deme crucial 
witnesses in cases centering on citizenship and inheritance. Athenian litigants often called 
members of these identifying groups to testify on their behalf because they were on close terms 
with one another, knew the intimate details of each other’s’ daily lives, and were in the best 
position to establish the identities of their members.  An Athenian jury would find the 175
testimony of the gennetai against Phano quite persuasive. 
 Also telling in Phano’s case is the fact that in his attempts to introduce his son to his 
genos, Phrastor once again failed to defend Phano’s civic identity in court. Phrastor brought a 
lawsuit against the gennetai, when they initially refused to register his son, and they eventually 
entered into arbitration with one another. When the gennetai challenged Phrastor to swear an 
oath that he believed that the boy was born of a citizen-woman, he refused to swear the oath 
(Dem. 59.60).  Critically, the gennetai were not asking Phrastor to swear to the rituals which he 176
had completed on his son’s behalf in any formal institutions. They asked him to swear that he 
had a personal relationship with the child and his mother and that he, Phrastor, had intimate 
knowledge that Phano was a citizen. Furthermore, just as he did with Stephanus, in a dramatic 
rhetorical turn, Apollodorus claimed that Phrastor’ refusal to take this oath was proof of Phano’s 
alien status (Dem. 59.63). In Apollodorus’ view, Phrastor’s failure to defend Phano condemned 
her. Repeatedly in the accusations against Phano, evidence of personal interactions and 
 Some particularly good examples: in Against Eubulides, the speaker Euxitheus took great pains to  175
explain why he might have been expelled from his deme, and he alleged that there was a conspiracy led 
by Eubulides himself. See particularly Dem. 57.6. See also Isaeus’ On the Estate of Apollodorus. The 
speaker Thrasyllus stressed that his adoptive father’s phratrymen and demesmen knew him personally and 
knew the validity of the adoption. See particularly Isaeus 2. 17-18 and Isaeus 2. 27-28. 
 See particularly the work of Fletcher and Sommerstein on oaths: Fletcher and Sommerstein, 2007. 176
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relationships was key in in establishing or challenging civic identity. How members of families 
were observed to treat each other in matters both trivial and consequential provided critical 
evidence of identity and social status for the individuals and the group. 
 Athenian litigants often treated oaths of this kind—where Athenians swore to their 
intimate connections with close relatives—as crucial proofs of civic status. In Isaeus’ On Behalf 
of Euphiletus, where the unnamed speaker represented his brother Euphiletus when he had been 
charged with ξενία, the speaker particularly stressed his own, his father’s, and his mother’s 
willingness to swear an oath in the sanctuary of Delphinian Apollo that Euphiletus was their 
relative and a legitimate Athenian citizen (Isaeus. 12.9-10). In addition, in Demosthenes’ Against 
Boeotus I, in an arbitration, the woman Plangon was actually able to force her former husband 
Mantias to introduce their sons to his phratry and deme by swearing a similar oath (Dem. 
39.3-4). Such oaths carried enormous weight in Athenian legal proceedings, and I agree with 
Apollodorus that Phrastor’s refusal to swear the oath on behalf of his own child would be taken 
as particularly damning evidence of Phano’s non-citizen status.  
 Later in his narrative, Apollodorus continued to play on the theme of male relatives 
failing to defend Phano in court. In perhaps the most shocking episode, Apollodorus claimed that 
Stephanus plotted against Epaenetus of Andros and purposefully caught him committing adultery 
with Phano, who apparently had already given him services many times. Stephanus then 
intimidated Epaenetus and demanded sureties from the man before he would release him (Dem. 
59.64). In a turn of events that eerily mirrored Phrastor’s countersuit against his former father-in-
law, when Stephanus released Epaenetus, Epaenetus brought a suit for false imprisonment 
against him. In his defense, Epaenetus pointed to a law “that forbids one from being taken as an 
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adulterer who has to do with women who sit in (work out of) a brothel and or who openly sell 
themselves” (Dem. 59.67).   177
 As Epaenetus argued, Stephanus arranged for him to come to his home and have intimate 
relations with Phano on at least a somewhat regular basis. Furthermore, each time he had stayed 
with Stephanus’ family, Epaenetus had supported the household financially (Dem. 59.67). Like 
Apollodorus, Epaenetus claimed that Stephanus’ behavior was the best indicator of Phano’s 
status. Formerly, he had treated Epaenetus as a customer and Phano as a prostitute, and therefore 
she was a prostitute and the daughter of Neaira, another prostitute. As Kapparis has noted, 
Apollodorus apparently was hesitant to accuse Phano of being a foreign prostitute outright in 
court.  In Epaenetus, he found the perfect mouthpiece, a man who had known Stephanus’ 178
family over a long period of time and had observed their personal habits. Again, Apollodorus 
considered Phano’s everyday actions and her personal relationships as the best proofs of her 
identity. Furthermore, Apollodorus had once more manipulated the idealized portrait of the 
citizen-wife, when he depicted Phano’s affair, entirely inappropriate relationship for an Athenian 
citizen-woman. Kapparis has argued that Apollodorus entirely misrepresented this episode, and 
Phano was simply a misguided woman who had been seduced after her failed first marriage.  179
However we consider this episode, Phano was either an adulterous woman or, at worst, a 
prostitute. At any rate, she would not make a sympathetic figure to an Athenian jury. 
 The full Greek text reads: τόν τε νόµον ἐπὶ τούτοις παρεχόµενος, ὃς οὐκ ἐᾷ ἐπὶ ταύτῃσι µοιχὸν λαβεῖν  177
ὁπόσαι ἂν ἐπ’ ἐργαστηρίου καθῶνται ἢ πωλῶνται ἀποπεφασµένως, ἐργαστήριον φάσκων καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι, 
 τὴν Στεφάνου οἰκίαν, καὶ τὴν ἐργασίαν ταύτην εἶναι, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων αὐτοὺς εὐπορεῖν µάλιστα. 
 Kapparis 1999, 37. 178
 Kapparis 1999, 37. 179
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 As with Phrastor, rather than face Epaenetus in court, Stephanus chose another route. He 
entered into arbitration with Epaenetus, and the men came to an agreement that Epaenetus would 
contribute 1000 drachmae to Phano's dowry, “since [Stephanus] had lost her dowry and could not 
provide her another again” (Dem. 59.69).  Although Epaenetus accused Phano of behavior that 180
would shame any citizen-wife, Stephanus chose not to address these allegations and so yet again 
failed to defend Phano’s identity as a citizen-woman in court. Moreover, when he solicited 1000 
drachmae from Epaenetus for Phano’s dowry, he publicly admitted that he had failed to protect 
her dowry when Phrastor refused to return it. If a dowry served as a symbol of a woman’s 
legitimacy and of her citizen status, Apollodorus created a powerful image in his description of 
Epaenetus’ payment to Phano’s dowry. Just as Stephanus tarnished Phano’s image as a citizen by 
allowing her to associate freely with a strange man, he also compromised her dowry when he 
solicited money from Epaenetus. Yet again, Apollodorus emphasized Stephanus’ behavior toward 
his daughter and his failure to protect her in court as proofs of Phano’s non-citizen status.  
 Finally, we come to Phano’s second marriage to Theogenes.  Modern scholars have 181
often discussed Phano’s marriage to Theogenes for its religious significance: Theogenes served 
as the king archon (βασιλεύς) while he was married to Phano.  As the king archon’s wife, 182
 In the terms of reconciliation given at Dem.59.71, Epaenetus agreed to put 1,000 drachmae toward 180
Phano’s dowry, and Stephanus apparently agreed “to offer Phano up to Epaenetus, whenever he stayed 
with him and wished to have relations with her.” I agree with Kapparis, however, that this document is 
likely a forgery. Stephanus did not treat Phano as a prostitute, when he demanded Epaenetus contribute to 
her dowry. This clearly implies that Stephanus wanted Phano to remarry, and indeed, she did! For more, 
see Kapparis 1999, 316-317. 
 See also Dem. 59.72: As Apollodorus narrated the events surrounding Phano’s second marriage, there 181
was also a political element to the match. Apparently, Stephanus met the inexperienced Theogenes and 
ingratiated himself with the man. Theogenes appointed Stephanus to his board of magistrates (as 
πάρεδρος). The marriage followed from the political ties between the two men. 
 For an excellent summary of this scholarship, see Kapparis 1999, 324-331. See especially Macurdy 182
1928; Hamilton 1992, 53-56. 
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Phano, as the ritual queen of Athens (βασίλιννα), became the bride of Dionysus during the 
festival of Anthesteria (Dem. 59.73). As both Kapparis and Blok have mentioned, a woman could 
usually consider her position as the ritual queen of Athens as almost unassailable proof of her 
citizen identity.  Apollodorus thus took special care in attacking Phano for performing these 183
sacred rites, when she herself was an alien. 
 In attacking Phano as the queen of Athens, Apollodorus again manipulated the 
ideological portrait of the citizen-wife. When he recounted the history of the rites at the 
Anthesteria, he declared, 
τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ νόµον ἔθεντο ἀστὴν εἶναι καὶ µὴ ἐπιµεµειγµένην ἑτέρῳ  
ἀνδρὶ ἀλλὰ παρθένον γαµεῖν, ἵνα κατὰ τὰ πάτρια θύηται τὰ ἄρρητα ἱερὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς
πόλεως, καὶ τὰ νοµιζόµενα γίγνηται τοῖς θεοῖς εὐσεβῶς καὶ µηδὲν καταλύηται  
µηδὲ καινοτοµῆται. 
And [the old Athenians] set down a law that [the king archon’s] wife was to be a 
citizen-woman who had not known another man but married as a virgin, so that 
the sacred rights of which none may speak may be celebrated on behalf of the 
city, and so that the sacrifices may be made for the gods piously, and in no way 
left undone or changed (Dem. 59.75).   
In his description, Apollodorus stressed that the wife of the king archon was supposed to be a 
citizen-woman and a virgin before she married him. In other words, she was in every aspect the 
opposite of the Phano whom Apollodorus had described in his speech, a woman whose husband 
had divorced her without ceremony, who had borne a child, who had an affair, and whose civic 
identity was questioned not only by her family but by the Athenian community as a whole. 
Perhaps Apollodorus had not fully proven that Phano was the daughter of Neaira, but he certainly 
established that she had been married to Phrastor. Phrastor himself and the members of his genos 
had borne witness to this union, and therefore, no matter whether she was an alien or a citizen, 
 See Kapparis 1999, 38; see also Blok 2017, 195.183
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Phano was unfit to serve as the queen of Athens. Apollodorus thus used Phano’s personal 
relationships as proof that she was the antithesis of the chaste, dutiful Athenian citizen-wife. 
 Furthermore, Apollodorus also stressed that Theogenes, like Stephanus and Phrastor, 
failed to defend Phano’s civic identity at a critical moment. After the conclusion of the 
Anthesteria, the Areopagus Council apparently undertook an investigation and discovered that 
Phano was of a questionable character. They then demanded that Theogenes pay a fine (Dem. 
59.81). Rather than pay the fine, however, Theogenes instead offered to divorce Phano, and 
Apollodorus credited him with an impassioned speech:  
‘ὅτι δὲ’ ἔφη ‘οὐ ψεύδοµαι, µεγάλῳ τεκµηρίῳ καὶ περιφανεῖ ἐπιδείξω ὑµῖν·  
τὴν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ἀποπέµψω ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστιν Στεφάνου θυγάτηρ  
ἀλλὰ Νεαίρας. κἂν µὲν ταῦτα ποιήσω, ἤδη πιστοὶ ὑµῖν ὄντων οἱ λόγοι οἱ παρ’ 
 ἐµοῦ λεγόµενοι, ὅτι ἐξηπατήθην· ἐὰν δὲ µὴ ποιήσω, τότ’ ἤδη µε κολάζετε ὡς  
πονηρὸν ὄντα καὶ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς ἠσεβηκότα.’ 
He said, “That I am not lying [about my ignorance of Phano’s true parentage], I 
shall show you with great and manifest proof: For I shall send the woman away 
from my house, since she is not the daughter of Stephanus but of Neaira. And if I 
do these things, let the words spoken by myself be trustworthy to you now, that I 
was deceived: But if I fail to do these tasks, then punish me as a wretched man 
and one who committed impiety against the gods (Dem. 59.82).  
Apollodorus created a powerful image of the choices open to Theogenes: first, he could remain 
married to Phano, a tacit admission that he had known about her previous marriage and perhaps 
even her origins as the daughter of a prostitute. Second, and undoubtedly the more appealing 
option, Theogenes could divorce Phano and thus save his own reputation while painting 
Stephanus as the ultimate manipulator, a man who risked the wrath of the gods to advance his 
own political agenda and marry his “daughter” to the king archon. If Phano had established her 
civic identity by serving as the king archon’s wife and becoming the bride of Dionysus, 
Theogenes certainly undermined her efforts by reportedly divorcing her immediately after the 
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Anthesteria. Yet again, Apollodorus discredited Phano by pointing to her personal relationships 
and her male relatives’ inability or reluctance to defend her before the wider Athenian 
community. 
 The connections that Apollodorus created between Neaira, Phano, and their male 
relatives are certainly complicated. As Apollodorus argued, Phrastor, Theogenes and Stephanus’s 
behavior toward Phano was a strong indicator of her civic status. When Phrastor refused to return 
her dowry, he signaled to the larger Athenian community that his ex-wife did not enjoy the rights 
of the Athenian citizen, who could expect to have her dowry returned to her family in the event 
of a divorce. When Stephanus failed to bring Phrastor to court to sue for Phano’s dowry, he too 
communicated Phano’s weak position in society. In Apollodorus’ narrative, the gennetai’s later 
refusal to admit Phrastor’s son was only natural. Why would the Athenian community accept 
Phano and her children as citizens, when the implications of her relatives’ actions were clear—
they treated Phano as illegitimate, and so she was illegitimate. Theogenes’ decision to divorce 
Phano after the Anthesteria festival was almost a foregone conclusion when Apollodorus closed 
his narrative on Phano’s dysfunctional relationships with her two husbands and father. A man 
with a promising political career, who had served as king archon, could never afford to be 
married to a woman with even a hint of scandal attached to her name. In Apollodorus’ 
accusations against Phano, the connection between personal relationships, especially within the 
immediate family, and civic identity becomes clear.  
 Moreover, Apollodorus’ arguments against Phano also demonstrate that the Athenians 
linked behavior with citizen status. Consider again Phrastor’s initial impressions of his young 
wife. Phano could not adjust to Phrastor’s moderate lifestyle, and she would not heed him. She 
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could not act the part of the model citizen-wife, and therefore Phrastor concluded that she could 
not be a citizen. With Stephanus’ relationship with Neaira widely known, Apollodorus offered 
the simplest explanation for the situation when he claimed that Phano was Neaira’s daughter and 
that this was a well-known secret in her circle of family and friends. Critically, however, 
Apollodorus could only connect Phano to Neaira through her inappropriate behavior. 
 Finally, Apollodorus’ attacks against Phano demonstrate that the Athenian family shared 
one civic identity. Consider his arguments concerning Phrastor’s failure to introduce his son into 
his genos. As Apollodorus argued, when the gennetai denied that the child was a citizen, they 
also impugned the civic identity of his mother, Phano. Apollodorus then took this conclusion to 
its logical extreme: if Phano were not an Athenian citizen, then she must be the daughter of the 
former slave and alien, Neaira. Apollodorus treated the attacks on the grandson’s civic identity as 
proof of the grandmother’s non-citizen identity (if we accept that Neaira was indeed the mother 
of Phano). Moreover, Neaira and Phano’s male relatives made a bad situation worse when they 
failed to defend the two women in court. As Apollodorus so clearly demonstrated throughout his 
speech, Athenians constantly negotiated their civic identities, and the civic identities of their 
female relatives, at communal events and through Athenian institutions like the law courts. An 
Athenian citizen stood up in court not only to defend his own status as a citizen but the status of 
his entire family.  
Conclusion 
 I could go on, and indeed, Apollodorus continued his speech long after his narrative of 
Phano’s marriage to Theogenes, even delving into a lengthy tangent on the grant of Athenian 
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citizenship to the Plataeans (Dem.59.94-106). I conclude, however, with a discussion of 
Apollodorus’ dramatic imagining of the chaos that would engulf Athens if the jurors were to 
acquit Neaira: 
ὥστε πολὺ µᾶλλον ἐλυσιτέλει µὴ γενέσθαι τὸν ἀγῶνα τουτονὶ ἢ γενοµένου  
ἀποψηφίσασθαι ὑµᾶς. κοµιδῇ γὰρ ἤδη [παντελῶς] ἐξουσία ἔσται ταῖς πόρναις  
συνοικεῖν οἷς ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ τοὺς παῖδας φάσκειν οὗ ἂν τύχωσιν εἶναι· καὶ  
οἱ µὲν νόµοι ἄκυροι ὑµῖν ἔσονται, οἱ δὲ τρόποι τῶν ἑταιρῶν κύριοι ὅ τι ἂν  
βούλωνται διαπράττεσθαι.  
It would be far better if this trial had never happened than, when it has happened, 
you vote for acquittal. For then there will be absolute liberty for prostitutes to 
live with whomever they choose, and to name their children the children of 
whomever they chance to meet; and your laws will be powerless, and the 
customs of the courtesans will have power to do whatever they wish! (Dem.
59.112).  
In Apollodorus’ arguments, the jurors decided not only the civic status of Neaira but the 
very definition of Athenian citizenship. Apparently, if the jurors voted to acquit Neaira, 
they would also transform her and her daughter Phano into the new models for the 
Athenian citizen-woman. In this nightmare landscape, Athenian women would become 
prostitutes who would show no respect for the institution of marriage. They would live 
with whomever they pleased and have illegitimate children who did not belong to any 
single household. In short, if Neaira and Phano were to set Athenian societal standards, 
they would destroy the city. In one of his final rhetorical flourishes, Apollodorus thus tied 
daily activities and personal relationships directly to the Athenian civic ideology 
surrounding citizenship.  
 Moreover, Apollodorus characterized his lawsuit against Neaira not as an attack 
on a single woman’s civic identity but as a defense of Athenian women and of the city as 
whole. In Apollodorus’ portrayal of Athens, if a single household shared one civic 
identity, then so did the city. Women like Neaira and Phano threatened not only their own 
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families with their behavior but the entire Athenian citizenry, because individuals—both 
men and women—were responsible for maintaining societal norms. By modern 
standards, we consider Apollodorus a man with a grudge against Stephanus who sought 
to destroy the man’s household by attacking his partner, Neaira. Apollodorus, however, 
masterfully painted himself as a man defending his community against a woman who 
sought to destroy it.  
 '155
CHAPTER V 
Athenian Anxieties about Family and Citizen Identity 
Introduction 
εὐθὺς ἔλεγον ὅτι Καλλίππη µήτηρ, αὕτη δ’ εἴη Πιστοξένου θυγάτηρ, ὡς  
ἐξαρκέσον εἰ ὄνοµα µόνον πορίσαιντο τὸν Πιστόξενον. Ἐροµένων δ’ ἡµῶν ὅστις 
εἴη καὶ εἰ ζῇ ἢ µή, ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἔφασαν ἀποθανεῖν στρατευόµενον, καταλιπόντα  
ταύτην θυγατέρα παρὰ τῷ Εὐκτήµονι, ἐξ ἐπιτροπευοµένης δὲ τούτω γενέσθαι,  
πρᾶγµα πλάττοντες ἀναιδείᾳ ὑπερβάλλον καὶ οὐδὲ γενόµενον… 
Straightaway they claimed that [the boys’] mother was Callippe, and that she 
herself was the daughter of Pistoxenus, as if it were sufficient if they produced 
the name Pistoxenus alone. And when we asked who he was and if he was alive 
or not, they claimed he had died in Sicily while on military expedition, leaving 
behind this daughter in the house of Euctemon, and that Euctemon had children 
by her while she was under his guardianship, fabricating a story surpassing in 
impudence and not even true (Isaeus. 6.13). 
 In disputing the estate of Euctemon, the orator Isaeus depicted the plaintiff Androcles as a 
mercenary rascal who sought to rob Chaerestratus, Euctemon’s adopted grandson, of his 
inheritance. Apparently, Androcles had declared himself the guardian of Euctemon’s two sons by 
his late wife Callippe and claimed his estate on their behalf. But the unnamed speaker, a close 
friend of Chaerestratus, asserted that Euctemon had only one son, the late Philoctemon, the 
adoptive father of Chaerestratus. The speaker further claimed that Androcles lied about the boys’ 
parentage and, even more incredible, fabricated the existence of Callippe, the putative wife of 
Euctemon and mother of his two sons. In making this argument, the orator was taking advantage 
of particular Athenian anxieties surrounding civic and family identity. Not only did Athenians 
fear that litigants like Androcles would manipulate women’s identities to gain control over 
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estates, they also had numerous other anxieties about a variety of circumstances, both global and 
personal, that could disrupt the fragile social fabric and make citizenship status vulnerable to 
attacks.  
 In my previous chapters, I focused on the performances of daily life that helped to 
establish civic identity and the personal relationships that defined Athenian institutions like 
adoption. In this chapter, I concentrate on evidence of Athenian anxieties surrounding these 
performances in two kinds of legal actions that often overlapped—lawsuits involving citizenship 
and inheritance. The legal speeches of Isaeus and Demosthenes illustrate that Athenians were 
acutely aware that both major catastrophes—such as the Peloponnesian War—and small-scale 
catastrophes—feuds among relatives, for example—threatened their ability to complete the 
everyday performative acts by which they defined their civic identities. Furthermore, Athenian 
concerns about their inability to complete quotidian performances demonstrate the importance of 
these kind of mundane activities to the their identification process.  
 To prove that the Athenians realized that even minor disruptions could weaken their 
fragile methods of identification, in this chapter I examine Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon. 
This particular case touches on the full panoply of Athenian fears surrounding performances of 
family and civic identity through the speaker’s extraordinary account of the struggle between 
Chaerestratus and his opponents Androcles and Antidorus for the estate of Euctemon. In this 
chapter, I first examine the Athenian concerns about how war and other large-scale catastrophes 
could upset everyday performative acts. For example, the speaker claimed that the death of 
Philoctemon, Euctemon’s son, during the Peloponnesian War emboldened Euctemon’s other 
relatives to come forward and claim his estate. When Athenian men died in battle or abroad, their 
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deaths could have lasting consequences for their families in Athens and could even endanger 
their civic identities and their estates. Secondly, I consider Athenians’ anxieties surrounding 
women’s civic identities and how Athenian litigants might manipulate them to threaten the 
informal performances that defined Athenian societal norms. As I discussed above, 
Chaerestratus’ representative claimed that his opponent Androcles, a distant relative of 
Euctemon, had fabricated Callippe to gain control over the old man’s estate. He had also 
previously sought to claim Euctemon’s daughter as an heiress, again so that he could acquire the 
family property. Third, I examine Athenian anxieties that women themselves might subvert the 
Athenian identification process. The speaker claimed that the former prostitute Alce manipulated 
the aged Euctemon, her lover, into giving away almost his entire estate and into admitting her 
son into his phratry and granting the boy citizenship. Lastly, I examine how family feuds, like the 
one between Euctemon and his son Philoctemon, could disrupt the performances associated with 
family and civic identity. 
Modern scholarship 
  In my own study, I focus on Athenian anxieties that centered around the family and the 
household, and I argue that concerns about disruptions to the mundane performances of identity 
demonstrate the vital role these quotidian activities played in the Athenian identification process. 
Other academics who have examined Athenian anxieties about civic identity, however, have 
taken an altogether different approach. In large part, they have focused on larger anxieties on the 
level of the polis. In one group, scholars have focused on two key pieces of legislation: Solon’s 
reforms of 594 BCE and the Periclean citizenship law of 451/0 BCE. Both laws have inspired 
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distinct branches of scholarship involving their reconstruction and extensive consideration of the 
anxieties that motivated the Athenians to pass legislation. Researchers treat the anxieties as the 
unknown cause and the laws as a natural result. The second group of scholars have focused on 
Athenian anxieties surrounding the infiltration of slaves and metics into the citizenry through 
institutions like the deme. In particular, these writers describe the measures that Athenians took 
to control the metic population and to deal with the characters who Athenians feared would try to 
introduce foreigners as citizens. 
 Scholars concentrating on Solon’s reforms have hypothesized that the law-giver was 
reacting to a number of intense anxieties during the sixth century BCE. Manville, for example, 
focused in particular on Solon’s ban on debt bondage, arguing that by prohibiting this practice, 
Solon guaranteed freedom to citizens and drew a clear boundary between citizen and non-citizen 
for the first time.  A second branch of this scholarship concentrated on Solon’s legal reforms 184
concerning the structure of the Athenian family. Although debate has arisen about the actual 
content of these laws, Susan Lape, for example, has argued convincingly that Solon might have 
made legitimacy a key requirement of citizenship, barring illegitimate children from becoming 
citizens and incentivizing Athenians to have children only within lawful marriages. Lape claimed 
that Solon’s reforms addressed Athenian anxieties surrounding social status; she asserted that 
Solon’s laws on the family “equalized sexual opportunity” and put Athenians, both wealthy and 
poor, on equal footing through marriage.  Finally, scholars like Paulin Ismard and Alain 185
DuPlouy have argued for the authenticity of Solon’s so-called law of associations, a fifth-century 
 See particularly Manville 1990, 124-156, where he concentrates in particular on Solon’s focus in his 184
reforms on creating both physical and legal boundaries.
 Lape 2002, 134.185
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law often credited to Solon by scholiasts. The law stipulated that agreements among members of 
demes, phratries, and other minor organizations were binding unless they went against the city’s 
laws. Ismard and DuPlouy have argued that these private organizations controlled citizenship in 
this period and so dominated the archaic Athenian community. The Athenians were thus eager to 
regulate their interactions.  186
 Researchers who have analyzed Pericles’ Citizenship Law have focused on a key passage 
from the Constitution of the Athenians, in which Pericles limited citizens to those born from two 
citizen parents “on account of the number of citizens” (διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν).  As Alan 187
Boegehold asked in his article on the Periclean legislation, “How did a πλῆθος of citizens create 
pressure? What did that πλῆθος do? Who exactly was being pressed?”  With these questions in 188
mind, modern scholars have put forward numerous interpretations of Aristotle’s explanation of 
the law. Again, these writers generally treat Pericles’ legislation as a remedy for growing anxiety 
among the Athenian population.  
  Modern academics have considered Pericles’ citizenship law as an expression of 
Athenian anxieties concerning the increasing number of marriages between Athenians and non-
citizens. After the Persian Wars, large numbers of foreigners entered Attica and settled there, 
prompting the Athenians to classify them as metics and create a number of provisions to control 
 See Ismard 2010, 44-83; Duplouy 2014. 186
 The Greek text reads: ἐπὶ Ἀντιδότου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν Περικλέους εἰπόντος ἔγνωσαν µὴ  187
µετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἂν µὴ ἐξ ἀµφοῖν ἀστοῖν ᾖ γεγονώς. ([Arist]. Ath.Pol.26.3).  
Likewise, in his brief description of the law, Plutarch stated that Pericles defined citizens as “those…who 
were born from Athenians on both sides.” Plutarch’s text reads: εἶχε δ’ οὕτω τὰ περὶ τὸν νόµον. ἀκµάζων  
ὁ Περικλῆς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ πρὸ πάνυ πολλῶν χρόνων καὶ παῖδας ἔχων ὥσπερ εἴρηται γνησίους, νόµον  
ἔγραψε, µόνους Ἀθηναίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ δυεῖν Ἀθηναίων γεγονότας (Plut. Per.37.3).
 Boegehold 1994, 58. 188
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this population (e.g. the payment of the metic tax). In earlier scholarship, academics like Charles 
Hignett argued that the Athenians passed this law to defend ethnic purity. Hignett surmised that 
the influx of immigrants would prompt the Athenians to consider more fully their own cultural 
identity: “The main object of the law of 451/0 was probably to preserve the racial purity of the 
citizen-body.”  Later scholars dropped arguments concerning the racial makeup of the Athenian 189
populace but retained a focus on the increasing number of foreign marriages in Attica. 
Humphreys, for example, argued that Pericles proposed his legislation to prevent aristocratic 
Athenians from marrying wealthy foreign women and perhaps getting their allegiances 
confused.  190
 In another vein of scholarship, scholars have considered the Periclean law in light of the 
privileges that Athenian citizenship ensured. Lambert argued that, as the Athenian empire grew 
in the early fifth century, the Athenians began to realize the high value of citizenship and saw a 
need to curb the number of citizens to fully defend these rights.  Patterson considered the 191
legislation in the wider context of fifth century politics, observing that during this period, the 
Athenians passed a number of measures meant to protect the rights of citizens. Patterson noted 
that such a legislative movement required the state first to define who were rightful citizens and 
 Hignett 1952, 345. As Alan Boegehold has noted, Hignett viewed the politics of fifth century Athens 189
as a scholar who had lived through the second world war, where racial politics obviously played a critical 
role in the crisis. See Boegehold 1994, 58. 
 Humphreys 1974, 93-94. Likewise, Walters argued that Pericles sought to prevent Athenian citizen 190
men from enfranchising their children by slaves or foreign women and thus increasing the citizen-body to 
the point where Athenian institutions would become unworkable. See Walters 1983, 332-336. See also 
Ruschenbusch 1974; Davies 1977; Sealey 1984; Raaflaub 1998; de Ste. Croix 2004. 
 Lambert 1993, 43. 191
 '161
second to limit and control the citizen population.  Likewise, in his later study of Pericles’ law, 192
Boegehold considered those privileges of citizenship where too great a number of citizens might 
pose a significant issue. He argued that the legislation sought to reduce the number of citizens 
with valid claims to land in Attica, the most precious commodity.  All of these scholars have 193
suggested logical solutions to the question of what prompted the Periclean citizenship law, but 
unfortunately, there is a distinct lack of evidence to support the majority of these claims. I agree 
with Josine Blok that we need a different approach when we consider Athenian anxieties 
surrounding citizen identity, an approach that does not follow the history of the Athenian 
constitution and which is not tied to specific pieces of legislation.   194
 In a completely different mode of scholarship, Classicists like Whitehead have 
considered anxieties around the metic population of Attica and the often-ambivalent feelings of 
citizens towards non-citizens. In his early work,Whitehead argued that metics were defined by 
their “exclusion from the whole political, social, economic and religious nucleus of Athenian 
life.”   He did not classify metics as quasi-citizens, enjoying limited rights within the city, but 195
 Patterson 1981, 104. 192
 Boegehold 1994, 61-64. Along similar lines, Blok has suggested that the Periclean law was meant to 193
curb the number of people who had a right to share in the religious traditions of the city on both a local 
and state level. She has argued that the Athenians were able to extend the rights to hold both political and 
religious office to all Athenians only because they limited the number of citizens. Blok 2009, 158-168. 
 In the first vein of scholarship on Pericles’ Citizenship Law, we have no evidence that the Athenians 194
felt particular concern about the growing number of non-citizens within Attica or an increase in marriages 
between citizens and non-citizens. In the second vein of scholarship, there is no indication in the ancient 
sources that Athenian institutions were becoming “unworkable” because of a swell in population.  
For a more detailed discussion of the shortcomings of the scholarship concerning Pericles’ Citizenship 
Law, see Blok 2009, 155-157. 
 Whitehead 1977, 70. Whitehead did acknowledge that metics played active roles in the Athenian 195
community, in particular taking part in major state festivals like the Panathenaia and the Dionysia. 
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anti-citizens, the negative image of Athenians who enjoyed all the privileges of citizenship. Most 
importantly, Whitehead noted that the Athenians were careful to demarcate between non-citizen 
and citizen. In his later work, Whitehead addressed more fully the Athenians’ anxieties 
concerning the penetration of metics into the citizenry in his consideration of corruption within 
the demes. In particular, Whitehead considered the dual concerns that the Athenians felt during 
the examination of the deme rolls in 346 BCE.  The Athenians feared that non-citizens would 196
bribe deme officials to enroll them illegally, and conversely, they were also concerned that 
legitimate Athenian citizens might be disenfranchised because of private feuds with their 
demesmen. 
 More recently, scholars have focused less on the rights of metics and their roles within 
specific institutions and more on the relationship between the metic population and the polis as a 
whole. Von Reden has argued that although the Athenians exploited the port of Piraeus and its 
population for money, ultimately civic ideology prevented the Athenian citizenry from feeling 
any obligation toward the metic population in Piraeus.  Von Reden concludes that, while the 197
Athenians were not necessarily anxious about metics in Piraeus, they were not eager to embrace 
them either. Cooper has built on these arguments, observing that the Athenians adopted an 
ambivalent attitude toward the metic population between 350 and 330 BCE. In this period, while 
the Athenians allowed foreigners more access to the legal system to encourage trade, they 
simultaneously passed harsher penalties for metics attempting to gain access to the citizenry.  198
 Whitehead 1986, 291-301. 196
 Von Reden 1995, 35.197
 Cooper 2003, 66-71. 198
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He also noted that during this period, the Athenian litigants often expressed extreme prejudices 
against metics to gain sympathy from jurors.    199
 I differ from other scholars both in the scale of my study and in the legal speeches which 
I will examine. Modern writers have conducted large-scale studies that focus on the anxieties of 
the polis and synthesize evidence from a wide variety of historical sources. I focus on specific 
legal cases because of the insight they offer into the workings of the Athenian family and 
household. I consider how Athenian litigants in court represented the anxieties that individual 
Athenians felt when they were unable to complete those performative acts that defined their 
family and civic identities. Furthermore, while modern scholars have focused almost exclusively 
on cases centering on citizenship when they have looked at legal speeches, I also consider the 
inheritance cases of Isaeus. As I argued in my previous chapter on adoption, the institutions that 
governed the adoption process also governed citizenship. Accordingly, Athenian anxieties 
concerning adoption also mirrored their anxieties about civic identity. 
War as disruptive force   
 Periods of conflict and unrest especially threatened the performative acts that established 
Athenians’ civic identities and their identities as adoptive children. Wars could prove particularly 
disruptive to testamentary adoptions, since a citizen often completed these adoptions before they 
departed on military service. If that citizen then died in battle or abroad, his will might be 
contested. His relatives could completely ignore the document, or, most egregiously, they might 
even forge a will in his name in which the citizen adopted someone of his relatives’ own 
 Cooper 2003, 71-78. 199
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choosing. Thus unprincipled Athenians, who took advantage of the chaos that often arose after a 
relative’s death in battle, undermined the complicated set of performances that confirmed 
adoptions. Moreover, major catastrophes like the Peloponnesian War profoundly disrupted the 
Athenian identification process. Citizens who died or were taken prisoners of war could not 
perform the duties and daily tasks that defined their identities, endangering their own civic status 
and that of their family members.  
 In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon, the speaker opened his arguments by explaining 
to the jurors why he acted as his friend Chaerestratus’ advocate in the case. He claimed that he 
and Chaerestratus were such close friends, that he willingly followed his friend to war when 
Chaerestratus acted as trierarch during the Sicilian expedition (415 BCE). During the conflict, 
the two were captured by the enemy and were held as prisoners of war together. The speaker 
asked the jury how could he face such perils with Chaerestratus in war and neglect to help him in 
court, as well? (Isaeus. 6.1-2). Particularly compelling is the speaker’s explicit comparison 
between the dangers that Chaerestratus faced in war and those he faced in court at the hands of 
Androcles and Antidorus. Both struggles could endanger Chaerestratus’ family and his status as 
Philoctemon’s adopted son. In his introduction, the speaker touched on a key theme to which he 
returned throughout his speech: the destructive effects of war on the Athenian adoption and 
identification processes.   
 Critically, Chaerestratus and the speaker were not the only men in the course of the 
speech to go to war. The speaker’s descriptions of Philoctemon’s life and the events leading to 
his death in battle (~370s BCE) are particularly revealing.  When Philoctemon was alive, he 200
 See Wyse 1904, 512-513 for the difficulties in dating Philoctemon’s death. See also Edwards 2007, 200
95-100. 
 '165
attempted to prevent his father from illegally admitting the son of the prostitute Alce, 
Euctemon’s lover, into their phratry (Isaeus. 6.22). Euctemon eventually introduced the boy to 
his phratrymen, despite Philoctemon’s protests. It appears, however, that the old man’s estate 
remained mostly intact, and Euctemon left his new “son” only a single plot of land (Isaeus. 6.23). 
Sometime after these events, Philoctemon, while he was acting as trierarch, died in battle near 
the island of Chios, after he had adopted Chaerestratus by will. After Philoctemon’s death, 
Euctemon apparently felt emboldened and drew up a will that described the conditions under 
which his son was admitted into the phratry (Isaeus. 6.27). More incredible, Alce and her 
accomplices Androcles and Antidorus later persuaded the senile and sick Euctemon to cancel this 
will and sell off his estate piecemeal (Isaeus. 6.30).  
 Although Philoctemon was unable to prevent fully his father from giving Alce’s alleged 
son a portion of his property, he did ensure that Euctemon could not destroy the family estate. 
Furthermore, before Philoctemon died, he had also prevented his father Euctemon from 
undermining the Athenian identification process by acknowledging an alien child as a citizen.  201
When Philoctemon died in battle, however, his elderly father was left vulnerable to the attacks of 
Alce, Androcles, and Antidorus who wanted to gain possession over his property. By influencing 
Euctemon, these conspirators disrupted those everyday performances, like management of one’s 
estate, that defined both civic and adoptive identities. Moreover, the speaker accused his 
opponents of ignoring Philoctemon’s will in which he adopted Chaerestratus. If this will were 
genuine, Chaerestratus would be considered Euctemon’s grandson and heir to his estate. By 
 It appears that Euctemon never introduced his alleged son to his demesmen, and so the boy would not 201
have been considered a “full” citizen. Judging from the text of this speech, it is possible that admission 
into the phratry was enough to guarantee the child his portion of Euctemon’s estate. For a more detailed 
discussion of this issue, see Wyse 1904, 516-519. 
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laying claim to the property, Androcles and Antidorus were also ignoring Philoctemon’s final 
wishes and disrupting the order of inheritance set out by Athenian custom and law.   
 Consider, too, the speaker’s account of Callippe’s childhood, the woman whom he 
claimed was the mother of Euctemon’s two children. The speaker claimed that her father was 
Pistoxenus, a man who died during the Sicilian Expedition (415 BCE). This account would give 
them a significant advantage in the case. They could draw sympathy from their audience by 
invoking the worst disaster that the Athenians faced during the Peloponnesian War and take 
advantage of the disruptions resulting from the conflict that meant that many of their assertions 
would go unchallenged. For example, Androcles and Antidorus might use Pistoxenus’ untimely 
death as a plausible excuse as to why he had never carried out performative acts on Callippe’s 
behalf and given her a proper introduction into Athenian society. They could also cite the chaos 
during the Peloponnesian War to explain why Pistoxenus and Euctemon had ignored many other 
normal social customs. Like the speaker and the jurors, Androcles and Antidorus were aware of 
the Athenian concerns about the fragility of the Athenian identification process, particularly 
during periods of war.  
 Likewise, in other inheritance cases that centered on testamentary adoptions, Athenian 
litigants were especially concerned when citizens died in combat. Customarily, Athenians drew 
up wills before they set out on military expeditions.  They could thus ensure that their chosen 202
heirs could gain possession of the estate and avoid lengthy legal battles. Throughout the legal 
speeches of Isaeus, Athenian litigants showed two distinct concerns: first, they were anxious that 
greedy relatives might take advantage of chaotic periods and ignore a will in which a citizen 
 See Rubinstein 1993, 22-24. For ancient sources, see Isaeus. 2.14; Isaeus. 5.6; Isaeus. 9.15; Isaeus. 202
10.22; Isaeus. 11.8. 
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adopted an heir, as in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon. Second, they were also concerned 
that disreputable characters might forge a will, particularly during chaotic periods, to insert their 
own heir into the order of succession. By fabricating a will, Athenians could circumvent the 
usual performances by which they confirmed their relationships with their family.  
 Isaeus’ On the Estate of Dicaeogenes gives us particularly important insights into 
Athenian anxieties about testamentary adoptions during periods of wartime and political 
unrest.  A certain Dicaeogenes II, son of Menexenus, died in the battle of Syme (411 BCE). 203
The struggle for Dicaeogenes II’s property took place in two stages. First, Dicaeogenes II died in 
combat, and he left a will granting one-third of his estate to his nephew, Dicaeogenes III. 
Dicaeogenes II willed the remaining two-thirds of his estate to his sisters, the daughters of 
Menexenus. In the second stage of the struggle for the estate, twelve years later, “when the city 
was suffering misfortunes and civil strife arose,” Dicaeogenes III came forward and claimed his 
uncle’s entire estate, allegedly with a forged will, asserting that Dicaeogenes II had adopted him 
as his sole heir (Isaeus. 5.7).   As in On the Estate of Philoctemon, Isaeus here played on a 204
variety of Athenian anxieties that arose during periods of conflict. He depicted a family whose 
lives were upended when the owner of the ancestral property died in war. He further stressed that 
Athenians like Dicaeogenes might be tempted to take advantage of periods of political unrest to 
win possession of their family’s entire estate. Even years or decades after war or civil strife, 
 See also Isaeus. 10.22: Aristarchus made a will, before he died in battle. The speaker feared that his 203
opponents might play on the jurors’ sympathy that a man’s will be set aside, when he had died bravely in 
war. For similar circumstances, see Isaeus. 11.8: Hagnias made a will, when he acted as ambassador, 
probably during the Theban War (378-371 BCE). See Wyse 1904, 671. 
 The full Greek reads: καὶ ἐν τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ οὐσῶν δικῶν οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἠξίωσε τὰ πεπραγµένα εἰπεῖν  204
ἀδίκως πεπρᾶχθαι, πρὶν δυστυχησάσης τῆς πόλεως καὶ στάσεως γενοµένης Δικαιογένης οὑτοσί, πεισθεὶς  
ὑπὸ Μέλανος τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου, ᾧ περ καὶ τἆλλα ἐπείθετο, ἠµφεσβήτει ἡµῖν ἅπαντος τοῦ κλήρου, φάσκων  
ἐφ’ ὅλῳ ποιηθῆναι ὑὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου τοῦ ἡµετέρου.
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Athenians could still face disruptions to those performative acts, like the inheritance and 
management of property, by which they affirmed their status.  
 In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Astyphilus, the speaker, Astyphilus’ half-brother, accused his 
cousin Cleon of forging a will in which Astyphilus had adopted Cleon’s son and granted him 
control over his entire property. Astyphilus died in a military expedition to Mytilene (Isaeus. 
9.1).  When Astyphilus’ body was brought back to Athens, the speaker further claimed that 205
their father was ill and he himself was away on military service. Cleon took this opportunity to 
claim the estate on his son’s behalf (Isaeus. 9.3). The speaker’s narrative here follows the same 
pattern as the speaker’s story in On the Estate of Dicaeogenes, in that the struggle for Astyphilus’ 
estate took place in two stages. First, Astyphilus died unexpectedly while traveling abroad as a 
soldier. Because he died without a legitimate son to inherit his estate, Astyphilus’ property would 
immediately be vulnerable to litigation. As legal speeches like Isaeus’ On the Estate of 
Nicostratus demonstrate, Athenians could engage in lengthy court battles for properties where 
the line of succession was unclear.  In the second stage of the conflict, the situation was 206
exacerbated because the speaker himself was away on military expedition and his father was ill. 
Astyphilus’ male relatives, most particularly his brother and father, could best defend his estate 
against false claimants. Cleon, aware that Astyphilus’ property was left unguarded, apparently 
took advantage of the chaotic situation and forged a will. Isaeus’ On the Estate of Astyphilus 
demonstrates the fragility of the Athenian adoption process during wartime, when Athenians like 
 The date of this expedition remains unclear. As the speaker stated later in the speech, Astyphilus had 205
served throughout the Theban War (Isaeus.9.14), so this work must be later than 371 BCE. Wyse has sug-
gested a date in the mid-360’s BCE; see Wyse 1904, 627. Welsh has also argued that Astyphilus could 
have served in a garrison on Lesbos in the 360’s. See Welsh 1991.
 There were no less than seven claimants to Nicostratus’s estate. See Isaeus. 4.8.206
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Cleon could take advantage of the death of one relative and the absence of another to circumvent 
the performances by which adoptive identity was usually established.  
 Finally, catastrophes like the Peloponnesian War did not impact the adoption process 
alone—these disruptive events also had an acute effect on the Athenian identification process, 
the duties and daily activities by which citizens established their status before the wider 
community. Most crucial for my own argument, the narrative presented by Euxitheus in 
Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides shares striking similarities with the speeches of Isaeus 
discussed above. Euxitheus’ civic identity came under suspicion in two distinct stages that again 
play on Athenian anxieties. First, Euxitheus claimed that his father served as a soldier in the 
Peloponnesian War, was taken prisoner, and sold into slavery on the island of Leucas, where he 
acquired a foreign accent (Dem. 57.18). His father’s long absence required his mother to work as 
a ribbon-seller and a wet-nurse, slavish occupations which endangered her civic identity (Dem. 
57.35).    
 In the second stage, Euxitheus alleged that his opponent Eubulides had taken advantage 
of a period of political unrest in the city to expel him from their deme, Halimous. In 346 BCE, a 
citizen named Demophilus proposed a decree that required an examination (διαψήφισις) of the 
deme registries on the grounds that demes admitted foreigners and metics either through 
ignorance or bribery.  This legislation led to many legal cases, and Euxitheus claimed that 207
Eubulides had realized this and seized his chance to get revenge on his old political rival:  
διόπερ τὸν µὲν ἄλλον ἅπαντα χρόνον δηµοτευόµενος µετ’ ἐµοῦ καὶ κληρούµενος  
οὐδὲν ἑώρα τούτων, ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἡ πόλις πᾶσα τοῖς ἀσελγῶς εἰσπεπηδηκόσιν εἰς  
 See the introduction to this study for more detail on this decree. See also Whitehead 1986, 104-109; 207
Cooper 2003, 66.  
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τοὺς δήµους ὀργιζοµένη παρώξυντο, τηνικαῦτα µοι ἐπεβούλευσεν. ἦν δ’ ἐκεῖνος 
µὲν ὁ καιρὸς τοῦ συνειδότος αὑτῷ τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὁ δὲ νυνὶ παρὼν ἐχθροῦ καὶ  
συκοφαντεῖν βουλοµένου. 
Although in the past when he acted as a demesman and drew lots for office with 
me, he observed none of these [accusations], but when the entire city was spurred 
on, angry at those people who unlawfully forced their way into the demes, only 
then did he plot against me. That earlier time was the right moment for one who 
knew that he was speaking the truth, but the present moment belongs to an 
enemy and one who wishes to bring malicious accusations (Dem. 57.49).   
Like Androcles, Dicaeogenes III, and Cleon, Eubulides seized on a chaotic moment in Athenian 
history. It was not only wars and civil unrest that destabilized the Athenian identification process; 
Athenian citizens used these major catastrophes to their own advantage to question the civic 
identity of others and the performative acts they had carried out as citizens. In this series of legal 
speeches, we can thus observe the anxieties that these kind of large-scale events invoked for 
Athenians in their everyday lives. Not only could wars prove disastrous for the city as a whole, 
but they could also spur on litigants to fight over their family estates and even to challenge the 
identities of their fellow citizens.  
The manipulation and fabrication of women’s identities 
 In his On the Estate of Philoctemon, Isaeus purposefully played on another kind of 
Athenian anxiety surrounding women’s civic identities in his depictions of Callippe, allegedly 
Euctemon’s second wife and the mother of his two younger sons. In the case of Callippe, the 
speaker argued that his opponents Androcles and Antidorus had fabricated the woman so that 
they could insert two alien children into the line of inheritance. As the speaker claimed, the 
mother of these children was actually Alce, a notorious prostitute, the lover of Euctemon, and the 
accomplice of Androcles and Antidorus. In inventing Callippe, these men bypassed (and by 
extension undermined) those performances of identity by which Athenian women affirmed their 
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identities. I would also argue, however, that Callippe’s case and others like it prove that the 
identification process effectively controlled access to the citizen body.  
 To begin, the speaker harped on the question of the two children’s mother and the 
unreliable nature of Androcles’ and his accomplice Antidorus’ claim to the estate. At the first 
hearing for the case, the men had been unable to name their ward’s mother, and the speaker 
considered this evidence in support of his own version of events: 
Ὅτε γὰρ αἱ ἀνακρίσεις ἦσαν πρὸς τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ οὗτοι παρακατέβαλον ὡς ὑπὲρ 
γνησίων τῶνδ’ Εὐκτήµονος ὄντων, ἐρωτώµενοι ὑφ’ ἡµῶν τίς εἴη αὐτῶν µήτηρ  
καὶ ὅτου θυγάτηρ, οὐκ εἶχον ἀποδεῖξαι, διαµαρτυροµένων ἡµῶν καὶ τοῦ  
ἄρχοντος κελεύοντος ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ τὸν νόµον. <Καίτοι δεινόν>, ὦ ἄνδρες,  
ἀµφισβητεῖν µὲν ὡς ὑπὲρ γνησίων καὶ διαµαρτυρεῖν, µητέρα δὲ ἥτις ἦν µὴ ἔχειν 
ἀποδεῖξαι µηδὲ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς µηδένα.  
For when the interrogations took place before the archon, and these men made a 
claim to the property as if on behalf of the legitimate sons of Euctemon, when 
they were asked by us who was their mother and whose daughter she was, they 
could not produce an answer, although we protested and the archon ordered them 
to answer in accordance with the law. And yet it is a strange thing, gentlemen, to 
make a claim as if on behalf of legitimate sons and to lodge a protest, but not to 
be able to demonstrate who the mother was, nor even anyone related to them 
(Isaeus. 6.12).  
Here I believe that the speaker offers modern scholars two critical insights into how the 
Athenians viewed their identification process. On one hand, if we believe the speaker’s claims, 
Androcles and Antidorus constituted a serious threat to the institutions that controlled 
citizenship. By fabricating a woman’s existence and claiming Alce’s two sons as Euctemon’s 
legitimate children, they sidestepped the usual performances by which Athenians recognized 
citizens. On the other hand, the speaker’s arguments in this case also suggest that the 
identification process was an effective mechanism by which to control the citizen body.  
Androcles and Antidorus could not simply concoct a citizen-mother for their two wards. They 
needed to establish that she had lived in society, married Euctemon, and carried out the usual 
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performative acts—both the religious and mundane—of the typical Athenian woman. Moreover, 
Androcles and Antidorus also needed to produce witnesses to testify on her behalf. As I have 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, relatives were the most important witnesses an Athenian 
litigant could provide in cases which centered on citizenship and inheritance. It would be 
difficult if not impossible for Androcles and his accomplices to establish that their wards were 
Euctemon’s legitimate children if they could produce no witnesses to confirm their mother’s 
identity. 
 The speaker considered his opponents’ changing accounts concerning their ward’s 
parentage as even more damning evidence of their nefarious intentions. After Androcles and 
Antidorus had secured a delay in the court proceedings, at the second hearing they returned with 
what the speaker deemed “a story surpassing in impudence and not even true” (Isaeus. 6.13). 
According to these men, Euctemon had his two sons by Callippe, a woman whose father 
Pistoxenus had appointed Euctemon as his daughter’s guardian, before he perished in the Sicilian 
Expedition (Isaeus. 6.13). In this passage, I believe that the speaker subtly suggested that the 
story his opponents presented was too convenient. If the children whom the plaintiffs represented 
as Euctemon’s legitimate sons were in fact the illegitimate children of Alce, Androcles and 
Antidorus would need to fabricate a more appealing woman to present to an Athenian jury. At the 
preliminary hearing, they fumbled (Isaeus. 6.13). Apparently, by the trial, they had created 
Callippe, the daughter of a war hero, a far more appealing character to Athenian jurors. As I 
argued above, Androcles and Antidorus might also be able to claim that Callippe’s father had 
died before he could introduce his daughter to Athenian society properly and carry out the 
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requisite performative acts on her behalf. Although the speaker had dealt his opponents a blow in 
the first hearing, they still proved to be formidable.  
 The speaker’s allegations that his opponents had completely fabricated the boy’s mother 
may seem extreme to a modern reader, but examples of this peculiar legal tactic actually appear 
at least three times in other legal speeches by Isaeus and Demosthenes. In Isaeus’ On the Estate 
of Ciron, the unnamed speaker attempted to claim his maternal grandfather’s estate. He began his 
case by criticizing his opponents’ underhanded tactics: “These men lay claim to the estate on the 
grounds that they are the nearest kin, and they insult us by alleging that we were not born from 
[Ciron]’s daughter, nor even was a daughter ever born to that man” (Isaeus. 8.1).  Crucially, the 208
speaker in this case seemed to consider his opponents’ allegations a common tactic. They 
manipulated his mother’s identity, so that they could claim his grandfather’s estate. In doing so, 
they undermined the identification process that controlled inheritance and civic identity. 
 Moreover, the speaker took great pains in the case to offer proofs that Ciron in fact had a 
daughter and that he himself was her son. He first stressed that his opponents had refused to hand 
over Ciron’s household slaves for torture, so that they could attest that Ciron had reared a 
daughter in his house, given two marriage feasts in her honor, and given a dowry to each of her 
husbands (Isaeus. 8.9). The speaker further highlighted the attention that Ciron had given him 
and his brothers: he claimed that Ciron always offered sacrifices, both at the local and state 
levels, with his grandsons at his side, as a public acknowledgement of their status as his relatives 
 The full Greek reads: Ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ χαλεπῶς φέρειν, ὅταν τινὲς µὴ µόνον  208
τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀµφισβητεῖν τολµῶσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόµων δίκαια τοῖς σφετέροις  αὐτῶν λόγοις  
ἀφανιεῖν ἐλπίζωσιν· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν οὗτοι ποιεῖν ἐγχειροῦσι. Τοῦ γὰρ ἡµετέρου πάππου Κίρωνος οὐκ  
ἄπαιδος τελευτήσαντος, ἀλλ’ ἡµᾶς ἐκ θυγατρὸς αὑτοῦ γνησίας παῖδας αὑτῷ καταλελοιπότος, οὗτοι τοῦ τε
κλήρου λαγχάνουσιν ὡς ἐγγυτάτω γένους ὄντες, ἡµᾶς <τε> ὑβρίζουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἐξ ἐκείνου θυγατρὸς  
ὄντας, οὐδὲ γενοµένης αὐτῷ πώποτε τὸ παράπαν (Isaeus. 8.1). 
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and heirs (Isaeus. 8.15). The speaker’s arguments demonstrate the Athenian identification 
process at work. He could rely on the performances that his grandfather had carried out on his 
mother’s and his own behalf to establish his identity.  
 In the pseudo-Demosthenic Against Macartatus, perhaps the most complicated surviving 
legal speech concerning an inheritance case, the speaker Sositheus, like Ciron’s grandson, had to 
defend the existence of a female claimant to an estate. Sositheus asserted ownership of the estate 
of Hagnias on behalf of Eubulides III, the adopted grandson of Hagnias’ first maternal cousin, 
Eubulides II. To establish the claim of Eubulides III to the estate, Sositheus first had to prove the 
legitimacy of original claimant to the estate: Phylomache, the paternal aunt of Hagnias and the 
mother of Eubulides II. As in the case of Callippe and Ciron’s daughter, Sositheus’ opponents 
claimed that Phylomache did not exist. As Sositheus indignantly explained, 
οἵτινες κατεχρῶντο ὡς τῷ Πολέµωνι τῷ πατρὶ τῷ Ἁγνίου τὸ παράπαν οὐδεµία  
γένοιτο ἀδελφὴ ὁµοπατρία καὶ ὁµοµητρία· οὕτως ἦσαν ἀναίσχυντοι καὶ βδελυροί,  
τηλικουτονὶ πρᾶγµα παρακρουόµενοι τοὺς δικαστὰς καὶ οὑτωσὶ περιφανές, καὶ  
ἐσπούδαζον καὶ ἠγωνίζοντο περὶ τούτου µάλιστα. ἡµεῖς δέ γε νυνὶ µάρτυρας ὑµῖν 
τοσουτουσὶ παρεσχήµεθα περὶ τῆς Πολέµωνος ἀδελφῆς, τηθίδος δὲ Ἁγνίου. 
[They] alleged that Polemon the father of Hagnias did not have any sister born of 
the same father and the same mother: So shameless and so disgusting were they in 
misleading the jurors in such a great and well-known matter, they zealously [sought 
to prove this] and fought especially concerning this [argument]. But we now have 
produced so many witnesses for you concerning the sister of Polemon and the aunt 
of Hagnias (Dem. 43.39). 
   
Considered closely, the case on Hagnias’ estate becomes almost comical—one party vehemently 
proclaiming that Phylomache had never existed, and the other zealously defending her. I believe, 
however, that Sositheus’ description of the proceedings perfectly encapsulates Athenian anxieties 
around the manipulation of women’s identities. First, if we can trust Sositheus’ version of events, 
his opponents attempted to portray Sositheus himself as a devious man who would fabricate a 
woman to gain control over the estate of his wife’s distant relatives. Apparently they presented 
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their case with passion, and they may have used similar arguments as the speaker in Isaeus’ On 
the Estate of Philoctemon concerning the difficulties Sositheus encountered in producing 
witnesses to attest to both Phylomache’s existence and her legitimacy. 
 Second, like Ciron’s grandson, Sositheus condemned his opponents as “disgusting” men 
who themselves manipulated the identity of Phylomache to gain control over the estate of their 
long-dead distant relative. He fiercely defended Eubulides III’s claim to the estate, and he 
presented multiple witnesses to attest to Phylomache’s birth and her position as Polemon’s sister. 
Most crucially, I believe that Sositheus considered his opponents’ arguments so threatening, 
because they undermined the entire identification process for Athenian women. His opponents 
adopted a clever strategy by attacking the identity of a woman who had died decades before the 
case. Athenian identification depended almost entirely on the witness testimony of key 
identifying groups to certain performative acts. Given that Phylomache was long dead by the 
time of this trial, Sositheus found it difficult to produce living witnesses to those communal 
events by which she would have established her civic identity. Sositheus did manage to find 
witnesses, however, and through their testimony we can observe the Athenian identification 
process as it was meant to function. But the accusations against Phylomache suggest that crafty 
Athenian litigants took advantage of certain weak points of their identification process, the most 
serious shortcoming being that it was difficult to establish the identities of people who had died 
years before.   
 Finally, in the pseudo-Demonsthenic Against Neaira, the speaker Apollodorus claimed 
that his political enemy Stephanus had been living with Neaira, a notorious former prostitute, as 
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his wife, and given her daughter Phano in marriage to two Athenian citizens. Apollodorus offered 
an interesting conjecture concerning Stephanus’ possible defense: 
ἀκούω δὲ αὐτὸντοιοῦτόν τι µέλλειν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς οὐ γυναῖκα ἔχει αὐτὴν ἀλλ᾽
ἑταίραν, καὶ οἱ παῖδες οὐκ εἰσὶν ταύτης ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἑτέρας γυναικὸςαὐτῷ ἀστῆς, ἣν φ
ήσει πρότερον γῆµαι συγγενῆ αὑτοῦ. 
But I hear that he will make some such defense, that he does not keep her as a 
wife but as a mistress, and that the children are not hers but from another citizen-
wife of his, a relative of his whom he had married before (Dem. 59.119).  
  
Apollodorus’ speculation concerning Stephanus’ defense is particularly striking, given that it 
almost perfectly mirrors the speaker’s accusations in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon. In 
both cases, the speakers claimed that the children in question—Alce’s sons and Neaira’s daughter 
Phano—were in fact the offspring of prostitutes. Both the opponents in the cases apparently 
offered the same defense, that the children were the product of an earlier marriage to a phantom 
citizen-wife. Furthermore, Apollodorus offered another interesting parallel to a case that I 
discussed earlier. Like the speaker in On the Estate of Ciron, Apollodorus stressed that 
Stephanus had refused to surrender Neaira’s household slaves who would best be able to attest to 
the children’s parentage and to the realities of the family’s daily activities (Dem. 59.120).  
 Apollodorus’ case against Neaira thus shares key similarities with inheritance cases, 
where we can observe anxieties about the manipulation of women’s identities. There is, however, 
a key difference between these cases: Apollodorus argued not about a struggle for an inheritance 
but a conflict about Athenian citizenship. Stephanus apparently fabricated the identity of his 
former citizen-wife to win citizenship for Neaira’s children. Indeed, Apollodorus’ case rested on 
his central accusation that Stephanus was a monster who “robbed native citizens…of their 
freedom of speech, but forced upon [the jurors] as Athenians those who have no right against all 
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laws” (Dem. 59.28). Through the character of Stephanus, we can observe that Athenian anxieties 
surrounding the manipulation of women’s identities extended from inheritance suits to legal 
cases concerning civic rights. By controlling and exploiting women’s identities, litigants could 
not only acquire valuable estates but also circumvent the performative acts that affirmed civic 
identity.  
The manipulation of heiresses 
 To return to my original case on the estate of Euctemon: the speaker brought even more 
urgency to the case in his accusation that Androcles had previously attempted to claim 
Euctemon’s widowed daughter as an heiress (Isaeus. 6.46). In Athenian inheritance law, if a 
citizen died and left a daughter (or even daughters) as his only legitimate child, she became an 
heiress (ἐπίκληρος). Her nearest male relative was then entitled to claim the right to marry her 
and so keep the estate within the family.  When Androcles sought the right to wed Euctemon’s 209
daughter, he threatened the processes that controlled both inheritance and civic identity. I would 
argue that this marriage would constitute a major disruption to the performances by which 
Euctemon’s family defined its identity. First, Androcles would gain partial control over the 
family estate. Furthermore, Athenians relied most especially on their relatives as participants in 
and witnesses to the performative acts that controlled family identity. If Androcles married into 
Euctemon’s family, he would be irrevocably linked with all of his relatives.   
 Anxiety for the well-being of heiresses is well-attested in Athenian law. The eponymous 
archon was charged with protecting particularly vulnerable Athenians: orphans, heiresses, 
 For more detail and a good summary of the scholarship on heiresses, see especially Rubinstein 1993, 209
87-97. 
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pregnant widows, and aged parents. He was authorized to fine any person who committed 
outrages against these people. Furthermore, any Athenian (ὁ βουλόµενος) could bring an 
impeachment (ἡ εἰσαγγελία) against any person who injured an orphan or an heiress.  An 210
impeachment differed from a state prosecution (ἡ γραφή) or a private lawsuit (ἡ δίκη) in that the 
prosecutor ran no risks. He was not forced to pay a court fee that he might have to forfeit if he 
lost his case. He also incurred no penalty if he failed to secure a certain percentage of the jurors’ 
votes. 
 The use of the impeachment procedure indicates that the Athenians were particularly 
concerned about the protection of orphans and heiresses, and they wanted to facilitate the 
prosecution of any person who dared maltreat these vulnerable populations. That the eponymous 
archon was charged with safeguarding both heiresses and widows pregnant by their deceased 
husbands is also suggestive. The Athenians sought to protect women on whom the continuance 
of particular households depended. Heiresses, after all, did not inherit estates—their male 
children did, and Athenians were concerned that unsavory men would attempt to insert 
themselves into an Athenian family by marrying an heiress. 
 In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon, the speaker was purposefully playing on 
Athenian anxiety about women’s identities and how heiresses in particular might be exploited. If 
the speaker’s claims were true, Androcles proved quite creative in his attempts to claim 
Euctemon’s property. First, he sought to claim the estate through Euctemon’s daughter (Isaeus. 
6.46) and then through the fabricated Callippe. I would argue that his actions toward both women 
align with one another perfectly. As the speaker depicted him, Androcles manipulated a number 
 For modern scholarship, see particularly Harrison 1998, 10-13; 132-138; Just 2016, 21-22. For ancient 210
sources, see Isaeus. 3.46; Dem. 35.48. 
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of women’s identities—Euctemon’s daughter, Callippe, and even Alce—to gain control over the 
estate. Androcles is perhaps the most dangerous character in the entire speech, given his 
willingness to subvert all societal norms and to undermine the Athenian identification process 
and the performances, like marriage, that defined it. 
 Apparently, Androcles abandoned his plan for Euctemon’s daughter, and his earlier legal 
action certainly weakened this case where he claimed that Euctemon had left two legitimate sons 
(Isaeus. 6.46).  More critical to my own argument, the speaker offered a passionate plea to the 211
jurors because Euctemon’s daughter was still in danger from the speaker’s opponents if they won 
their case: “You ought to consider…whether it’s right that the daughter of Euctemon…come 
under the power of these men either to be married to anyone they choose or to be allowed to 
grow old [unmarried]” (Isaeus. 6.51).  In the current case, Androcles and Antidorus unlawfully 212
claimed both Euctemon’s estate and custody over his widowed daughter, a living, breathing 
Athenian citizen-woman, a far more serious offense than merely fabricating Callippe. The 
speaker painted a nightmare vision for the future: If the speaker’s opponents gained possession 
of Euctemon’s estate, it would no doubt prove catastrophic to his daughter. Whether the men 
managed to marry her off or to leave her a widow for the rest of her life, they would determine 
the future of Euctemon’s family. In one scenario, the daughter may have children, but by a 
 As the speaker himself noted: Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῦ µάρτυρος αὐτοῦ σκέψασθε τὴν τόλµαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν,  211
ὅστις εἴληχε µὲν αὑτῷ τῆς θυγατρὸς τῆς Εὐκτήµονος ὡς οὔσης ἐπικλήρου, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κλήρου  
τοῦ Εὐκτήµονος [πέµπτου] µέρους ὡς ἐπιδίκου ὄντος, µεµαρτύρηκε δ’ Εὐκτήµονος ὑὸν εἶναι γνήσιον.    
Καίτοι πῶς οὗτος οὐ σαφῶς ἐξελέγχει αὐτὸς αὑτὸν τὰ ψευδῆ µεµαρτυρηκότα; (Isaeus. 6.46). 
 The full Greek reads: Ἐνθυµεῖσθαι τοίνυν χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες, πότερον δεῖ τὸν ἐκ ταύτης τῶν  212
Φιλοκτήµονος εἶναι κληρονόµον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ µνήµατα ἰέναι χεόµενον καὶ ἐναγιοῦντα, ἢ τὸν ἐκ τῆς 
ἀδελφῆς τοῦτον, ὃν ὑὸν αὐτὸς ἐποιήσατο· καὶ πότερον δεῖ τὴν ἀδελφὴν <τὴν> Φιλοκτήµονος, ἣ Χαιρέᾳ  
συνῴκησε, νῦν δὲ χηρεύει, ἐπὶ τούτοις γενέσθαι ἢ ἐκδοῦναι ὅτῳ βούλονται ἢ ἐᾶν καταγηράσκειν, ἢ  
γνησίαν οὖσαν ὑφ’ ὑµῶν ἐπιδικασθεῖσαν συνοικεῖν ὅτῳ ἂν ὑµῖν δοκῇ· (Isaeus. 6.51). 
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husband who shared the same evil character as Androcles and Antidorus; in the second, 
Euctemon’s daughter died alone and ensured the end of her father’s line. In either case, 
Androcles and Antidorus would illicitly acquire Euctemon’s estate and insert themselves into his 
family. They would thus upset the performances by which Euctemon’s family, most especially 
his female relatives, established their identities. The speaker thus painted his opponents as the 
ultimate manipulators of the Athenian household. 
 The pseudo-Demosthenic Against Stephanus II provides an interesting parallel to the 
scenario surrounding Euctemon’s daughter. The orator Apollodorus delivered the speech against 
his relative Stephanus on a charge of false-witnessing. Stephanus had testified in an earlier trial 
on behalf of Phormio, who was attempting to block Apollodorus from suing him for embezzling 
from Apollodorus’ father’s, Pasio’s, bank. Apollodorus, however, aimed the majority of his 
attacks against Phormio; in one argument, Apollodorus claimed Phormio had illegally married 
Apollodorus’ mother Archippe, whom he considered an heiress (Dem. 46.19). Apollodorus first 
cited the law concerning betrothals: A woman could only be given in marriage by her father, her 
brother, or her paternal grandfather. If she had none of these relatives, her legal guardian was 
obligated to marry her or to give her a dowry (Dem. 46.18). Because his mother had none of 
these male relatives living, Apollodorus declared himself Archippe’s guardian and her an heiress. 
As Adele Scafuro has convincingly demonstrated, however, this was a ludicrous claim.  Simply 213
put, the Athenians defined an heiress as the daughter of a man without male heirs. When the 
daughter had a male child, he would inherit his grandfather’s estate.  
 Scafuro 2011, 272-273. 213
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 Why would Apollodorus argue that his mother was an heiress? In his speech, Apollodorus 
attempted to damage the reputation of Phormio through a number of arguments. To name just a 
few: Apollodorus claimed that Phormio had illegally used Stephanus as his own personal 
mouthpiece, when the man testified for him; Apollodorus also argued that litigants were barred 
from testifying on their own behalf (Dem. 46.10). Moreover, Apollodorus claimed that Phormio 
had forged his father’s will, because Pasio had no authority to draw up a will and therefore 
would not have done so (Dem. 46.15).  Although modern scholars have often dismissed 214
Apollodorus’ speech, his accusations fit into a larger pattern. Apollodorus sought to further 
discredit Phormio by taking advantage of Athenian concern about the treatment of heiresses. 
Apollodorus portrayed Phormio as a man like Androcles: deceptive, greedy, and willing to 
manipulate a woman and subvert the Athenian identification process that controlled inheritance 
to gain control over a wealthy estate. 
Woman as manipulator: Alce  
 To return again to Isaeus’ speech on the estate of the aged Euctemon, if Androcles and 
Antidorus had invented Callippe, then who was the mother of the two boys for whom these men 
claimed Euctemon’s estate? The speaker claimed that as an old man, Euctemon had begun an 
affair with a woman named Alce, a retired prostitute who managed an apartment building that 
Euctemon owned in the Ceramicus district of Athens (Isaeus. 6.19-20). He declared that the two 
boys were actually Alce’s sons by a freedman named Dion. In Alce, Chaerestratus’ advocate 
 Apollodorus’ arguments here are almost incomprehensible. He argued that his father was an adoptive 214
son—of the Athenian people—and therefore had no authority to make a will. He further argued that Pasio 
had legitimate sons and so could not make a will.
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created a Scylla meant to terrify his Athenian audience. She embodied all the traits of an “evil” 
woman. She manipulated Euctemon, so that he illegally introduced her son to his phratrymen. 
Then, with the aid of Androcles and Antidorus, she exploited Euctemon’s senility and 
manipulated the old man into selling the majority of his assets. Finally, Alce even violated 
Athenian customs and laws by participating in a procession for Demeter and Persephone. The 
speaker thus portrayed Alce as the ultimate manipulator and the embodiment of Athenian 
anxieties concerning dishonest women. She effectively undermined every kind of performance—
political, religious, and mundane—by which Athenians established their family and civic 
identities.  
 The speaker explained that Euctemon had gradually abandoned his wife and daughters to 
live with Alce and her children, exclaiming that “he would go out to the house and on each 
occasion he would spend much time there, and sometimes he would even dine with the woman, 
leaving behind his wife and his children and the home in which he lived” (Isaeus. 6.21).   The 215
speaker described Euctemon’s actions toward Alce and her children as a kind of sad parody of 
the quotidian routines an Athenian citizen would carry out with his family. Euctemon lived with 
Alce, took meals with her, and considered her children as his own. Alce and her two sons thus 
took the place of his lawfully wedded wife and his legitimate children, subverting Athenian 
societal norms. By engaging in an unnatural relationship with Euctemon, Alce adopted the role 
of his wife rather than of his mistress. She also undermined the performative acts Euctemon was 
 The Greek reads: φοιτῶν γὰρ ὁ Εὐκτήµων ἐπὶ τὸ ἐνοίκιον ἑκάστοτε τὰ πολλὰ διέτριβεν ἐν τῇ 215
συνοικίᾳ, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐσιτεῖτο µετὰ τῆς ἀνθρώπου, καταλιπὼν καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὴν 
οἰκίαν ἣν ᾤκει (Isaeus. 6.21). 
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obligated to complete as a citizen; he needed to safeguard his familial home and to maintain 
relationships with his relatives. Yet Alce did not threaten Euctemon’s family alone.  
 Eventually, the speaker conjectured, Alce had addled Euctemon with drugs and 
convinced him to introduce her elder son to his phratry, an act through which Euctemon could 
win him Athenian citizenship (Isaeus. 6.21-22). While an Athenian jury would frown upon Alce 
living with Euctemon in a pseudo-marriage, this arrangement was not technically illegal. The 
speaker, however, expanded on his allegations when he claimed that Alce had actually 
manipulated Euctemon into acknowledging her son to his phratrymen. The speaker credited Alce 
with even greater powers that extended not only to the household but even to key institutions, 
like the phratry, that controlled citizenship. Moreover, in his accusations, Chaerestratus’ advocate 
also alluded to the laws concerning adoption that forbid citizens from adopting if they were 
senile, ill, drugged, or under the influence of a woman.  In his narrative concerning the woman 216
Alce, the speaker combined all four of these elements to fully discredit Euctemon’s 
acknowledgement of her elder son. 
 The speaker also played on tropes that appear in other legal cases, perhaps most famously 
in the pseudo-Demosthenic Against Neaira, which featured the prostitute Neaira who schemed 
with her lover Stephanus to pass off her children as Athenian citizens. The speaker Apollodorus 
depicted Neaira and her daughter Phano as particularly crafty in their treatment of Phano’s ex-
husband Phrastor. When Phrastor fell ill, the pair nursed him back to health. Apollodorus 
conjectured that the two women had cajoled Phrastor to acknowledge his son by Phano as his 
legitimate child, although Phano herself was illegitimate (Dem. 59.55-56). Like the speaker in 
 For more discussion on this topic, see my chapter concerning the institution of adoption.216
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Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon, Apollodorus needed to explain why Phrastor might have 
introduced this child to the members of his genos, a clear proof of the child’s legitimacy. 
Apollodorus found an effective means to discredit Phrastor’s son by painting his putative 
grandmother and mother as conniving women who were willing to manipulate a sick man into 
carrying out formal performances of citizenship for an illegitimate child.  
 Likewise, in the legal speeches on inheritance cases written by Isaeus, litigants often took 
advantage of the Athenian anxiety that a clever woman might influence a man when he adopted a 
child.  In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Menecles, the speaker took particular pains to disprove his 217
opponent’s claim that his sister had influenced her ex-husband, Menecles, when he adopted the 
speaker. As the adopted son proclaimed, 
Ὅτι δὲ οὐ παρανοῶν οὐδὲ γυναικὶ πιθόµενος ὁ Μενεκλῆς ἐποιήσατο, ἀλλ’ εὖ  
φρονῶν, ἐνθένδε ἐστὶν ὑµῖν ῥᾴδιον ἐπιγνῶναι. Πρῶτον µὲν γὰρ ἡ ἀδελφή, περὶ  
ἧς οὗτος τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ λόγου πεποίηται, ὡς ἐκείνῃ πεισθεὶς ἐµὲ ἐποιήσατο,  
πολλῷ πρότερον ἦν ἐκδεδοµένη πρὶν ἢ τὴν ποίησιν γενέσθαι, ὥστ’ εἴ γ’ ἐκείνῃ  
πεισθεὶς τὸν ὑὸν ἐποιεῖτο, τῶν ἐκείνης παίδων τὸν ἕτερον ἐποιήσατ’ ἄν· δύο γάρ  
εἰσιν αὐτῇ.  
That Menecles, not insane nor even persuaded by a woman, adopted me, but being 
in his right mind, it is easy for you to understand from the following 
circumstances. For first, my sister, concerning whom this opponent has made the 
majority of his argument, under whose influence he claims that he adopted me, 
had been married long before the adoption took place, so that if he adopted a son 
under her influence, he would have adopted one of her own children; for she had 
two sons (Isaeus. 2.19).  
Like the speaker in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon, the adopted son’s opponent had 
portrayed his sister as the archetypal manipulative woman who had influenced her ex-husband to 
benefit her relatives. Also interesting is that the speaker in this particular case did not treat his 
opponent’s argument as outlandish. In fact, he treated the accusations as quite commonplace, and 
 See also Isaeus 7, where the speaker Thrasyllus must also defend the legitimacy of his adoption 217
against a charge that his adoptive father Apollodorus had been under the influence of a woman.
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he suggested a more likely scenario in which his sister would have manipulated Menecles into 
adopting one of her own children, a far more profitable arrangement for her immediate family. 
Again, the speakers in these cases—Chaerestratus’ advocate, Apollodorus, and the opponent of 
Menecles’ adopted son—, all fell back on tropes which would be familiar to their audience and 
play on Athenian anxieties. 
 The speaker in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon did not solely accuse Alce of 
inserting her children into the citizenry, although an Athenian jury would think this alone was a 
serious allegation. He also described her financial motives in living with Euctemon and assigned 
her the leading role in Androcles and Antidorus’ plot to gain possession of the old man’s entire 
property. As the speaker recounted, Euctemon made a will to ensure that his alleged son would 
inherit property upon his death (Isaeus. 6.27-28).  Androcles and Antidorus “came under the 218
influence of that woman” and manipulated Euctemon into canceling the will to expedite their 
theft of his entire estate (Isaeus. 6.29).  The senile Euctemon then sold off the majority of his 219
land and his possessions for cash, which Alce, Androcles, and Antidorus immediately seized, 
avoiding the pains of laying claim to the property through legal proceedings (Isaeus. 6.33-34). 
The sequence of events that the speaker presented is particularly notable: only when Androcles 
and Antidorus came under the influence of the woman Alce did they make moves against 
Euctemon’s estate. He assigned Alce an enormous amount of power here. In ending this portion 
of the speech, he further lamented: “Before my opponents made their acquaintance with the 
 Scholars disagree whether this document would have constituted a will in Athenian law. See Wyse 218
1904, 514-516.  
 The Greek reads: Κειµένου δὲ τοῦ γραµµατείου σχεδὸν δύ’ ἔτη καὶ τοῦ Χαιρέου τετελευτηκότος, 219
ὑποπεπτωκότες οἵδε τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁρῶντες ἀπολλύµενον τὸν οἶκον καὶ τὸ γῆρας καὶ τὴν ἄνοιαν τοῦ  
Εὐκτήµονος, ὅτι εἴη αὐτοῖς ἱκανὴ ἀφορµή, συνεπιτίθενται (Isaeus. 6.29). 
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woman and plotted with her against Euctemon, Euctemon and his son Philoctemon possessed…a 
large fortune” (Isaeus. 6.38).  Although Chaerestratus’ advocate faced Androcles and Antidorus 220
in court, he made it clear that Alce was mainly responsible for stripping Euctemon’s family of 
their property, a potent symbol of their family and civic identities.  
 When Euctemon died, the speaker claimed that Alce neglected the old man’s body and 
committed her first offense against Athenian religious customs. While Euctemon’s corpse was 
lying out in the house, the conspirators locked his slaves in a closet to prevent them from 
delivering news of his death to his family and carried off the furniture from the home to the 
adjoining house owned by Antidorus (Isaeus. 6.39). When Euctemon’s wife and daughters finally 
arrived, Alce and her accomplices barred the women from the house and declared “it was not 
fitting that they bury Euctemon” (Isaeus. 6.40).  In this account, the speaker portrayed Alce as 221
a woman who manipulated Euctemon’s family structure and, even worse, Athenian religious 
practices. First, she barred Euctemon’s lawful wife and his legitimate daughters from tending to 
his body, claiming that right for herself even though she was in no way related to Euctemon. 
Especially in inheritance cases, Athenian litigants often held up the performance of burial rites as 
proof of their identities as adoptive children.  Second, Alce then failed to carry out Euctemon’s 222
 The full Greek reads: Πρὶν µὲν τοίνυν τούτους γνωρίσαι τὴν ἄνθρωπον  καὶ µετ’ ἐκείνης  220
ἐπιβουλεῦσαι Εὐκτήµονι, οὕτω πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἐκέκτητο Εὐκτήµων µετὰ τοῦ ὑέος Φιλοκτήµονος 
ὥστε ἅµα τά τε µέγιστα ὑµῖν λῃτουργεῖν ἀµφοτέρους τῶν τε ἀρχαίων µηδὲν πραθῆναι τῶν τε προσόδων  
περιποιεῖν ὥστε ἀεί τι προσκτᾶσθαι (Isaeus. 6.38).
 The full Greek reads: Καὶ οὐδ’ ἐπειδὴ ἑτέρων πυθόµεναι ἦλθον αἱ θυγατέρες αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ γυνή, οὐδὲ  221
τότε εἴων εἰσιέναι, ἀλλ’ ἀπέκλεισαν τῇ θύρᾳ, φάσκοντες οὐ  προσήκειν αὐταῖς θάπτειν Εὐκτήµονα·  
καὶ οὐδ’ εἰσελθεῖν ἐδύναντο, εἰ µὴ µόλις καὶ περὶ ἡλίου δυσµάς (Isaeus. 6.40). 
 See especially Isaeus.2. 36-37; Isaeus. 4.19; Isaeus. 8.24. Litigants could also use the failure to per222 -
form burial rites to disprove the legitimacy of adoptive children. See especially Isaeus. 9.4-5; Isocr. 19.31-
33.
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funeral. Given the emphasis that the Athenians placed on proper burial, the speaker’s 
extraordinary account of Alce would certainly have an impact on jurors. If we believe the 
speaker’s portrayal of Alce, she managed to subvert every performative act that defined the 
Athenian identification process.   
 Finally, the speaker accused Alce of perhaps her most shocking indiscretion when he 
claimed that she joined in a procession in honor of Demeter and Persephone and entered their 
temple against Athenian law and custom (Isaeus. 6.49-50). As he exclaimed, 
ἡ διαφθείρασα τὴν Εὐκτήµονος γνώµην καὶ πολλῶν ἐγκρατὴς γενοµένη οὕτως  
ὑβρίζει σφόδρα πιστεύουσα τούτοις ὥστε οὐ µόνον τῶν Εὐκτήµονος οἰκείων 
καταφρονεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσης. 
The woman who destroyed Euctemon’s reason and who was master of so much 
property was so insolent in her reliance on these men [Androcles and Antidorus], 
that not only did she show her contempt for Euctemon’s family but even for the 
whole city! (Isaeus. 6.48).  
The speaker painted Alce as a woman who subverted all social norms. First, she destroyed 
Euctemon and his relatives by inserting her own child into the line of succession, when 
Euctemon introduced her son to his phratrymen. Second, she had “become the master” (ἐγκρατὴς 
γενοµένη) of Euctemon’s entire estate, when she and her accomplices convinced the old man to 
sell off his properties. Finally, she undermined Athenian religious customs when she failed to 
perform Euctemon’s burial rites and when she illicitly took part in the procession celebrating 
Demeter and Persephone meant only for initiates.  Alce thus failed to carry out all the duties 223
and daily activities by which Athenians identified citizen women. By the end of the speaker’s 
account, Alce became the anti-wife, a caricature of the worst character traits which Athenian 
women could embody. But Alce offers us important insights into those peculiar feminine 
 See also Dem.59.73. In a famous passage, Apollodorus accused Neaira’s daughter Phano of illicitly 223
taking part in the Anthesteria festival. 
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characteristics that invoked anxieties for Athenian audiences. To the Athenians, if women exerted 
too much control, they not only threatened their family structure but also jeopardized the 
Athenian identification process itself.  
Family feuds 
  In his account of the legal battle for Euctemon’s estate, Isaeus presented a sensational 
story in which he purposefully touched on key tropes that triggered strong feelings for Athenians: 
the effects of war on the family, greedy kinsmen who manipulated their female relatives to gain 
property, and harlots like Alce who cheated citizens of their money. Isaeus further described the 
family feud between Philoctemon, Euctemon, and Androcles, a quarrel that Philoctemon’s 
relatives had attempted to prevent. Indeed, throughout his corpus, Isaeus again and again 
discussed family fights to elicit emotion from his audience of jurors. Not only were Athenians 
anxious that in-fighting among relatives might disrupt the order of succession in inheritance 
cases; they were also concerned that kinsmen might scheme against one another to gain 
possession of the familial estate and so disrupt the performances that determined family identity.   
 In the opening of his case, the speaker lamented that a great misfortune had befallen 
Euctemon in his old age, a misfortune “that ruined his entire house, squandered his money, and 
threw him into a quarrel with his nearest relatives.”  The speaker acknowledged that Alce and 224
her accomplices’ worst crime was not only that they brought about financial ruin for Euctemon’s 
 The full Greek reads: Εὐκτήµων µὲν γὰρ ἐβίω ἔτη ἓξ καὶ ἐνενήκοντα, τούτου δὲ τοῦ χρόνου τὸν µὲν 224
πλεῖστον ἐδόκει εὐδαίµων εἶναι—καὶ γὰρ οὐσία ἦν οὐκ  ὀλίγη αὐτῷ καὶ παῖδες καὶ γυνή, καὶ τἆλλ’  
ἐπιεικῶς ηὐτύχει—ἐπὶ γήρως δὲ αὐτῷ συµφορὰ ἐγένετο οὐ µικρά, ἣ ἐκείνου πᾶσαν  τὴν οἰκίαν  
ἐλυµήνατο καὶ χρήµατα πολλὰ διώλεσε καὶ αὐτὸν τοῖς οἰκειοτάτοις εἰς διαφορὰν κατέστησεν (Isaeus. 
6.18).
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family but that they also created painful divides between Euctemon and his relatives, especially 
his son Philoctemon. When Euctemon attempted to introduce Alce’s child to his phratry, 
Philoctemon and his phratrymen barred the old man from doing so. Euctemon then threatened to 
marry another woman so that he could produce more children (Isaeus. 6.22). Euctemon did not 
idly threaten his son. The Athenians adopted a partible inheritance system, where each male heir 
could claim an equal portion of his father’s property. By siring more children, Euctemon would 
guarantee that each of his sons, including Philoctemon, would receive a smaller share of his 
estate. If the estate were divided among multiple heirs, this would also split up and greatly 
devalue a property which the speaker proudly declared had supported many liturgies (Isaeus. 
6.60). Philoctemon’s other relatives understandably advised him to permit his father to introduce 
Alce’s child to the phratry because they feared that “greater quarrels would arise” (Isaeus. 
6.23).  Euctemon’s family realized the devastating consequences that in-fighting could have on 225
the cultural processes that controlled inheritance. Heirs with competing claims might attempt to 
win the entire estate through one or more lawsuits.  
 In his conclusion, the speaker lingered on another quarrel among Euctemon’s family 
members, the ongoing feud between Philoctemon and his distant relative Androcles. Apparently, 
Alce had not chosen Androcles as her partner at random but because the man had close ties with 
her target, Euctemon. Androcles had apparently insisted that Philoctemon had never written a 
will and that Chaerestratus had concocted the entire adoption (Isaeus. 6.54). In response, the 
speaker argued: 
 The full Greek reads: Εἰδότες δ’ οἱ ἀναγκαῖοι ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνουµὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γένοιντο παῖδες ταύτην  225
τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντος, φανήσοιντο δ’ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἔσοιντο ἔτι µείζους διαφοραί,  
ἔπειθον, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸν Φιλοκτήµονα ἐᾶσαι εἰσαγαγεῖν τοῦτον τὸν παῖδα ἐφ’ οἷς ἐζήτει ὁ Εὐκτήµων,  
χωρίον ἓν δόντα (Isaeus. 6.23). 
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(54) σὺ δ’ οὐ παραγενόµενος διαρρήδην µεµαρτύρηκας ὡς οὐ διέθετο 
Φιλοκτήµων, ἀλλ’ ἄπαις ἐτελεύτησε. Καίτοι πῶς οἷόν τε εἰδέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες;… 
(55) Πάντων γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνος ἔχθιστον ἐνόµιζε διά <τε> τὴν ἄλλην πονηρίαν  
καὶ διότι τῶν συγγενῶν µόνος µετὰ τῆς Ἀλκῆς ἐκείνης τούτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις  
συνεπιβουλεύσας τοῖς τοῦ Εὐκτήµονος χρήµασι τοιαῦτα διεπράξατο, οἷά περ  
ὑµῖν ἀπέδειξα. 
(54) But you [Androcles], although you weren’t present, you have provided clear 
testimony that Philoctemon did not write a will, but he died childless. And yet 
how could he know this, gentlemen?… (55) For that man [Philoctemon] regarded 
him as his worst enemy because of his general wickedness, and because he 
[Androcles] alone of his relatives, along with Alce, plotted with this man 
[Antidorus] and others against the property of Euctemon and committed those 
acts which I have described to you (Isaeus. 6.54-55).  
Here, the speaker sought to discredit Androcles’ arguments that Philoctemon died without an heir 
by pointing to the enmity between the two men. In this passage, however, the speaker 
contradicted his earlier family history. Consider his earlier narrative: Philoctemon and his 
phratrymen attempted to block Euctemon from introducing his “son” to the phratry (Isaeus.6. 
21-22). Philoctemon finally agreed to admit the boy, on the condition that he would receive only 
a single farm on Euctemon’s death (Isaeus. 6.24). At some point after this drama, Philoctemon 
died serving as a trierarch (Isaeus. 6.27). Euctemon then drew up a will to further validate Alce’s 
child’s claim to the estate (Isaeus. 6.27). Only then, after Philoctemon died and Euctemon drew 
up the will, did Androcles and Antidorus join with Alce to gain possession of Euctemon’s estate 
(Isaeus. 6.29). We can consider the speaker’s claim that Philoctemon hated Androcles because he 
plotted with Alce and Antidorus against his father an exaggeration of the truth or even an outright 
lie.  
 Still, the speaker’s accusation that Philoctemon considered Androcles “his worst enemy” 
offers important insights into Athenian concerns about family quarrels. The speaker sought to 
discredit Androcles by claiming that he was engaged in a fight with Philoctemon before his 
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death, with the implication that Androcles would have no way of knowing whether Philoctemon 
had written a will. With this argument the speaker may have also suggested that Philoctemon 
would never have neglected to write a will and so allow his family estate to pass to two 
illegitimate boys whose guardian, Androcles, was his bitter enemy. In any case, Isaeus returned 
to one of the key themes that appears throughout his corpus: the destructive effects of family 
feuds on the everyday performances that defined the institution of adoption and the Athenian 
identification process as a whole.  
 Likewise, in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Cleonymus, the nephews of Cleonymus claimed his 
estate as his natural heirs. But before his death, Cleonymus had written a will that named his 
relatives Pherenicus and Poseidippus as his heirs, allegedly because at the time he was quarreling 
with his nephews’ guardian Deinias. As the speaker claimed: 
Τότε γοῦν ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ὀργῆς Κλεώνυµος ταύτας ποιεῖται τὰς διαθήκας, οὐχ  
ἡµῖν ἐγκαλῶν, ὡς ὕστερον †ἐσώθη† ἔλεγεν, ὁρῶν δὲ ἡµᾶς ἐπιτροπευοµένους ὑπὸ 
Δεινίου καὶ δεδιὼς µὴ τελευτήσειεν αὐτὸς ἔτι παῖδας ἡµᾶς καταλιπὼν καὶ τῆς  
οὐσίας ἡµετέρας οὔσης γένοιτο κύριος Δεινίας· ἡγεῖτο γὰρ δεινὸν εἶναι τὸν  
ἔχθιστον τῶν οἰκείων ἐπίτροπον καὶ κύριον τῶν αὑτοῦ καταλιπεῖν, καὶ ποιεῖν  
αὑτῷ τὰ νοµιζόµενα τοῦτον, ἕως ἡµεῖς ἡβήσαιµεν, ᾧ ζῶν διάφορος ἦν·  
At that time Cleonymus made this will because of his anger, not because he had 
any charge against us, as he [Pherenicus] later said, but because he saw that we 
were under the guardianship of Deinias, and because he feared that he himself 
might die and leave us behind while we were still children, and Deinias might 
become master of the property if it were ours: For he thought it terrible to leave 
his worse enemy as guardian of his relatives and master of his estate, and [he 
thought it terrible] that this man perform the customary rites for him, with whom 
he had been quarreling while he lived, until we grew up (Isaeus. 1.10).  
 The speaker apparently used his uncle Cleonymus’ quarrel with Deinias to counter his 
opponents’ arguments and bolster his own case. First, he stressed that Cleonymus had no 
complaint against his nephews when he wrote the will. In his speech, Pherenicus had apparently 
declared that the speaker and his brothers actually had the dispute with their uncle to discredit 
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their claim to the estate. Both parties then had made a quarrel the center of their legal cases. 
Furthermore, the speaker needed to address why Cleonymus had written the will. The most 
damning argument against the nephews’ case was that Cleonymus had made a will in the first 
place. As the speaker asserted, his uncle could not bear the idea that a man he hated might gain 
control over his property and, even worse, perform his burial rites. In this passage the speaker 
depicted the quarrel between Cleonymus and Deinias as a force that had destroyed the natural 
order of the household. In an ideal Athenian family, Cleonymus ought to have left his estate to 
his natural heirs and trusted that their guardian would manage the property efficiently. Moreover, 
he ought to have confidence that his nephew’s guardian would carry out his funeral rites in 
accordance with custom. I believe the quarrel between the two men would arouse anxieties for 
the jury because it disrupted the everyday performances which defined Athenian family—and 
more critically to my own argument, civic—identity.  
 In his On the Estate of Menecles, Isaeus depicted a quarrel between brothers that 
destroyed Menecles’ estate. The speaker, Menecles’ nephew and his adopted son, sought to 
defend his claim to his adoptive father’s property against the counterclaim brought by Menecles’ 
brother. To attack his opponent, the speaker pointed to the brothers’ ongoing quarrel concerning 
their family property. Before his death, Menecles sought to sell a piece of his land to discharge a 
debt (Isaeus. 2.28). His brother, apparently angry because Menecles had chosen to adopt the 
speaker, claimed a part of the property from Menecles to prevent the sale. Menecles reserved this 
portion of the land for his brother and then sold the remainder to pay off his debt (Isaeus. 2.9). 
Later in arbitration, Menecles’ brother was awarded the portion of land he had claimed, thus 
depriving Menecles of the majority of his own estate. As the speaker exclaimed,  
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Εἰ µὲν γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ὀνόµατός µοι διαφέρεται, καὶ ἀναίνεται εἰ ἐγὼ ἔσοµαι ὑὸς  
Μενεκλέους, πῶς οὐ φθονερός ἐστιν; Εἰ δὲ περὶ χρηµάτων ἐστὶν ὁ  λόγος  
αὐτῷ, ἐπιδειξάτω ὑµῖν ὁποῖον χωρίον ἢ συνοικίαν ἢ οἰκίαν κατέλιπεν ἐκεῖνος, ἃ  
ἐγὼ ἔχω νυνί. Εἰ δὲ µηδὲν τούτων κατέλιπεν, ἃ δ’ ἦν αὐτῷ ὑπόλοιπα… οὗτος  
ἔλαβε ζῶντος ἐκείνου ἔτι, πῶς οὐ περιφανῶς ἐξελέγχεται ἀναιδὴς ὤν;  
But if it is a question of money for him, let him show to you what land or house 
or building that man [Menecles] left behind, which I now possess. But if he left 
none of these things, and the things which remained to him, this man [Menecles’ 
brother] took while that man [Menecles] lived, how is he not clearly proven to be 
a shameless wretch? (Isaeus. 2.27).  
Again, the speaker bolstered his own case by demonstrating the base character of Menecles’ 
brother. Because he was jealous that Menecles had chosen to adopt a son (the speaker) outside of 
his immediate family, Menecles’ brother had subverted Athenian norms by robbing him of the 
majority of his estate. The speaker also argued that, even more egregiously, the brother’s current 
lawsuit was his final step in claiming the entire property and thus robbing the speaker of his own 
right to inherit his father’s estate. Athenian citizens defined themselves in part by their family 
properties.  The speaker characterized the feud between the two brothers as a disruptive force 226
that threatened both Menecles and his adoptive son’s ability to carry out a key performance of 
civic identity and take possession over their family estate.    
 Isaeus often depicted these types of feuds and the terrible effects they had on Athenians’ 
family and civic identities. To return, for a moment, to Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon, the 
speaker explained Philoctemon’s allowing his father to introduce an alien child into their phratry 
by pointing out that Philoctemon and his relatives were afraid of greater quarrels (Isaeus. 6.23). 
He made this argument because he thought the jurors would empathize with Philoctemon and 
would understand that family in-fighting and the fear of its results could drive otherwise 
 In Demosthenes’ Against Eubulides, Euxitheus argued that he was undoubtedly a citizen because he 226
had taken possession of his portion of the family estate (Dem. 57.46). Furthermore, Athenian citizens 
might be disenfranchised if they squandered their inheritance (Aeschin. 1.19-21).
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respectable citizens to undermine Athenian custom. A citizen might be driven to write a will so 
that his estate would not pass into the hands of a bitter enemy. A brother might claim a portion of 
his brother’s property out of spite. In sum, family feuds were feared and avoided at all costs 
because they subverted those daily performances, including the right of inheritance and 
management of the family estate, that were so crucial in defining Athenian citizenship. 
Conclusion 
 In his speech On the Estate of Philoctemon, Isaeus provided a broad overview of the 
anxieties which seemed to trouble his audience of Athenian jurors. First, he touched on the 
disastrous effects of war on the Athenian family. Philoctemon’s death in battle afforded Alce and 
her accomplices the opportunity to rob the senile Euctemon of his property. Isaeus realized, 
however, that Athenian fears were not limited to major catastrophes like war or political unrest. 
The orator focused next on those smaller, everyday disruptions that could have equally 
deleterious effects on the Athenian household. With Callippe, Euctemon’s putative wife, Isaeus 
played on the Athenians’ concern that unscrupulous men might manipulate women’s identities to 
disrupt the everyday performances that defined their civic identity. In Alce, Isaeus created a 
character who was the antithesis of the good Athenian citizen-wife. Rather than protect and 
maintain Euctemon’s household, Alce actively sought to acquire and sell off all of Euctemon’s 
properties. Finally, Isaeus portrayed the vicious family feuds that his audience would realize had 
the potential to divide relatives and threaten family estates.  
 In one interpretation of this speech, Isaeus strung together a series of sensational 
incidents to concoct a true melodrama. I believe, however, that Isaeus tied the fears that are 
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reflected in each episode to an overarching anxiety about disruptions to the Athenian social 
order. In war, the death of a son before his father constituted a rupture in the line of succession 
that could lead to family in-fighting and prolonged court cases. Moreover, if a citizen were taken 
prisoner, he would be prevented from carrying out those duties that defined his civic identity and 
from protecting the citizen status of his family members. In daily life, a woman who manipulated 
her husband into adopting a son, for example, again represented a break in the order of 
inheritance. Athenians were further concerned that a woman might also persuade her husband or 
lover to introduce an illegitimate child to his phratry and deme, a terrible blow to the citizen 
body. A woman like Alce might even set off a feud that could damage intimate relationships and 
jeopardize familial estates. The Athenians’ anxieties suggest that these kinds of daily occurrences 
had the power to undermine the performances that defined Athenian family and civic identity just 
as dramatically as large-scale conflicts and populations shifts.  
 The legal speeches of Isaeus and Demosthenes provide a fresh way of looking at 
Athenian anxieties about establishing and retaining both family and civic identity. We need not 
rely on fragmentary texts and sweeping theories to consider the root causes of these kind of 
fears. Works like Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon provide us with extraordinary details 
about the practical concerns of Athenians who were trying to keep possession of their estates or 
establish their position within their communities. As these speeches indicate, these kinds of 
catastrophes could happen to anyone, and an audience of citizens would particularly empathize 
with an Athenian litigant defending his family and safeguarding his civic rights. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusions: Identification Ancient and Modern 
 When modern scholars examine the Athenian identification process, they often 
emphasize its fundamental differences from our current systems. Take, for example, Scafuro’s 
introduction to her study on identification: “It is a well-known phenomenon of Attic life that no 
central or local archive preserved a written record of the births of polis inhabitants. The absence 
of such a record appears from a modern perspective all the more startling in view of the strict 
requirements for citizenship that were set out in Perikles' famous enactment of 451/0.”   The 227
analyses I have presented of speeches like Euxitheus’ in defense of his identity provide a very 
different perspective, however. The arguments that the Attic orators made in defense of 
challenges to identity reveal far more similarities between the Athenian process and modern 
systems of identity verification, especially the one in place in the United States, than differences. 
Both approaches to identification share fluid requirements for proofs of identity and 
authentications that favor certain citizens over others. Moreover, in each of these systems, both 
documentation and everyday activities confirm identity. While we ought to study the Athenian 
identification process in its own right as an effective mechanism both to establish civic identity 
and to control the citizen body, the challenges faced by Athenians trying to place themselves in 
their culture invite comparisons with the challenges Americans of all stripes face today. 
 Scafuro 1994, 156. 227
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 I can speak to this issue directly. I recently moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
needed to apply for a new driver’s license. I could choose from a range of documents to establish 
my Massachusetts residency and my citizenship.  I needed only to provide the requisite number 228
of documents to prove my identity. Likewise, when the Athenians established their own civic 
identities, they did not have to complete every single performative act associated with 
citizenship. They could choose from a series of performances spread over the political, religious, 
and the everyday. Moreover, the documents I brought to the RMV represented my activities in 
daily life. My apartment lease confirmed that I actually resided in Cambridge. The fact that I live 
in Massachusetts is crucial, not the documentation itself. In a similar vein, Athenians did not 
present their phratrymen and demesmen as witnesses in court to attest only to their formal 
performances of identity. Rituals like the introduction into the phratry and deme symbolized 
citizens’ network of relationships within these groups. The introduction meant nothing, if an 
Athenian did not forge personal connections within these associations.   
 Furthermore, I faced my own scrutiny when I visited my local Registry of Motor 
Vehicles. Fern, the first of three clerks to inspect my pile of papers, told me that the leasing 
agreement I had brought to establish residency was invalid because my name was not listed on 
the same page as the address of my apartment. I argued that this was the only copy of the lease in 
 A person seeking a driver’s license in Massachusetts needs three types of documents: First,“lawful 228
presence documents” confirm legal residency in the United States. A citizen can present either a passport 
or a birth certificate. Second, “social security number documents” establish that the applicant has a valid 
social security number; these might include a social security card or a W-2 form. Finally, one needs 
documents to establish residency in the state. These might include: federal, state, county, city, or town 
issued documents (like a Medicaid statement dated within sixty days or property taxes for the current 
year); bills (including utility bills or a credit card statement dated within sixty years); a lease or mortgage; 
financial-related documents (such as a bank statement or a pay stub dated within sixty days); school-
issued documents (like a school transcript or a tuition bill for the current year); or insurance documents 
(like a home or rental insurance policy for the current year). For more information on the application for a 
Massachusetts Class D Driver’s License, visit: https://www.mass.gov/passenger-class-d-drivers-licenses. 
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my possession. I was juggled between four different clerks, until a senior administrator decided 
that my lease was valid. A far more serious example of citizenship scrutiny in the U.S. involves a 
growing number of Americans in South Texas who hold U.S. birth certificates but have been 
denied passports by the state department. The government claims that between 1950 and 1990 
several physicians and midwives operating in the Rio Grande Valley accepted bribes to forge 
birth certificates for an undetermined number of infants. People who have been in this country 
since birth and have always considered themselves Americans are now faced with challenges to 
their civic status that will require them to find means of proving their citizenship.  I am certain 229
that a man like Euxitheus felt the same anxieties as these Americans do today when he was 
forced to establish facts that were so fundamental to his personhood—that he was a citizen, that 
his parents were citizens, and that he had lived as a citizen his entire life.  
 Finally, both verification systems, ancient and modern, favor certain classes of citizens. 
In facing my own challenges during my visit to the RMV, I had key advantages. Both of my 
parents are employed in state government, and I am familiar with the types of arguments which 
would appeal to Fern and her colleagues. Even if I had been denied registration on that first 
expedition to the RMV, I also have the time, money, and knowledge to acquire other documents 
to establish my residency. As to the scrutiny of citizens in the Rio Grande Valley, certain passport 
applicants whose citizenship has come under question have appealed their cases to the federal 
government. Others who cannot afford the legal fees face deportation proceedings; in some 
extreme circumstances, people who have lived as U.S. citizens their entire lives are effectively 
 Kevin Sieff has reported on this issue over the course of the fall 2018. See his September 13, 2018 229
article in the Washington Post titled, “U.S. is denying passports to Americans along the border, throwing 
their citizenship into question.” Rachel Martin of NPR also interviewed Kevin Sieff on this topic. See her 
August 30, 2018 interview. 
 '199
trapped in Mexico, their passports confiscated at the border.  Likewise, in Classical Athens, 230
litigants like Euxitheus had distinct advantages when they presented their cases. Euxitheus, 
despite his pleas about his family’s poverty during the Peloponnesian War, was evidently wealthy 
enough to hire the famous Demosthenes to write his defense. Moreover, over the course of his 
life, he held offices like the phratrarchy and the demarchy and stood as priest of Heracles (Dem. 
57.23; 57.46; 57.63). 
 In her modern study of the Athenian identification process, Scafuro has framed Athenian 
methods for status verification as a system that arose in the absence of documentation, implying 
that the Athenians would have adopted identification procedures that relied on public records if 
they were available. But as the speeches the Attic orators indicate, the Athenians did have these 
kind of records available to them.  As Euxitheus attested, one of the demarch’s primary duties 231
was to keep an accurate account of the deme’s members in its official register (Dem. 57.26). 
Euxitheus also made clear that the demarch had access to tax records that listed individual 
demesmen (Dem. 57.63). Furthermore, the phratries also kept an official register of their 
members.  Most critically, although Athenian litigants often made reference to these registries 232
in speeches that focused on civic and family identity, no speaker ever pointed to these rolls as 
proof of identity. As I have argued throughout this study, the Athenians did not devise their 
 Again, see Kevin Sieff’s September 13, 2018 Washington Post article. 230
 See Sickinger 1999 for a comprehensive study of public archives in Athens. See also Faraguna 2015 231
for an overview of the importance of writing practices in ancient Greek law. 
 Lambert lists the passages from the Attic orators where the phratry registers are described. See Lam232 -
bert 1993, 176 n.187. 
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identification process in the absence of public records; rather, they preferred proofs of identity 
that relied on witnessed performances over documentary evidence.   
 The goal of this study of Athenian legal speeches has been to examine how the Athenian 
identification process actually functioned. Here too I believe that modern scholars have focused 
too much on political and religious activities as the critical proofs of civic identity in Classical 
Athens. This single focus on participation in formal institutions excludes major actors in the 
identification process, most particularly women. The arguments presented in Athenian legal 
cases belie this narrow focus. If these performances were the most important evidence of civic 
identity, the arguments presented by litigants in the speeches of Demosthenes and Isaeus would 
be almost nonsensical. Consider Euxitheus’ defense once again: If political and religious offices 
truly constituted the “essence of citizenship” (to borrow a phrase from Hansen), why would 
Euxitheus devote just under half of his speech to defending the non-political activities of his 
parents (Dem. 57.18-46)?  Why would he call his uncles to testify that they had given his father 233
Thucritus his portion of the family estate (Dem. 57.19)? Why would he call the Athenian 
Cleinias to testify to his personal relationship with Euxitheus’ mother who acted as his wet-nurse 
(Dem. 57.44)? Moreover, why would Euxitheus bother to defend his mother’s citizenship at all, 
if her identity was determined entirely by her male relatives? If the Athenians felt that only 
formal performances determined civic identity, Euxitheus ought to have called the members of 
his genos, phratry, and deme to testify that he and his father had passed their scrutinies and held 
offices within these associations and then rested his case. The simplest explanation that accounts 
for all of the evidence presented in the speeches of the Attic orators is that the Athenian 
 Hansen 1991, 97.233
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identification process included and even emphasized performative acts completed outside of 
political and religious institutions. This focus on everyday activities and participation in public 
institutions outside of typical political performances (e.g. taking part in lawsuits and arbitrations) 
as proofs of citizenship broadens our view of Athenian society and allows us to appreciate the 
roles that women, metics, and slaves played in establishing and defending civic identity. 
 Like the American system for citizenship verification, the Athenian process had weak 
points, as the Athenians themselves were well aware. For example, Euxitheus claimed that non-
citizens bribed officials to include their names on the deme register (Dem. 57.59). Both 
Euxitheus and the speaker in Isaeus’ On Behalf of Euphiletus argued that their demesmen had 
conspired against them to expel them from their ranks, possibly for political purposes (Dem. 
57.16-17; Isaeus. 12.12). Moreover, Euphiletus’ brother also suggested that childless Athenians 
might be driven to pass a non-citizen as their own child and illegally admit them into their 
phratry and deme (Isaeus. 12.2). These vulnerabilities, however, did not render the Athenian 
identification process non-functional, as scholars like Cohen and Vlassopoulos suggest.  In 234
fact, we have ample evidence that the Athenian system effectively controlled access to the citizen 
body. Chaerestratus’ representative in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Philoctemon established that it 
was difficult for his opponents to fabricate a woman like Callippe as the mother of their two 
wards (Isaeus. 6.64-65). Athenian citizen women, like men, needed to carry out their own set of 
performative acts over the course of their lives to establish their identities. These acts were 
almost impossible to falsify or to circumvent, because everyday performances, like managing the 
 See Cohen 2002, especially Chapter 4. See also Vlassopoulos 2007.234
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household and caring for children, needed to take place repeatedly over the course of a lifetime 
and because they required many witnesses. 
 In this study, I have offered analyses of key Athenian legal speeches with the goal of  
redefining the performances of identity in Classical Athens. In my view, the farmer who 
socialized with his demesmen completed a performance of citizenship as powerful as  
Demosthenes’ delivery of a speech to the assembly. The man who stood as witness in court and 
affirmed his brother’s right to inherit attested to both of their civic identities. The woman who 
kept to the house and cared for her family confirmed her civic status and that of her children. 
These performances defined both individuals and the Athenians as a people. The Attic orators 
then offer a picture of the Athenian identification process as a dynamic range of performances 
that encompassed every aspect of Athenian life and involved every Athenian. 
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